Tackling the Challenges of Information Security Incident Reporting: A Decentralized Approach by Michail, A. & Michail, A.
TACKLING THE CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
INCIDENT REPORTING:  
A DECENTRALIZED APPROACH 
ALEXIS MICHAIL 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
the University of East London for the degree of professional 
doctorate in Information Security 
School of Architecture, Computing & Engineering 
JANUARY 2020 
ii 
 
Abstract 
Information security incident under-reporting is unambiguously a business 
problem, as identified by a variety of sources, such as ENISA (2012), Symantec 
(2016), Newman (2018) and more. This research project identified the 
underlying issues that cause this problem and proposed a solution, in the form 
of an innovative artefact, which confronts a number of these issues. 
 
This research project was conducted according to the requirements of the 
Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM) by Peffers et al (2007). The 
research question set at the beginning of this research project, probed the 
feasible formation of an incident reporting solution, which would increase the 
motivational level of users towards the reporting of incidents, by utilizing the 
positive features offered by existing solutions, on one hand, but also by 
providing added value to the users, on the other. The comprehensive literature 
review chapter set the stage, and identified the reasons for incident under-
reporting, while also evaluating the existing solutions and determining their 
advantages and disadvantages. The objectives of the proposed artefact were 
then set, and the artefact was designed and developed. The output of this 
development endeavour is “IRDA”, the first decentralized incident reporting 
application (DApp), built on “Quorum”, a permissioned blockchain 
implementation of Ethereum. Its effectiveness was demonstrated, when six 
organizations accepted to use the developed artefact and performed a series of 
pre-defined actions, in order to confirm the platform’s intended functionality. The 
platform was also evaluated using Venable et al’s (2012) evaluation framework 
for DSR projects. 
 
This research project contributes to knowledge in various ways. It investigates 
blockchain and incident reporting, two domains which have not been 
extensively examined and the available literature is rather limited. Furthermore, 
it also identifies, compares, and evaluates the conventional, reporting platforms, 
available, up to date. In line with previous findings (e.g Humphrey, 2017), it also 
confirms the lack of standard taxonomies for information security incidents. This 
work also contributes by creating a functional, practical artefact in the 
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blockchain domain, a domain where, according to Taylor et al (2019), most 
studies are either experimental proposals, or theoretical concepts, with limited 
practicality in solving real-world problems. Through the evaluation activity, and 
by conducting a series of non-parametric significance tests, it also suggests that 
IRDA can potentially increase the motivational level of users towards the 
reporting of incidents. 
 
This thesis describes an original attempt in utilizing the newly emergent 
blockchain technology, and its inherent characteristics, for addressing those 
concerns which actively contribute to the business problem. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, there is currently no other solution offering similar 
benefits to users/organizations for incident reporting purposes. Through the 
accomplishment of this project’s pre-set objectives, the developed artefact 
provides a positive answer to the research question. The artefact, featuring 
increased anonymity, availability, immutability and transparency levels, as well 
as an overall lower cost, has the potential to increase the motivational level of 
organizations towards the reporting of incidents, thus improving the currently 
dismaying statistics of incident under-reporting.  
 
The structure of this document follows the flow of activities described in the 
DSRM by Peffers et al (2007), while also borrowing some elements out of the 
nominal structure of an empirical research process, including the literature 
review chapter, the description of the selected research methodology, as well 
as the “discussion and conclusion” chapter.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Information and communication technologies are facing the trend of larger 
connectivity and increased integration, and although various security controls 
exist, and usually are in place, to protect against information security incidents, 
such incidents still occur (Line & Albrechtsen, 2016). Longer than a decade ago, 
Finn et al (2007, p.409) noticed “a substantial increase in information security 
incidents”, with a quasi-exponential increase in the total number of incidents, 
according to the report of the CERT Coordination Center. As technology 
continuously evolves and expands, so do cyber threats and incidents, with the 
numbers getting progressively worse. According to Gemalto’s Breach Level 
Index Report (2018), during only the first six months of 2018, 3.3 billion data 
records, around the globe, have already been exposed. According to the same 
source, that counts for a 72 percent increase in stolen, lost or compromised 
records, when compared to the same period, in 2017. In fact, Gemalto 
estimates that a total number of 15 billion records (at the time of writing) have 
been exposed since 2013, with an astounding number of 75 records being 
exposed per second. Cheng et al (2017) provide some examples of “major 
enterprise data leak incidents in recent years”, with the “Yahoo” breach in 2014 
topping the list (500 million records stolen with an estimated cost of $350 
million), followed by the 2013 “Adobe” breach (152 million records – cost of 
$714 million) and the 2013 “Target” breach (110 million records - $252 million). 
Other high-profile incidents involve “JPMorgan” (2014 - 252 million records), 
“Adult Friend Finder” (2016 - 412 million records) and even more recently the 
2018 “Marriott” hotel chain breach, with an estimated number of 500 million 
records exposed (Armerding, 2018). 
 
It is obvious that in the interconnected world we are now living in, organizations 
around the globe face millions of security threats on a constant basis. In order 
to adequately deal with these threats, many organizations have developed 
various security incident management procedures. A key element of these 
procedures is incident reporting – which occurs right after the initial incident 
identification and verification and usually happens through the utilization of an 
internal (within the organization) or external (relevant regulatory bodies and 
authorities) reporting platform, where incidents are recorded for further analysis 
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and consequent actions. This approach, however, does not seem very 
appealing to organizations, for various reasons, which are presented in the next 
sections of this chapter.  
 
1.1. Information Security Incident Reporting 
Information Security Incident reporting can simply be described as the process 
of notifying either a user, an entity (e.g. an organization), a group of entities 
and/or an authoritative body, about a security incident which has occurred. 
According to NIST’s Special Publication 800-61 (2012, p.69), a security incident 
can be described as “the violation of an explicit or implied security policy”. The 
Publication provides some examples of such incidents, such as attempts for 
unauthorized access to systems or data, unplanned disruptions or denial of 
service attacks, unauthorized processing of data, or unauthorized changes to 
hardware and/or software. 
 
As Gordon et al (2003) point out, “one desirable way of supplementing the 
technical solutions to security problems is for organizations to share information 
related to computer security breaches, as well as to unsuccessful breach 
attempts”. This sharing of information - according again to the authors – is 
useful for preventing, detecting and correcting security breaches, by helping 
organizations from falling victims to security breaches experienced by other 
organizations. Such information helps organizations respond more quickly with 
focused remedies, should an actual breach occur (Gordon et al, 2003). 
Furthermore, according to ENISA (2013), the benefits of incident reporting are 
both well-known and widely supported, and include -among others - 
“information sharing, the dissemination of lessons learnt and experience 
exchange, identification of root causes and mitigation techniques, as well as 
data trend analysis”. 
 
Because of the presumed benefits of information sharing, various governments 
have initiated actions toward developing security-based information sharing 
organizations, such as the CERT Coordination Centres, INFRAGARD, 
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Information Sharing Analysis Centres (ISAC), Secret Service Electron Crimes 
Task Forces, and Chief Security Officers Round Tables (Gordon et al, 2003). In 
a more recent paper, Gordon et al (2015) also demonstrated that information 
sharing can reduce the uncertainty associated with cybersecurity investments in 
private sector firms, and thus reduce the tendency to underinvest in 
cybersecurity activities. 
 
In today’s digital societies, responding to security incidents is becoming 
increasingly imperative in business, while the effects of a breach can be very 
destructive to an organization (Grispos et al, 2017). Line & Albrechtsen (2016) 
state, that Information security management is a relatively young field of both 
practice and research, and that an efficient incident management process – the 
ability to appropriately prepare for, and respond to, information security 
incidents – is important to maintain the functioning of systems. In fact, the 
European Commission (through efforts initiated by the European Union Agency 
for Network and Information Security - ENISA) considers incident reporting so 
important, that it has regulated and mandated incident reporting for various 
segments within Europe, such as the telecom sector (through the “Art. 13a 
Telecom Framework Directive”), the trust service providers (through the “Art. 19 
eIDAS regulation”) and the digital service providers (through the “Art. 16-4 NIS 
Directive”). It is therefore now illegal for these entities not to report information 
security incidents to the specified authorities. 
 
According to the International Standard 27035 (ISO/IEC 27035:2011, 2011), an 
information security incident management process has 4 major phases: prior 
preparations, response to an incident, post-incident evaluations and 
improvements. The Standard also denotes that organizations can benefit from 
having an adequate incident management process, by reducing the number of 
incidents, improving the focus and prioritization of security activities, and 
improving their risk assessment efforts and overall information security level. 
The incident reporting procedure falls within the 2nd phase, as part of the 
incident response phase. Gonzalez (2005) views information security reporting 
as a quality improvement process that is essential to reduce incidents.  
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According to Sveen et al (2007), information security incidents arise from many 
sources, such as software, hardware and configuration errors, or inadequate 
physical security which allows external attackers and/or malicious insiders to 
attack the system. They go on mentioning that the reporting of incidents allows 
them to be investigated and learned from, and that this knowledge can be used 
to avoid such incidents in the future, by putting into place adequate technical 
and organizational countermeasures.  Furthermore, according to NIST’s 
Incident Handling Guide 800-61 (2012), information sharing is the most 
important aspect of incident response coordination, where different 
organizations share threat, attack, and vulnerability information with each other, 
so that each organization’s knowledge can benefit the other. This is both 
necessary and mutually beneficial, since the same threats and attacks often 
affect a multitude of organizations. 
 
1.2. Existing incident reporting platforms 
The various, available, reporting tools, focus on incidents which are caused by 
faults, failures or malicious activity. Reporting platforms are being used in a 
variety of business domains; examples include platforms being utilized as IT 
helpdesk/bug tracking platforms by IT departments, as security reporting 
platforms by information security departments, as well as safety reporting 
platforms, by health and safety organizational departments. In many cases 
safety and security are interrelated, and there are similarities between safety 
and information security reporting systems, as both attempt to reduce risk by 
learning from incidents (Sveen et al. 2007). A search for identifying incident 
management/reporting platforms/software available through the web, indicates 
a far greater amount of available platforms/software related to 
reporting/managing “safety” incidents (i.e. workplace health & safety, personnel 
injuries, facilities maintenance disruption and generally incidents directly related 
to occupational health and safety agencies) rather than “security” incidents (i.e. 
information security incidents). It therefore comes as no surprise that both 
Schneier (2011) and Reed-Mohn (2007), when comparing current practices in 
information security reporting systems against those in the healthcare, aviation, 
and rail industries, concluded that the quality of practices in information security 
reporting systems “did not match those of their safety-critical equivalents”. 
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Furthermore, Gonzalez (2005) examined the successful implementation of 
incident reporting programs in another sector – aviation - and then suggested 
an equivalent model for information security purposes. 
Information Security incident reporting has traditionally occurred through ad hoc 
methods, such as email, instant messaging clients, and phone (NIST, 2012). 
According to the same source, this type of reporting usually relies on an 
individual’s connections with employees in incident response teams of partner 
organizations, and tends to be largely unstandardized, in terms of what 
information is communicated and how that communication occurs. As an 
alternative, various reporting platforms (software) have been created and 
became available in the market, which can be used for reporting internally 
within an organization, or externally, with third parties. They are utilized by 
national CERTs and various Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISAC) 
globally, in both the public and private sector. As an example, the UK National 
CERT uses the “Threatvine information sharing platform”, which is designed to 
“enable communication between CERTs and their Competent Authorities and to 
ensure resilience across the wider supply chain” (Threatvine, 2018, p.2). Other 
examples of platforms with similar functionality include “LogicManager’s 
Security Incident Management Software”, “D3 Security incident response 
platform”, “Resolver’s Incident Management Software”, “Omnigo’s Incident 
Reporting Software” and “OTRS’ STORM software”. 
 
At this point, it is important to differentiate between “incident reporting" and 
“incident responding” software/platforms. Incident “responding” platforms are 
different from incident “reporting” platforms and are out of scope of this research 
project. These platforms usually utilize some sort of automated incident 
response software, with automatic correlation of events and alerts (from across 
the organizational environment) and automatic or semi-automatic triaging, 
investigation and remedy actions. Incident “reporting” platforms, on the other 
hand, are utilized purely for reporting purposes and are thus within scope. 
 
The core functionality of reporting platforms is essentially the same; participants 
gain access to a centralized platform (database), where they can view and/or 
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report incidents. Information is stored in a centralized database (of the platform 
provider), while the service can be installed either on premise or on a 
public/private cloud. Access to the reporting platforms is usually possible 
through a web-based interface, while a few platforms have also developed 
separate versions for mobile clients. The typical user interface contains a 
homepage (with latest incidents, alerts and news) a support page and/or forum 
(some platforms also utilize a community forum and/or chat functionality for 
participant conversations), a profile page for each member (some platforms 
even offer social-networking-like functionality, such as following a member, 
updating your status, adding skills to your profile and giving out endorsements), 
and the ability to create and share an incident report, and/or search/browse 
through the already submitted incidents. Submitted incidents are usually ranked 
(by users who submit them) according to their severity (or risk ranking) and their 
visibility (some members may restrict access to other members of the same 
platform – e.g. a user may submit an incident only visible within his/her own 
company or only visible to sector-specific institutions which are members of the 
platform). When creating a new report, users can input various details of the 
incident, such as its category (e.g. phishing, Denial of Service attack, malware 
etc.), the incident’s details (e.g. date, scope, duration, affected systems, modus 
operandi and various other technical details) and also upload attachments, such 
as text files, videos or photographs.  
 
1.3. The causal problem and research question 
Although most organizations are compelled by various regulations to report 
security incidents to relevant bodies and authorities (e.g. PSD2 for payment 
incidents in financial institutions, NIS directive for reporting incidents from 
critical infrastructure providers, GDPR reporting for personal data breaches, 
companies reporting a cyber-crime to the Police and so on) it seems that only a 
small percentage of incidents are actually being reported. According to the IOD 
& Barclays Policy report (2016), only 28% of cyberattacks against businesses 
were reported to the police. The Internet Security Threat Report by Symantec 
(2016) mentions that the number of companies that refused to report the scope 
of a data breach jumped by 85 percent, compared to the previous year. The US 
Securities & Exchanges Commission reported that nearly 65% of affected public 
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companies did not report cybersecurity breaches to the SEC, between 2011-
2017 (Newman, 2018). Since 2011, when the S.E.C. issued its initial cyber 
guidance, only 106 companies have reported incidents to the S.E.C. But during 
that same period, there were 4,732 cyberattacks on American businesses, 
researchers for the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse found (Newman, 2018).  
It is evident that organizations hesitate to report security incidents. This 
happens for a variety of reasons, as companies may not want to reveal the 
damage they've suffered, due to concerns about possibly scaring off potential or 
existing customers (reputation), damaging their stock value, incurring potential 
legal liabilities, because of the lack of knowledge or internal policies to properly 
recognize or deal with attacks, or even because employees intentionally 
conceal information security incidents (Kaspersky, 2017). PAC & Telefonica 
(2015, p.17), conducted a survey among 200 decision-makers in large 
organizations in the UK, France and Germany, and found out - among other – 
that the top organizational issue, when responding to cyber incidents, was 
dealing with “customer concerns (in response to media attention given to high-
profile breaches)”, as “protecting a firm's reputation and brand image with its 
customers is of primary importance, since it directly affects sales, as well as 
competitors’ positioning”. Another survey from SentinelOne (2016) revealed that 
although 48% of the 500 organizations surveyed, worldwide, had suffered a 
ransomware attack (during the past year), just 54% of respondents had 
reported the incident(s) to law enforcement, and just 48% notified authorities 
and/or regulators. 
 
Recent history justifies the concerns over reporting. Nesmith (2018) lists some 
infamous top-level resignations caused by major data breaches, such as the 
Target’s CEO in 2014, Ashley Madison’s CEO in 2015, Sony Picture’s co-
chairman, again, in 2015 and Equifax’ CEO in 2017. In short, it seems there is a 
tendency to point the finger at the CEO after a data breach, something which 
does not encourage CEOs to report cyber security incidents. As Nesmith (2018) 
points out, with data breaches making the news on a nearly daily basis, the 
days of CEOs not sharing the blame are gone - it is no longer the case that the 
CIO or CISO of the company is solely the one to blame. The report mentioned 
earlier by Ipsos MORI and the University of Portsmouth (2017), stated a few 
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other reasons for not reporting incidents, such as businesses stating that 
“breach was not significant enough” (58%), that businesses were not aware of 
whom to report it to (16%) and that reporting “won’t make a difference” (10%). 
 
Gonzalez (2005) notes that there should be little doubt about the need to 
improve reporting of cyber security data/incidents, followed by analysis and 
sharing of insights, and that the numerous Computer Emergency Teams 
(CERTs) and Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) around 
the world have established various cyber security reporting systems. However, 
he goes on, nearly two decades after their emergence, the CERT Coordination 
Centre, acknowledges that systematically collected data on cyber-attacks is not 
generally available. He states that this often happens because of fear for bad 
publicity. Even when detailed data are eventually shared, in most cases 
restricted use agreements hamper their availability to the research community. 
Even between state-members of the EU, there is still little exchange of 
information about breaches, between different national authorities (ENISA, 
2012). 
It is obvious that organizations fear about their reputation, when confronted with 
a security incident. Apart from reputational concerns, traditional reporting 
platforms and centralized databases also suffer from other concerns, such as 
non-constant availability (100% availability is never guaranteed) and the fact 
that anybody with sufficient access to the platform (e.g. a malicious system 
administrator) can destroy/corrupt or alter the data within. Furthermore, 
because of their centralized nature and sensitive content, reporting platforms 
require major investments for ensuring their security (both physical and 
electronic). This cost, along with all other costs associated with a centralized 
database (i.e. need for increasing storage space, disaster recovery/business 
continuity arrangements and other) is, of course, ultimately passed on to the 
platform’s subscribers. 
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1.3.1. Research question 
The identified limitations of the traditional information security incident reporting 
platforms, lead to the forming of the following research question: 
 
Is there a way to create an innovative information security incident 
reporting solution, which will utilize the positive features offered by 
existing solutions, but will also provide added value to users, in order to 
increase their level of motivation towards the reporting of incidents? 
 
1.3.2. Research purpose and scope 
The purpose and scope of this research can be summarized as follows: 
o Identify and evaluate existing information security incident reporting 
schemes and solutions 
o Evaluate the use of blockchain technology as a resolution towards the 
inherent problems of existing reporting solutions 
o Design, develop and evaluate an incident reporting solution, which 
provides added value to users, and increases their level of motivation 
towards the reporting of information security incidents.  
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1.4. Research motivation 
This research was driven by various motivations: 
 
o The very low numbers of information security incident reporting 
Although virtually everyone agrees that information security incident reporting is 
beneficial to organizations (NIST, 2012; Gordon et al, 2003; ENISA, 2013; 
Gordon et al, 2015; Line & Albrechtsen, 2016; Gonzalez, 2005), reporting 
statistics show that very few incidents are actually being reported (IOD & 
Barclays Policy report, 2016; Symantec, 2016; Newman, 2018; Ipsos MORI, 
2017; SentinelOne, 2016; ENISA, 2012). Proposing a solution for potentially 
increasing the reporting numbers is a serious motivation for this research. 
 
o The excitement of potentially utilizing a new/recent technology for 
producing a solution 
Blockchain technology has the potential of impacting all sectors and layers of 
society, in a multitude of combined ways – it is disrupting society by enabling 
new kinds of disintermediated digital platforms, while also improving efficiency 
over existing structures, by removing the need for actively intermediated data-
synchronization and concurrency control (Mattila, 2016). Both developers and 
researchers have become aware of the capabilities of this new technology and 
are exploring various applications across a vast array of sectors (Christidis and 
Devetsikiotis, 2016). Zhao et al (2016) argue that blockchain technology is 
becoming “increasingly relevant”, while a recent global business survey from 
IBM (2017) indicated that 33% of C-suite executives surveyed, were 
considering, or have already been actively engaged with blockchain (IBM, 
2017). 
Utilizing, therefore, blockchain technology in order to propose a potential 
solution to the existing problem of security incidents under-reporting, is an 
exciting prospect. 
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o The preliminary interest of the CYCSO for utilizing such as solution 
It is evident that developing such a solution would be useless, if organizations 
themselves would not be interested in utilizing it. Therefore, and in order to 
identify potential (preliminary) interest for such a solution from the industry, a 
request was sent to the Cyprus Cyber Security Organization (CYCSO – not for 
profit), which operates under the auspices of the Cyprus Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (CCCI Cyprus) and has access to thousands of Cypriot 
enterprises. According to its website, CyCSO is “a private initiative led by the 
Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCCI) and the participation of the 
Cyprus Institute of Neuroscience and Technology”. Its aims are to create a 
“cyber-security ecosystem to be linked to the European ecosystem, in 
coordination with the European Cyber Security Organisation – ECSO”, as well 
as to develop “an innovative and dynamic cyber-security industry in Cyprus” 
(CYCSO, 2018). 
 
CYCSO agreed in including three questions for this matter, as part of a wide-
ranging cyber-readiness survey they were planning to send-out to their 
organizational members. They also expressed their initial interest in using the 
platform – once it was ready – for establishing an Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centre (ISAC) for their organizational members. This survey acted as 
a pilot study, in order to identify signs of any preliminary interest from the 
Cypriot businesses, in utilizing such a solution. 
The three questions (the survey was comprised of 16 questions, in total) 
included in the survey were the following: 
 
Q14) How would you describe your incident-response capability (i.e. to take a 
structured approach in handling a security-related incident, once such has 
occurred)? 
 
“Q15) Recently, a National Computer Security Incident Response Team 
(CSIRT) has been created in Cyprus, to cater, however, only for the needs of 
Critical Infrastructure owners/administrators, banks and ISPs. The CSIRT’s aim 
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is to ensure the existence of (at least) a minimum level of security, by 
implementing proactive and reactive security services to reduce the risks of 
network information and cyber security incidents, as well as respond to such 
incidents as and when they occur. Do you think a similar initiative, which would 
cover the needs of the whole private sector would be beneficial for your 
organization?” 
 
“Q16) Although a great variety organization are compelled by various 
regulations to report security incidents to relevant bodies and authorities (i.e. 
PSD2 for payment incidents in financial institutions, NIS directive for reporting 
incidents from critical infrastructure providers, reporting because of GDPR, 
companies reporting a cyber-crime to the Police and so on) a very small 
percentage of incidents are actually reported. This happens for a variety of 
reasons, as companies may not want to reveal the damage they've suffered 
due to concerns about possibly scaring off potential or existing customers 
(reputation), damaging their stock value, or incurring potential legal liabilities or 
even because companies do not have the knowledge or internal policies to 
properly recognize or deal with attacks. Would you be interested in a solution 
which would allow your organization to submit security incidents in an 
anonymous fashion enabling both governmental, regulatory & supervisory 
authorities as well as individual organizations to have a greater picture of the 
attack landscape based on historical and current trends? Such a solution will 
not rely on a central managing authority (thus no dependence on a single 
platform/database/authority and no legal liabilities applicable whatsoever) and 
would enable your organization to have a clear, real-time view of the security 
incidents happening in organizations throughout Cyprus.” 
 
The (electronic) survey was sent to about 10,000 Cypriot businesses, of all 
sectors and sizes, on the 27th of August of 2018, with no set deadline for 
responses. Due to the fact that no response deadline had been set and 
because of the time-limitations of this research, CYCSO was specifically asked 
to provide the results of the first one hundred (100) respondents. The results - 
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as these were provided by CYCSO - on the 15th of February of 2019 - were the 
following: 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Q14 of CYCSO Cyber-readiness survey 
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Figure 1.2. Q15 of CYCSO Cyber-readiness survey 
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Figure 1.3. Q16 of CYCSO Cyber-readiness survey 
 
These preliminary results unveil some interesting assumptions about the 
Cypriot business entities. Just 21% of the participants rated their incident-
response capability (Q14) as “mature” (20%) or “excellent” (1%), with the vast 
majority (74%) of the respondents describing their capability as either “average” 
(40%) or “immature” (34%). 
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However, when it comes to the question of whether the private sector would 
benefit from an incident-response scheme, similar to the one employed by the 
national CSIRT (Q15), the vast majority of respondents expressed a positive 
opinion (73%), while 24% of the respondents were skeptical about such an 
initiative (21% answered “maybe” and 3% answered “I don’t know”) and just 2% 
expressed a negative opinion. 
 
Furthermore, when the issue of security incidents under-reporting was brought 
up and the potential of having an anonymous-reporting solution, with no 
reliance on a central authority (Q16), the vast majority were - again - positive 
(69%), with a further 18% of the participants answering “Maybe”, a 10% 
answering “I don’t know” and just a 2% expressing a definite negative opinion. 
 
Although the aforementioned descriptive statistics cannot in any way lead to the 
forming of definite conclusions, they do provide an indication of a preliminary 
interest from the Cypriot businesses in utilizing such a solution. In addition, the 
fact that the Cyprus Cyber Security Organization has expressed its interest (as 
an authority) in using this decentralized platform for establishing an ISAC for its 
members, can also be considered as a strong motivation. 
 
o Academic requirement 
This research counts towards the partial fulfilment of the requirements of the 
University of East London, for the degree of “Professional Doctorate in 
Information Security”. 
 
1.5. Research approach and structure 
This research follows a methodology/framework developed by Peffers et al 
(2007), named “Design Science Research Methodology (DSRM)”. The 
framework includes 6 “activities”, which were undertaken sequentially: 
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Activity 1 →  Problem identification and motivation 
Activity 2 → Define the objectives for a solution 
Activity 3 → Design and development 
Activity 4 → Demonstration 
Activity 5 → Evaluation 
Activity 6 → Communication 
 
The following table provides an overview of the activities undertaken as part of 
this research, along with a short description and concurrent association with this 
research’s chapters:  
 
Activity 
no. 
 
Title Description Pertinence Relevant 
Chapters 
1 Problem 
identification 
and motivation 
Define the specific 
research problem 
and justify the value 
of a solution 
During this activity the 
problem of the traditional 
security reporting platforms 
were analysed, and the 
value of the decentralized 
solution was discussed. 
 
1,2 
2 Define the 
objectives for a 
solution 
Infer the objectives of 
a solution from the 
problem definition 
and knowledge of 
what is possible and 
feasible 
 
During this activity the 
objectives of the 
decentralized solution were 
inferred rationally from the 
problem specification. 
4 
3 Design and 
development 
Create the artefact. 
Such artefacts are 
potentially constructs, 
models, methods, or 
instantiations or new 
properties of 
technical, social, 
During this activity the 
reporting platform’s desired 
functionality and 
architecture were 
determined and the platform 
was developed. 
5 
18 
 
and/or informational 
resources 
 
4 Demonstration Demonstrate the use 
of the artifact to solve 
one or more 
instances of the 
problem 
During this activity a proof 
of concept of the reporting 
platform was executed with 
the participation of a small 
number of organizations. 
 
6 
5 Evaluation Observe and 
measure how well 
the artifact supports a 
solution to the 
problem 
During this activity the 
actual observed results 
from the use of the 
reporting platform were 
compared to the initial 
objectives of the proposed 
solution. In addition, the 
platform was evaluated by 
external parties.  
 
7 
6 Communication Communicate the 
problem and its 
importance, the 
artefact, its utility and 
novelty, the rigor of 
its design, and its 
effectiveness to 
researchers and 
other relevant 
audiences, such as 
practicing 
professionals, when 
appropriate 
During this activity the 
aforementioned activities 
were documented. The 
structure of the document 
followed the flow of the 
DSRM activities and also 
utilized some elements out 
of the nominal structure of 
an empirical research 
process, including the 
“literature review”, “research 
methodology” and 
“discussion and conclusion” 
chapters.  
 
1-8 
 
Table 1.1. Research approach and structure 
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1.6. Related work 
The comprehensive literature review (chapter two) identified a limited amount of 
literature directly relevant to information security incident reporting and 
blockchain. Graf & King (2018), used a Blockchain smart contract technique to 
provide an automated trusted system for incident management workflow, that 
allows automatic acquisition, classification and enrichment of incident data. 
Their work, however, is focused on developing a solution that could replace 
human input, by facilitating automatic cyber incident classification, in order to 
enable analysts to focus on other tasks. Other examples include Blockchain-
based Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems - for 
storing and accessing information security events - utilized by multiple devices, 
within the broader concept of the Internet of Things (Mesa et al, 2019; 
Miloslavskaya & Tolstoy, 2019) as well as a blockchain-based risk and 
information system control framework, able to register risk registration data on 
the ledger, thus ensuring traceability and irreversibility of entries (Ma et al, 
2018).  
The most directly relevant work regarding incident reporting and blockchain was 
published by Adebayo et al (2019), who propose a theoretical framework for 
public information sharing, based on blockchain. This framework describes an 
open blockchain implementation, with no central authority, where any security-
conscious organization could join as a member, and could also include various 
security vendors (e.g. antivirus companies) which, in-turn, could offer applicable 
solutions (e.g. patches) to participating organizations, via a cloud configuration, 
also accessible via the blockchain. As stated above, their work produced a high-
level, theoretical framework and not an actual instantiation. 
 
1.7. Contribution to knowledge 
Information security incident under-reporting is unambiguously a business 
problem, as identified by a variety of sources, such as ENISA (2012), Symantec 
(2016), Newman (2018) and more. This research project identified the 
underlying issues that cause the problem of incident under-reporting. These 
issues include organizations not reporting incidents due to fears related to 
competition, the low chance of prosecution, reputational concerns, the 
20 
 
increased cost related to reporting processes, possible financial penalties and 
reprimands, the low level of organizational IS maturity, as well as burdensome 
regulatory compliance procedures (Koivunen, 2010; Ahmad et al, 2015; Ruefle 
et al, 2014; Choo, 2011; Ahmad et al, 2012, Johnson, 2002; Metzger et al, 
2011; Jaatun et al, 2009; Etzioni, 2014; Humphrey, 2017; Housen-Couriel, 
2018). A solution is proposed, in the form of an innovative artefact, which 
confronts a number of these issues, and more specifically issues related to 
reputational concerns and the increased cost of reporting, by embedding 
specific features in the developed artefact, such as reporting anonymity, within 
a low-cost reporting ecosystem. The developed artefact is the first application 
utilizing a private blockchain for the manual reporting of incidents, through a 
web-accessible reporting platform. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
there is currently no other solution offering similar benefits to 
users/organizations for incident reporting purposes. 
 
In summary, this research project makes the following contributions: 
 
o adds to the literature of two fields which have not been extensively 
studied (incident reporting and blockchain). 
o identifies, compares, and evaluates the existing reporting schemes and 
solutions, with an emphasis in manual reporting platforms. 
o identifies the lack of standard taxonomies for information security 
incidents, in line with previous findings. 
o identifies the blockchain applications currently available in the areas of 
information security, data management and incident reporting.  
o describes the process of designing, developing, and evaluating a 
functional, practical artefact in the blockchain domain, a domain where 
most studies are either experimental proposals, or theoretical concepts, 
with limited practicality in solving real-world problems (Taylor et al, 2019).  
o indicates that the developed solution can potentially increase the 
motivational level of users towards reporting incidents, through a series 
of non-parametric significance tests. 
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1.8. Thesis outline  
The following table provides a short summary of this research’s chapters: 
Chapter 
 
Title Summary 
1 Introduction This chapter introduces the concept of information 
security incident reporting, identifies the causal 
problem and sets out the research question. It 
also describes the research motivation, approach 
and structure while also pointing out the 
previously related work and the contribution to 
knowledge. 
 
2 Background, literature 
review & reporting means 
evaluation 
This chapter provides a comprehensive synopsis 
of literature and background information related to 
information security incident reporting and the 
various aspects of the blockchain technology. It 
also includes an evaluation of the existing incident 
reporting means. 
 
   
3 Research methodology This chapter includes a description of the 
available types of research, the research 
philosophy and paradigms, a description of the 
relevant research methods which could have been 
undertaken to complete this project, as well as the 
specific methodology (Design Science Research – 
DSR) which was eventually selected, along with 
the reasons behind this selection. The chapter 
also includes a synopsis of the six activities 
undertaken during this project (following the 
DSRM process model by Peffers et al (2007)), 
and also discusses research ethics and other 
research considerations. 
 
4 The decentralized 
solution: Objectives 
 
This chapter sets out the objectives of the 
proposed solution, which were directly derived 
from the research question. 
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5 The decentralized 
solution: Design and 
development 
 
This chapter describes the various design and 
development activities that led to the creation of 
the artefact - a private, incident reporting platform, 
based on the Ethereum blockchain technology. 
 
6 The decentralized 
solution: Demonstration  
 
This chapter describes the verification and 
validation activities performed in order to 
demonstrate how the produced artefact provides a 
solution to the defined problem. 
 
7 The decentralized 
solution: Evaluation 
This chapter describes the activities performed to 
evaluate the developed artefact, by utilizing a 
DSR evaluation framework proposed by Venable 
et al (2012).  
 
8 Discussion and 
conclusion 
This chapter provides a summary of the research, 
identifying contribution to knowledge, along with 
various limitations of the proposed solution and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
 
Table 1.2. Thesis outline 
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2. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW & REPORTING 
MEANS EVALUATION  
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents a comprehensive overview of the background literature 
necessary, to examine both information security incident reporting, as a holistic 
process, as well as blockchain technology, in the light of a new technology, 
potentially capable of disrupting traditional business models (Friedlmaier et al, 
2018). The two, aforementioned, domains, constitute the major themes of this 
research topic and the literature map in figure “2.1” portrays the structure upon 
which the literature analysis and evaluation are based. According to Creswell 
(2014), one of the first tasks of a researcher occupied with a new topic, is to 
organize the literature; a literature map can significantly aid this process, by 
breaking down the research topic into major literature topics and sub-topics, 
thus providing a visual summary of the available literature. According to the 
same author, literature maps can be organized in various ways- there is no 
“right” or “wrong” arrangement. Figure “2.1.” displays a hierarchical break-down 
of the two major topics (“Information security incident reporting” and “Blockchain 
technology”) unfolding into their various sub-topics: 
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Figure 2.1. Literature map 
Tackling the challenges of Information Security 
Incident Reporting: A decentralized approach 
Information Security 
incident reporting 
Information Security 
incident  
Types of information 
security incidents 
Financial impact of an 
incident  
Incident reporting in incident 
response’s lifecycle  
Incident reporting: 
scaling the benefits  
Motivation 
for reporting 
De-motivation 
for reporting 
Incident reporting 
means & methods  
Auto vs manual 
reporting 
Reporting platforms 
vs other means 
Evaluation of reporting 
platforms  
Identification of 
platforms 
Comparison of 
platforms 
Review of 
platforms 
Other incident 
reporting related work  
The blockchain 
technology 
How blockchain 
works  
Public, private & 
hybrid blockchains 
Blockchain variety  
Blockchain evolution  
Blockchain 
consensus algorithms  
Blockchain suitability  
Advantages 
of blockchain 
Disadvantages 
of blockchain 
Blockchain 
decision 
models 
Blockchain 
applications  
Blockchain & data 
management 
Blockchain & 
information security 
Blockchain & 
incident reporting 
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2.2. Information Security incident reporting 
Information has become the critical asset in the operation and management of 
virtually all modern organizations (Pipkin, 2000) and is regarded as the resource 
with the highest organizational value (Usmani et al, 2013). Information aids 
organizations to increase their operational efficiency, process automation and 
decision quality. It also helps in reducing response times, minimize costs and/or 
maximize profit (Denning, 1999; Finne, 2000; Abrahams et al, 1995). According 
to Sorrels et al (2008), information incidents can occur for a variety of reasons, 
including external attacks, malicious insiders, natural disaster, accidents, and/or 
equipment failure. Should an incident occur, Grimaila et al (2008), consider 
necessary to notify all parties whose mission is critically dependent upon the 
impacted information resource – and in a timely manner – in order for them to 
take appropriate contingency measures. As previously mentioned, Information 
Security Incident reporting can be described as the procedure of 
notifying/sharing/reporting to either a user, an entity (e.g. an organization), a 
group of entities/users, as well as an authoritative body about a security incident 
which has occurred. Incident reporting can be viewed as a quality improvement 
process for organizations, essential to reduce incidents (Gonzalez, 2005). The 
benefits of this procedure vary: sharing such information can aid organizations 
respond more quickly with focused remedies (Gordon et al, 2003), it can aid 
prevention, detection and correction of potential security breaches (Gordon et 
al, 2003, Sveen et al, 2007), it can enhance the identification of root causes and 
mitigation techniques, it can provide statistics for data trend analysis (ENISA, 
2013), while it can also reduce the uncertainty associated with cybersecurity 
investments (Gordon et al, 2015). NIST (2012, p.45) considers incident 
reporting as the “most important aspect of incident response coordination”. 
 
2.2.1. Information Security Incident 
Many definitions attempt to clarify the meaning of an “information security 
incident”. Probably the simplest of them, is the one given by Condon & Cukier 
(2008, p.72), who describe a security incident as “an event that has been 
verified as attributable to a security failure - as opposed to a hardware failure or 
misinterpretation of data”. Spruit & Gerhardt (1997) describe incidents as an 
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unintended disruption or complication which results in the disability, 
discontinuance or cost to an organization. Even earlier, in 1991, Wack defined a 
computer security incident as “any adverse event whereby some aspect of 
computer security could be threatened; loss of data confidentiality, disruption of 
data or system integrity, or disruption or denial of availability” (Wack, 1991, p.1). 
A security incident can also be described as “a violation (or imminent threat of 
violation) of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard 
security practices” (NIST, 2012; Hansman & Hunt, 2005). Examples of such 
incidents are attempts for unauthorized access to systems or data, unplanned 
disruptions or denial of service attacks, unauthorized processing of data, or 
unauthorized changes to hardware and/or software (NIST, 2012; ISO/IEC 
27001, 2013; ISO/IEC 27035, 2016).  
 
A more formal definition was formed by Stephenson (2004, p.4), who described 
an incident as ‘‘a change of state in a bounded information system from the 
desired state to an undesired state, where the state change is caused by the 
application of a stimulus external to the system’’. In other words, an incident can 
be described as an event that overcomes any preventative controls of an 
organization and inflicts negative changes on its information systems 
(Baskerville et al, 2014).  
 
At this point, it is critical to explicate the difference between an information 
security “event” and an “incident”. According to ISO/IEC 27035 (2016, p2), an 
information security event is “an occurrence indicating a possible breach of 
information security or failure of controls”, whereas an information security 
incident “is one or multiple related and identified information security events that 
meet established criteria and can harm an organization’s assets or compromise 
its operations.” Therefore, a security event does not necessarily transform into 
an incident. Instead, a set of pre-established criteria dictate whether an event 
can be classified as an incident.  
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Information Security incidents can be deliberate or accidental (e.g. caused by a 
human error or a natural phenomenon) and can be triggered by both technical 
and physical means (Kostina et al, 2009). Spruit (1998) points out that security 
incidents often occur due to a concurrence of circumstances and explains that 
individuals may sometimes take decisions or perform actions that initially seem 
correct, but eventually lead to security breaches. According to SANS’ Incident 
Handler’s Handbook (2011, p.2), “an incident is a matter of when, not if, a 
compromise or violation of an organization’s security will occur”. 
 
Back in 1998, Howard & Longstaff, in their effort to develop a common 
language for security incidents, presented the following diagram, in order to 
explain an incident’s taxonomy: 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Computer & network incident taxonomy (Howard & Longstaff, 1998) 
 
The diagram, even though developed as early as in 1998, depicts a practically 
valid impression of an incident’s scope: from the various types of the attackers, 
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to their tools and objectives, as well as their modus operandi. Nevertheless, 
some categories have since been enriched, such as the various types of 
attackers: organizations now face newer threats such as the “insider threat” – a 
very dangerous security threat posed by internal entities of an organization, 
such as a former or a disgruntled employee (Ambre & Shekokar, 2015), or 
attacks caused by “hacktivism” - a digital form of activism that often employs 
hacking skills and tools in order to attack governmental institutions and private 
organizations grounded on a particular idea/belief (Brekine et al, 2019). The 
attackers’ tools and methods have also evolved throughout the years, in 
addition to the various types of new vulnerabilities and potential targets 
introduced in this new era of “social media”, artificial Intelligence”, “machine 
learning”, “big data”, “Internet of Things” and “Blockchain”. 
 
2.2.2. Types of information security incidents 
Historically, researchers have been struggling to reach consensus upon a 
universally accepted list/categories of information security incidents. Icove et al 
(1995) and Cohen (1995 & 1997) presented incident taxonomies - in attempts to 
classify incidents - with terms such as: “Denial of Service attacks”, “Dumpster 
diving”, “Viruses & worms”, “Excess privilege” and many more appearing in their 
classification schemes. However, as stated by Cohen (1995), “a complete list of 
the things that can go wrong with information systems is impossible to create” 
and since “there is potentially an infinite number of different problems that can 
be encountered, any list can only serve a limited purpose”.  Howard & Longstaff 
(1998) also stated, that even assuming that an exhaustive list could indeed be 
developed, the taxonomy would be unmanageably long and difficult to apply. 
According to the same authors, it is also not uncommon to find disagreements 
in many different definitions of security incidents (Howard & Longstaff, 1998). 
Even for popular terms such as “computer virus”, for example, although most 
agree upon the general notion, there is no universally accepted definition 
(Amoroso, 1994). Papers by Neumann & Parker (1989), Cheswick & Bellovin 
(1994), Landwehr et al (1994), Cohen (1995 & 1997), Lindqvist & Johnson 
(1997), Howard & Longstaff (1998), and more recent work by Kiltz et al (2007), 
Zhu et al (2011) and Kacha (2014), are some examples of proposed 
taxonomies regarding information security incidents. 
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The complexity of setting up (and maintaining) a universally accepted 
list/categories of information security incidents has not only been disconcerting 
individual researchers, but organizations and authoritative bodies, as well. The 
amount of different information security incident terms, the amount of different 
taxonomies and the number of different versions of the same taxonomies, have 
all been reported as complications by ENISA (2018), the European Union 
Agency for Network and Information Security. ENISA aims to create a taxonomy 
that can ensure that all European CSIRTS “speak the same language”, 
something which would further facilitate sharing across CSIRTs, as well as 
enable the harmonization of statistics between the CSIRT community (Mattioli & 
Leguesse, 2018). ENISA and the European Computer Security Incident 
Response Team are currently at the stage of developing such a taxonomy 
(ENISA, 2018), which is going to be based on the latest “eCSIRT.net mkVI” 
taxonomy, created by Stikvoort (2015). The eCSIRT.net mkVI” taxonomy is 
currently in use by many European CSIRTs (ENISA, 2018) and is using the 
following classification scheme for security incidents: 
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Table 2.1. eCSIRT.net mkVI Classification Scheme by Stickvoort (2015) 
 
Other classification schemes, with very similar categories and characteristics, 
include, among other, the “Open Threat Taxonomy” by Tarala & Tarala (2015), 
the taxonomy developed by the “MISP threat sharing platform”, with readily 
available machine-tags for incidents (Wagner et al, 2016), the CESNET’s 
simplified “incident taxonomy” (Kacha, 2010) and even an incident taxonomy 
developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA, 2017), regarding major 
incident reporting for its members (i.e. financial organizations) under EU 
Directive 2015/2366 (PSD2).  
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2.2.3. The financial impact of an incident 
In a broader context, Knight & Pretty (1997), while investigating organizational 
catastrophes, showed a direct causal relationship between organizations that 
effectively responded to an incident and successfully recovered from 
catastrophes. Shedden et al (2010) state, that the ability of organizations to 
effectively mitigate incidents, of all kinds, plays a major role in preventing those 
incidents from escalating into a catastrophe. The number of reported incidents 
concerning IT systems keeps rising each year (Ryba etl al, 2009), and these 
incidents are able to inflict staggering financial losses to organizations (Grispos 
et al, 2014). Information Security threats are now a major risk to organizations, 
and Chabinsky (2014) states that information security issues require board-level 
consideration, as they have the same effects with other major business issues. 
Information Security risk mitigation should be treated as a business issue, since 
it has a positive impact on the share price and market position of organizations 
(Von Solms & von Solms, 2005).  
 
Zafar et al. (2012), in a study investigating the impact of an organization publicly 
announcing an information security breach, identified that a security breach 
announcement not only affects the impacted organization, but can also have an 
effect on the wider industry as a whole. The financial impact of security 
breaches has been emphasized by both academic researchers as well as 
practitioners, and ways to combat these increased security incidents in 
organizations are constantly being investigated (Glisson et al.2006). Campbell 
et al (2003), when examining the economic effect of information security 
breaches reported in newspapers on publicly traded US businesses, identified a 
significant negative market reaction for security breaches involving 
unauthorized access to confidential information – but no significant reaction 
when the incident did not involve confidential information. Pirounias et al (2014), 
when investigating the impact of security incidents on a firm’s value, identified a 
negative statistically significant impact of security breaches, with technology 
firms appearing to suffer higher costs from security breaches than non-
technology firms. In the same context, when examining the impact of security 
incidents on the stock value of firms, Yayla & Hu (2011, p.60) identified that 
“pure e-commerce firms experienced higher negative market reactions than 
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traditional firms in the event of a security breach”. Furthermore, when 
investigating security incidents in healthcare organizations, He & Johnson 
(2017) identified that such incidents can have “a negative impact”. In addition, in 
this new era of “social media” we are now living in, Rosati et al (2019, p.1) 
identified that “the use of social media exposure at the time of a data breach 
exacerbates the negative stock price to the announcement”, when analyzing 87 
data breaches from 73 US publicly-traded organizations. In other words, the fact 
that anyone can publicly share an opinion in various social networks nowadays, 
makes things much worse for organizations, following an information security 
incident.  
 
Along the same lines, investigations by Ettredge and Richardson (2003), Garg 
et al. (2003), Cavusoglu et al (2004) and Acquisti et al (2006) found that 
information security breaches lead to significant negative market valuation in 
organizations. Garg et al (2003) even attempted to estimate the average cost of 
an incident of publicly listed companies: they found the cost to be somewhere 
between $17 and $28 million per incident, or 0.5 to 1.0 percent of the 
company’s annual sales. On the contrary, there are some investigations that do 
not find any significant impact in organizations following a security breach, such 
as those by Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) and Kannan et al (2007). Moreover, an 
investigation by Rosati et al (2017) on a sample of 74 data breaches from 2005 
to 2014, even identified “a positive short-term effect of data breach 
announcements on both bid-ask spread and trading volume”, but only 
evidenced on the actual day of the announcement, with “market efficiency 
ensuring a quick return to normal market activity”. A systematic review by 
Spanos & Angelis (2016) analyzing 45 studies on information security impact on 
stock prices, aligns with the above: The majority (75.6%) – but not all - of the 
studies, do, indeed, report statistical significance of the impact of security 
incidents to the stock prices of organizations (Spanos & Angelis, 2016). 
 
It is therefore obvious, that, in most cases, financial consequences to 
organizations can indeed be brought on by an information security incident. 
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2.2.4. Incident reporting in incident response’s lifecycle 
Since attacks frequently compromise valuable business and personal data, it is 
critical for an organization to respond rapidly and efficiently when security 
breaches occur (NIST, 2012) .Incident response, which can also be referred to 
as “incident management” or “incident handling”, refers to the formal, structured 
methods, by which organizations engage “teams” to detect and eradicate 
information security incidents (Wiik et al, 2005). These incident response teams 
are created in an effort to address information security incidents (Killcrece et al., 
2003; Mitropoulos et al, 2006). The objective of a security incident response 
team, according to Mitropoulos et al (2006), is to minimize the damage from an 
incident, while allowing an organization to learn about the root cause of the 
incident and thus prevent its re-occurrence. Jaikumar (2002) even described 
these teams as 'firefighters' within organizations, devoted to the preparation, 
identification, analysis and recovery from security incidents.  
 
A structured incident response procedure allows the organization and 
particularly those handling the incident to “know exactly what to do” (Osborne, 
2001), and is thought to be one of the most important requirements for business 
continuity in an organization (Nowruzi et al, 2012). Whitman & Mattord (2005) 
note, that, in general, when considering the timeline of business continuity, 
incident response is the immediate action taken after a security breach (or 
potential security breach), while disaster recovery and business continuity are 
longer-term concerns. In other words, incident response can be described as 
the considerations and actions undertaken upon the detection of a security 
incident, and the immediate short-term actions taken to reduce the exposure of 
the organization (Shedden et al, 2010). It is a critical process, ensuring that 
organizations have the capability of effectively responding to, recovering from, 
but also learning from, security incidents (Shedden et al, 2010). A structured 
procedure also helps eliminating uncertainty and unnecessary panic from the 
human resources devoted to handling an incident (NIST, 2012). The ultimate 
objective of the incident response procedure is to minimize the effects of a 
successful attack and to ensure an expedient recovery (Wiik et al, 2005). 
Although incidents do not necessarily result in breaches, indeed avoiding that 
incidents eventually result in breaches, is the main reason for having an incident 
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response procedure in place (Bersnmed & Tondel, 2013). Since incident 
response should not be just a reactive process but it should also be proactive, 
in nature (ISO/IEC 27035, 2016), an incident response procedure should take 
all appropriate measures to minimize the risk of an incident materializing in the 
first place (Davis et al, 2006). 
 
There are various schemas/models describing the appropriate phases/steps an 
incident response procedure should follow. NIST (2012), for example, in its 
“Computer Security Incident Handling Guide”, describes four phases in an 
incident’s response life cycle: “Preparation, “Detection & Analysis”, 
“Containment, Eradication & Recovery” and “Post-incident activity”. Similarly, 
ENISA (2010), also includes four phases in its “Good Practice Guide for 
Incident Management”: “Incident Detection”, followed by “Triage”, “Analysis” and 
finally “Incident response”. Six phases are described by the SANS Institute 
(2011) “Incident Handler’s Handbook”, namely: “Preparation”, “Identification”, 
“Containment”, “Eradication”, “Recovery” and “Lessons learned”. Another 
example is the “Information Security Incident management” international 
standard” (ISO/IEC 27035, 2016), which describes five phases in the incident 
response procedure: “Preparation”, “Identification”, “Assessment”, “Response” 
and “Learning”. Mitropoulos et al (2006), also presented a six-phase procedure 
for incident response, as evident in the following figure:  
 
 
Figure 2.3. The incident response procedure (Mitropoulos et al, 2006) 
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It is therefore noticeable that while different organizations/bodies/researchers 
may use slightly different numbering and/or sequencing of phases, the overall 
philosophy behind an “ideal” incident response procedure, ultimately remains 
the same. 
 
As stated by Line and Albrechtsen (2016), the various incident response 
schemas/models have a large number of similarities, with each describing a 
preparation phase and subsequent phases for detection analysis and incident 
response, while also including activities related to “lessons learned”, although 
not all schemas define a separate phase for this activity. Ultimately, these 
models perform the same functions, through a very similar procedure. It is worth 
noting, however, that while other models (such as SANS, NIST etc.) are either 
developed by single organizations or by individual researchers, the ISO/IEC 
standard is based on international consensus (Line & Albrechtsen, 2016). 
Furthermore, Tondel et al (2014), in a systematic review of empirical studies on 
information security incident management, compared the identified studies with 
the ISO standard and concluded that current practices and experiences align 
well with it.   
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The following figure depicts the five phases of the ISO/IEC 27035 standard:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Information security incident response phases (ISO/IEC 27035, 
2016) 
 
According to the standard, the first phase (“Plan and prepare”) runs 
continuously, whereas the following four phases come into play upon the 
occurrence of an incident. “Plan and prepare” phase includes activities such as 
establishing a team, creating a policy and plan, as well as gaining management 
support and creating a culture of incident awareness, in an organization. The 
following phase, “Detection and Reporting”, is triggered upon the occurrence of 
an event, and involves collecting all necessary incident information from the 
internal and external environment, detecting the suspicious activity and its 
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sources, and reporting accordingly, possibly through an incident reporting 
platform or through any other means (e.g. electronic mail or telephone). The 
“Assessment and Decision” phase is the one that follows, where the event 
should be assessed, and the kind of response required should be decided. 
During this phase, a security event could eventually escalate into a security 
incident. The “Responses” phase denotes the necessary actions required to 
contain, resolve and recover from the incident. The last phase, “Lessons 
Learnt”, is the phase where the organization should identify if everything 
eventually worked out “according to plan” and consider ways to improve their 
response procedure and their overall information security posture. These 
improvements should then be fed to the continuously running “Plan and 
Prepare” phase.  
 
It is therefore critical to explicate where “information security reporting” fits 
within the overall incident management lifecycle. The obvious answer is, that 
reporting should be initiated in the “Detection & Reporting” phase - where an 
event, after its detection and validation, should be reported to designated 
internal and external systems and actors. Furthermore – and subject to an 
organization’s reporting protocol – reporting could also be initiated in the 
“Assessment and Decision” phase, after a security event has been effectively 
classified as a security incident. However, incident reporting, as an activity, 
could also be part of the “Lessons learned” phase: After an organization has 
concluded all necessary actions to resolve an incident – it could report a 
detailed description of the actual incident - to all interested parties – which could 
include, among other, a more accurate description of the incident, including its 
name, category and criticality ranking, the attacker’s modus operandi, the 
systems affected and any other relevant information. This report could generally 
re-evaluate all information submitted as part of the initial report, in order to 
support clarity and accuracy of information, among all information-sharing 
parties. This could basically be characterized as a “revisit action”, and could be 
important to perform, as organizations, in the initial stages of an incident, could 
pay less attention to precisely reporting - and describing - an incident 
(especially to external parties), as they would rather focus their efforts towards 
identifying, containing, resolving and recovering from an incident occurring 
38 
 
Incident 
reporting
"Detection 
and 
Reporting" 
phase
"Lessons 
Learnt" phase
within their own organization. The following figure portrays the three phases of 
the ISO 27035 (2016) standard where incident reporting could be incorporated: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Figure 2.5. Incident reporting in the incident management lifecycle of ISO 27035 
 
2.2.5. Incident reporting: Scaling the benefits 
As already mentioned, it seems that organizations commonly find it difficult to 
disseminate information related to security incidents (He and Johnson, 2012; 
Grispos et al., 2015). A general mistrust is usually shown to any outsider who 
wants to obtain data on internal information security issues (Kotulic & Clark, 
2004). The task of information sharing gets even harder, since organizations 
usually do not have a systematic or standardized way of sharing incident-
related information, as identified by He et al (2014), in an empirical study aiming 
to present a template for structuring the organizational lessons learned from 
security incidents. Organizational disclosure decisions are usually shaped by 
various factors, such as information collection and processing costs, regulatory 
and litigation costs, as well as various other economic and reputational factors 
(Meek et al, 1995; Schwartz & Janger, 2006). Having these in mind, should 
organizations ultimately report or not their various security incidents? The 
following sections present the positive and negative aspects of each approach. 
 
“Assessment 
and Decision” 
phase 
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2.2.5.1. Motivation for incident reporting 
According to ISO/IEC 27002 (2013), since information security incidents might 
surpass organizational and national boundaries, there is an increasing need to 
coordinate response and share information about these incidents with external 
organizations. Efficient reporting is considered a major factor, for effective 
information security management in an organization (Ma et al, 2009) and the 
need for information dissemination is created by every incident, both for people 
inside the company, as well as for outside audiences (Coombs & Holladay, 
2012). Information sharing is an important aspect of incident response 
coordination, where different organizations share threat, attack, and 
vulnerability information with each other, so that each organization’s knowledge 
can benefit the other and thus collectively reduce the potential impact of 
incidents (NIST Incident Handling Guide, 2012). According to the same source, 
this is both necessary and mutually beneficial, because the same threats and 
attacks often affect a multitude of organizations. Along the same lines, 
Reynolds & Seeger (2005, p.46) argue that disclosing incident information is an 
essential part of crisis communications and can "reduce and contain harm, 
provide specific information to stakeholders, initiate and enhance recovery, 
manage image and perceptions of blame and responsibility, repair legitimacy, 
generate support and assistance, explain and justify actions, apologize, and 
promote healing, learning, and change". 
 
Information security reporting can be viewed as a quality improvement process 
(Gonzalez, 2005). Among the ability of recognizing an incident, effectively 
reporting it is of paramount value in today’s digital atmosphere (Grispos et al, 
2017). Researchers (Sveen et al, 2005; Khurana et al, 2009) argue that the 
reporting of incidents allows them to be investigated and learned from, and that 
this knowledge can then be used to avoid such incidents occurring in the future, 
by putting into place adequate technical and organizational countermeasures. 
Therefore, overall cyber security posture can be improved by voluntarily sharing 
incident information across industries (Schwartz & Janger, 2006). Furthermore, 
Hausken (2007) argues that when security investments become too costly for 
organizations, the exchange of incident-related information with other business 
entities can generally improve their cyber defense.  
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Regulatory compliance can also act as a major motivation for incident reporting 
(Fitzpatrick & Rubin, 1995). Regulations such as the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), the NIS Directive for critical infrastructure 
providers and the PSD2 Directive for financial institutions, all impose strict 
incident-related reporting requirements for organizations (Housen-Couriel, 
2018). Among complying with regulatory requirements, organizations choose to 
disclose incident information also for other reasons, such as restoring reputation 
in the eyes of the media and value chain, or even for asking for the help of 
supporters (Kaufmann & Kesner, 1994). Kulikova et al (2012) argued in favor of 
voluntary reporting, based on the fact that the vast majority (92%) of security 
incidents in 2011 were discovered by a third party, and thus organizations 
eventually had to deal with the “public embarrassment” caused by the incident. 
Regarding the matter of “restoring public reputation”, Gordon et al (2010) even 
found statistically significant evidence that voluntary disclosures about security 
incidents have a positive effect on the market value of an organization, although 
this can be contentious, as evident in the following section. 
  
2.2.5.2. Demotivation for incident reporting 
Although it seems there are many benefits for reporting incidents (Sveen et al, 
2005; Khurana et al, 2009; Schwartz & Janger, 2006; Hausken, 2007; Ma et al, 
2009; Kulikova et al, 2012; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Gonzalez, 2005; Grispos 
et al, 2017 and more), the reporting statistics convey a different reality. 
According to the IOD & Barclays Policy report (2016), only 28% of cyberattacks 
against businesses were reported to the police. The Internet Security Threat 
Report by Symantec (2016) mentions that the number of companies that 
refused to report the scope of a data breach jumped by 85 percent, compared 
to the previous year.  The US Securities & Exchanges Commission reported 
that nearly 65 percent of affected public companies did not report cybersecurity 
breaches to the SEC, between 2011-2017 (Newman, 2018). Since 2011, when 
the SEC issued its initial cyber guidance, only 106 companies have reported 
incidents to the Commission. But during that same period, there were 4,732 
cyberattacks on American businesses, researchers for the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse found (Newman, 2018). Furthermore, a report by Ipsos MORI 
and the University of Portsmouth (2017), has identified that just over four in ten 
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(43%) UK businesses (survey sample: 1523 UK businesses) reported their most 
disruptive breach outside their organization, and most commonly this was 
reported only to an outsourced cyber security provider (where the reporting 
might be to enable appropriate aid). Only 26% of the most disruptive breaches 
were externally reported to anybody outside of a cyber security provider, with 
the most common places to report the breach being a bank, building society or 
credit card company, followed by the Police at just 19%. Reporting to other 
public sector agencies was identified as very low, with reporting to Action Fraud 
UK being the most common (7%), followed by a few other public sector 
agencies, such as the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) 
and the Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnerships (CISP and CIFAS). 
Even between state-members of the EU, there is still little exchange of 
information about breaches, between different national authorities (ENISA, 
2012).  
 
Sharing information about information security issues is not always as 
straightforward, since sensitive information is involved (Line & Albrechtsen, 
2016). Organizations share a lack of willingness to disseminate incident-related 
information outside the organization (Jaatun et al, 2009; Hove et al, 2014), as 
well as a general lack of openness, when it comes to discussing security 
incidents (Jaatun et al, 2009). A study by Koivunen (2010) identified a 
substantial demand for the incident originators to retain their anonymity 
throughout the reporting process. Furthermore, according to Ahmad et al 
(2015), organizations incline towards purposely excluding ‘outsiders’ from the 
early stages of incident response, in order to prevent “misunderstandings” and 
“premature conclusions”, which may lead to embarrassment. Even within a 
context of a “trusted relationship”, it seems that organizations hesitate to report 
security incidents to other entities, for various reasons, which include negative 
publicity, competition and regulatory compliance (Ruefle et al, 2014). Choo 
(2011) states that organizations under-report due to considering most incidents 
as not being “serious enough”, as well due to concerns regarding adverse 
publicity and low chance of prosecution. According to Kopp et al (2017), even 
when sharing is mandated by a regulation, and government agencies actively 
contribute their own knowledge of cyber incidents for the mutual benefit of 
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participants, private sector actors’ participation may be less than optimal. In 
addition, Humphrey (2017) states that organizations may under-report due to 
their limited IS organizational maturity: they may focus efforts on the immediate 
incident, rather than on the root cause of the problem and they may be resistant 
to change, based on the rigidity of their core beliefs. Furthermore, they may lack 
corporate responsibility, while they could also exhibit a tendency towards 
scapegoating. They could also face dilemmas of contradictory imperatives, such 
as the need for “communication” versus the need for “confidentiality”. 
  
However, reporting issues may originate from within. Humphrey (2017) 
identified that incident under-reporting might occur in organizations because of 
ineffective communications of personnel, as well as due to the difficulty faced by 
employees in understanding complex events. Furthermore, the author states 
that people are often not willing to learn from negative experiences (even if it’s 
for their own benefit), and that human alliances can lead to people “forgiving” 
other colleagues. Low job satisfaction and a high level of stress could also have 
adverse effects on the quality/quantity of reporting (Humphrey, 2017). 
Furthermore, Ahmad et al (2012) identified several reasons which discouraged 
employees from reporting security incidents within an organization. These 
reasons include fear for financial penalties, reprimands and reputational impact, 
as well as burdensome follow-up procedures applied by the regulators. Johnson 
(2002), when proposing barriers that must be addressed for incident reporting to 
be effectively applied in industries, suggested removing the fear of retribution 
from reporting entities, as well as creating an organizational environment which 
encourages reporting, while also isolating the fear of negative media publicity. 
Moreover, other issues also influence the overall effectiveness of the reporting 
process. Metzger et al. (2011) identified that some network administrators did 
not report incidents, either because they “did not know that they should” or 
because they were afraid of the incident’s consequences. Moreover, according 
to Briggs et al (2017, p.5), employees may also hesitate to report incidents due 
to the fear about “being held accountable for the outcome”. Hove and Tårnes 
(2013), while conducting a survey of employees in an organization, identified 
that employees were not sure which incidents to report and to whom, within the 
organization. Moreover, Jaatun et al (2009) identified a “deep sense of mistrust” 
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between network administrators and process control engineers – a fact which is 
distressing, since incident management is collaborative in nature (Tondel et al, 
2014). Cusick and Ma (2010) state that a variety of incidents may be observed 
but not necessarily logged, typically when the incident is considered as “non-
critical”. Along the same lines, Kurowski and Frings (2011) identified that in 
organizations with an active reporting system/platform, just 17 percent of the IT 
Security Managers surveyed admitted that all cases were registered in the 
incident reporting system/platform, with as many as 50 percent of the incidents 
reported just through e-mail or telephone, without being added to the platform.  
 
Bad communications, internal or external, can cause an overall confusion about 
a situation among key audiences, they can initiate rumors and they can even 
have a negative effect on a firm’s shares (Dilenschneider & Hyde, 1985). It 
seems likely that organizations face both internal and external contemplations in 
the overall incident reporting process. However, as Ruefle et al (2014) point out, 
incident reporting is beneficial for organizations and throughout the process of 
incident reporting, it is important for them to properly balance the protection of 
the organization’s identity and providing generalized incident information. This 
will allow the recipients to assess their similarity to the target, perform risk 
analysis, and prioritize defensive actions (Ruefle et al, 2014). 
 
 2.2.6. Incident reporting: Means and methods 
Incident reporting can be accomplished manually or automatically and can 
happen through various means such as telephone, e-mail, reporting 
software/platforms, or through verbal communications (Metzger et al, 2011; 
Grispos, 2017). Manual reporting refers to the manual registration of incidents 
(through any means) by human beings, while automatic reporting does not 
require human interference - it can be accomplished through various automated 
tools, such as antiviruses, firewalls and IDS/IPS systems. It is important to note, 
that automatic reporting is directly linked – and immediately follows - the 
automatic “detection” of incidents, by these various tools, whereas manual 
reporting depends on an individual registering the incident, with information 
probably combined from a variety of sources (which may also include 
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information received from automated tools), but with the incident’s detection and 
identification/validation stage already to have taken place (Schultz, 2007). 
 
2.2.6.1. Automatic vs manual reporting 
As previously mentioned, detection, collection, and reporting of incidents may 
happen manually or automatically (Tondel et al, 2014). When researching 
current practices in information security incident management, Tondel et al 
(2014) described many examples of automatic reporting mechanisms, such as 
reports received from security monitoring systems (IDS/IPS), antivirus software, 
honeypots, log monitoring systems, information security management systems 
and correlation engines, as well as reports occurring from network monitoring 
systems such as firewalls, network flow analysis, and web filtering mechanisms. 
Metzger et al (2011) and Grispos et al (2017) described ways for the manual 
reporting of incidents, which cannot happen without human interaction, and 
involve individuals registering incidents, such as reporting incidents through 
telephone and e-mail, through verbal communication and through software 
implementations, such as various reporting/incident tracking platforms.  
 
In some organizations, the detection and reporting processes of incident 
handling are completely automated (Cusick and Ma, 2010; Metzger et al., 
2011). This is a relatively new concept (Koivunen, 2010) and only became 
available when, in 2007, the Trans-European Research and Education 
Networking Association (TERENA) proposed a machine-readable format for the 
automated reporting of incidents: The Incident Object Description Exchange 
Format (IODEF), an XML-based scheme for representing information security 
incidents commonly exchanged between CSIRTs, currently in its second 
version (Danyliw, 2016). Since then, however, other standards have been 
proposed, by various organizations and bodies, in an attempt to standardize 
automated security information sharing. Examples of these standards include, 
among others, the Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information 
(TAXII), proposed by the US Department of Homeland Security and utilizing the 
STIX language – an XML language specifically used for conveying cyberthreat 
information (Kampanakis, 2014), the Security Content Automation Protocol 
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(SCAP), proposed by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) and the Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework (CVRF), proposed 
by the Industry Consortium for Advancement of Security on the Internet 
(Kampanakis, 2014). These standards enabled the creation of various 
automated information sharing platforms, such as the “Cyber Threat XChange 
(CTX)” platform, the “Open Threat Exchange (OTX)” platform, the “Soltra” 
platform and the “Collaborative Research into Threats (CRITS)” platform 
(Mtsweni et al, 2016). In addition, automatic reporting platforms have been 
developed by national CERTs, such as the “Warden” platform developed by the 
Czech CERT (Bodo & Kouril, 2014), the “AbuseHelper” platform developed by 
the Finnish, Estonian and Belgium CERTs, the “Megatron” platform developed 
by the Swedish CERT and the “n6” platform developed by the Polish CERT 
(Kijewski & Pawliński, P, 2014). 
 
Automation in incident reporting, however, does not come trouble-free and the 
automated tools have their limitations (Tondel et al, 2014). Most of the proposed 
standards use XML, which can be considered a restricting factor for data 
sharing, with concerns focusing on redundancy, storage size, and processing 
(Kampanakis, 2014). Werlinger et al (2010) identified a lack of accuracy in tools, 
with high false positive rates, as a result. In addition, the automated tools’ 
usability is also a concern, with researchers identifying an organizational need 
for often customization/adjustments of these tools (Werlinger et al., 2008, 2010; 
Metzger et al, 2011). Furthermore, information needs to be sanitized before 
automated exchange can take place, while sharing all available security data 
could lead to performance and scaling concerns in organizations (Kampanakis, 
2014). Hove and Tårnes (2013), when researching automated 
monitoring/reporting systems in three organizations, although they did signify 
the potential of tools and automation, they also highlighted the fundamental role 
of users in detecting and reporting abnormal and suspicious system behavior. 
Line (2013), when researching the power automation systems in six large 
distribution system operators, identified that although automated 
detection/reporting systems were in place, in most cases operators relied on 
manual detection/reporting of incidents by the employees. 
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It seems that manual reporting still remains the key in the reporting of incidents, 
despite the recent focus in automatic mechanisms (Werlinger et al, 2010; 
Koivunen, 2010; Metzger et al, 2011; Hove and Tårnes, 2013; Line, 2013). This 
is further supported by a case study conducted by Grispos et al (2015), who 
identified that the majority of security incidents in the organizations they 
surveyed were reported manually, either through e-mails or verbally. In addition, 
Metzger et al (2011) reached similar conclusions: they identified that even when 
automated systems were in place in the organizations they surveyed, the 
majority of incidents were manually reported, by either e-mail or telephone, 
through local systems and service administrators. According to the same 
authors, when they examined various CSIRT operations at the Leibniz 
Supercomputing Centre (LRZ), they identified that the manual reporting process 
was the one most frequently used, and ultimately, the one truly essential. Along 
the same lines, Hove et al (2014) concluded that in organizations, manual 
reporting processes were more popular than automatic ones. These findings, 
however, do not suggest that manual reporting is a panacea for organizations, 
nor that issues cannot still be caused by manual reporting processes. For 
example, manual reporting can still produce false positives: users may 
inadvertently input false data into a reporting form, or even worse, they may 
deliberately select to do so, given the ‘right’ motivation. It is therefore crucial, 
whatever the method (manual or automatic) an organization ultimately utilizes 
for its reporting purposes, that proper security controls are in place (e.g. 
policies, standards and procedures, proper sanitization and scrutinization of 
reports and other). 
  
2.2.6.2. Incident reporting platforms vs other reporting means 
Researchers have indicated a variety of methods that employees use for the 
manual reporting of incidents, such as e-mail, telephone and other verbal 
communications (Metzger et al, 2011 and Grispos et al, 2015, 2017; Hove and 
Tårnes, 2013; Line, 2013 and others). In addition, studies by Ahmad et al 
(2012) and Hove and Tårnes (2013) revealed that in some organizations, 
incidents were reported through existing help desk functions. Furthermore, 
manual incident tracking/reporting platform systems were in use by 
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organizations surveyed in studies by Ahmad et al (2012), Cusick and Ma (2010) 
and Metzger et al (2011). 
 
Communicating incidents though e-mail, telephone or other informal tools might 
become problematic: e-mails could be delivered to the wrong recipients (or not 
delivered at all), telephones might not be answered, and verbal communications 
might be ignored, or even deliberately neglected. The utilization of an incident 
reporting platform, for reporting purposes, is considered of high value to 
organizations: Metzger et al (2011) stated that organizations should use such a 
tool and recommended to collect all data related to the incidents into such a 
system, while Cusick and Ma (2010) praised the use of an incident reporting 
platform for reporting incidents.  
 
An incident reporting platform, with a clean and easy to navigate interface, with 
clear submission instructions and available templates, could probably aid the 
incident reporting capability of an organization. It could eliminate the possibility 
of delivering a report to unauthorized recipients (since the platform’s users 
would be pre-authorized), while it could also enable the possibility of extracting 
statistics and reports, viewing historic trends, and submitting queries in a 
searchable database.  
 
2.2.7. Evaluation of existing reporting platforms 
As mentioned in the “Introduction” chapter of this document, a search for 
identifying incident management/reporting platforms/software available through 
the web, indicates a far greater amount of available platforms/software related 
to reporting/managing “safety” incidents (i.e. workplace health & safety, 
personnel injuries, facilities maintenance disruption and generally incidents 
directly related to occupational health and safety agencies) rather than 
“security” incidents (i.e. information security incidents). There are, of course, 
similarities between safety and security platforms, since in many cases they are 
interrelated (Sveen et al, 2007), however “safety” reporting platforms fall out of 
scope, since they serve a different purpose.    
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Information Security incident reporting has traditionally occurred through ad hoc 
methods, such as email, instant messaging clients, and phone (NIST, 2012). 
According to the same source, this type of reporting usually relies on an 
individual’s connections with employees in incident response teams of partner 
organizations and tends to be largely unstandardized, in terms of what 
information is communicated and how that communication occurs. As an 
alternative, various reporting platforms (software) have been created and 
became available in the market, which can be used for reporting internally, 
within an organization, or externally, with third parties.  
 
2.2.7.1. Identification of existing reporting platforms 
The first step towards evaluating the existing information security incident 
reporting platforms/software currently available, concerned their discovery and 
identification. Therefore, a rigorous search was conducted in both general 
interest databases (i.e. “Google” and “Bing” search engines) and academic 
databases. This rigorous search was necessary, in order to identify as many 
available/accessible reporting platforms as possible, so as to appropriately 
identify, compare and evaluate their various features and characteristics in a 
sufficiently representative degree. Although the search was international in 
scope, only texts in English language were considered. The search was purely 
electronic, no grey literature or hand search was applied. The following table 
summarizes the applicable search criteria: 
Search objective Discover and identify existing security incident 
reporting software/platforms 
Search type Electronic 
Search strings used 
(in multiple combinations) 
“incident”, “report*”, “software”, “platform*”, “information”, 
“security”, “tool*” 
General interest 
databases searched 
Google search engine, Bing search engine 
Academic databases 
searched 
ArXiv, CiteSeerx, DBLP, Proquest, Taylor Francis, Science 
Direct, Semantic Scholar, Wiley Online Library, Elsevier, Google 
Scholar 
General interest database 
search details 
Title and description of each result was examined. In cases of 
insufficient information, the electronic resource was 
accessed/examined 
49 
 
Academic databases 
search details 
Title, abstract and keys/notes of each paper was examined. In 
cases where the abstract provided unclear or insufficient 
information, the whole paper was examined 
Academic resource type Articles and proceedings (not limited to peer-reviewed), reviews, 
books 
Software reporting type Pure incident reporting platform or incident 
response/management platform with integrated reporting 
functionality; Manual and/or automatic reporting functionality 
De-duplication method Manual, non-automated 
Language English 
Creation date Not specified 
 
Table 2.2. Search criteria for identification of reporting platforms 
A total number of 286 unique, reporting platforms/software were identified, 
which belonged to several, different, categories. The following table presents a 
summary of the results: 
Category Examples of platforms Total number of 
software/platforms 
Information Security incident 
reporting platforms (manual 
and automatic) 
Warden (auto), Threatvine 
(manual), MISP (auto & manual), 
CyberCPR (manual), 
LogicManager (manual) 
44 
IT helpdesk functionality/bug 
tracking reporting platforms 
JIRA Service Desk, Pager Duty, 
Victorops, Freshservice, 
ServiceDesk Plus 
89 
Safety incident reporting 
platforms 
Quentic Incident Management 
Software, ProcessMAP Incident 
Management, Safety 
Dashboard, 1st Incident 
Reporting, andSafety Hazard 
and incident 
136 
Incident reporting platforms for 
specific industries 
SitePatterns (construction), 
Alliance (healthcare), I-sight 
(investigations), 3tc Software 
(Fire & rescue services), Datix 
Incident reporting (healthcare) 
17 
 
Table 2.3. Incident Reporting platforms 
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As expected, the information security reporting platforms identified are 
considerably less in numbers, compared to the other categories. However, 
these other categories of reporting platforms are out of the scope of this project, 
since they are not directly relevant to the information security domain. Out of the 
44 information security incident reporting platforms identified, 32 are utilized 
exclusively for the automatic reporting (following the automatic detection) of 
incidents and are also out of scope. The remaining platforms (some of which 
may also support automatic reporting, but also allow for the manual reporting of 
incidents) are presented in the following section. 
 
2.2.7.2. Comparison of existing reporting platforms 
In total, 12 manual reporting platforms were identified: Threatvine, CyberCPR, 
Blackthorn GRC, MISP, LogicManager, D3 Security, Resolver’s Incident 
Management Software, OTRS’ STORM software, TheHive Project, 
MetaIncident, Cherwell Incident Software and SureCloud platform. In order to 
perform a comparison between the platforms, 11 directly comparable features 
of the platforms were evaluated. These were extracted from each platform’s 
published product guide/whitepaper, based on simple inclusion criteria: a 
feature/characteristic was included in the comparison if it appeared in two or 
more of the available guides/whitepapers. The results are presented in the 
following table: 
Name Threatvine 
 
CyberCPR Blackthorn GRC 
Website https://www.surevin
e.com/threatvine/ 
https://www.cybercpr.c
om/ 
https://www.blackthor
n.com/ 
Software type Commercial 
software 
Commercial software Commercial software 
Deployment Cloud or on 
premise 
Cloud or on premise Cloud or on premise 
Guaranteed availability 99.5% 98% Figure not disclosed 
Customer support 
available 
Yes Yes Yes 
Web-browser interface Yes Yes Yes 
Mobile-friendly version 
available 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Automated reporting 
features  
No No No 
Customization possible Yes Yes Yes 
Developer ISO/IEC 
27001 certified 
Yes No No 
Supports anonymous 
submissions 
Yes No No 
Community 
forum/chat/social 
features available 
Yes Only chat available No 
Name MISP LogicManager D3Security 
 
Website https://www.misp-
project.org 
https://www.logicmana
ger.com 
https://d3security.c
om/ 
Software type Open source Commercial software Commercial 
software 
Deployment On premise On premise On premise 
Guaranteed availability N/A N/A N/A 
Customer support 
available 
Limited – community-
based support 
available 
Yes  Yes 
Web-browser interface Yes Yes Yes 
Mobile-friendly version 
available 
No Yes Yes 
Automated reporting 
features  
Yes Yes Yes 
Customization possible Yes Yes Yes 
Developer ISO/IEC 
27001 certified 
No Yes Yes 
Supports anonymous 
submissions 
No No No 
Community 
forum/chat/social 
features available 
Yes No Chat available 
 
 
             Name                             Resolver                 OTRS’ STORM               TheHive 
 
Website https://www.resolver.
com 
https://otrs.com/ https://thehive-
project.org/ 
Software type Commercial software Commercial software Open source 
Deployment Cloud  On premise On premise 
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Guaranteed availability 99.9% N/A N/A 
Customer support 
available 
Yes Yes Limited – 
community-based 
support available 
Web-browser interface Yes Yes Yes 
Mobile-friendly version 
available 
Yes Yes No 
Automated reporting 
features  
Yes No Yes 
Customization possible No Yes Yes 
Developer ISO/IEC 
27001 certified 
Yes No No 
Supports anonymous 
submissions 
No No No 
Community 
forum/chat/social 
features available 
No No No 
Name MetalIncident Cherwell SureCloud 
 
Website https://www.metaco
mpliance.com 
https://www.cherwell.c
om 
https://www.sureclou
d.com/ 
Software type Commercial software Commercial software Commercial 
software 
Deployment On premise On premise Cloud  
Guaranteed availability N/A N/A 95-99% 
Customer support 
available 
Yes Yes Yes 
Web-browser interface Yes Yes Yes 
Mobile-friendly version 
available 
Yes Yes Yes 
Automated reporting 
features  
No No No 
Customization possible No Yes Yes 
Developer ISO/IEC 
27001 certified 
No No Yes 
Supports anonymous 
submissions 
No No No 
Community 
forum/chat/social 
features available 
No No No 
Table 2.4. Comparison of Information security Incident Reporting platforms 
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The core functionality of reporting platforms is essentially the same; participants 
gain access to a platform, where they can view and/or report incidents. 
Information is stored in a centralized database (of the customer or of the 
platform’s provider), while the service can be installed either on premise or on a 
public/private cloud, with some platforms offering both options. Regarding cloud 
deployments, the offered guaranteed availability ranges from 95 to 99.5 per 
cent, while all platforms offer customer support (with various packages/levels). 
Access to the reporting platforms is possible through a web-based interface, 
while most platforms have also developed separate versions for mobile clients. 
In addition to the manual submission of incidents, some platforms offer 
automated reporting features, which can automatically process logs from 
various security tools such as IDS/IPS systems, firewalls and other network 
monitoring mechanisms. At an extra cost, most platform providers are willing to 
customize their software, to fit the customer’s exact environment and needs – 
while customization is certainly possible with the two, available, open-source, 
platforms. About half of the platforms’ developers are certified with the ISO/IEC 
27001 standard, the widely regarded standard for information security, a fact 
which may indicate that their product may be more secure and trust-worthy 
(Hsu et al, 2016). 
 
The typical user interface contains a homepage (with latest incidents, alerts and 
news) a support page and/or forum (some platforms also utilize a community 
forum and/or chat functionality for participant conversations), a profile page for 
each member (some platforms even offer social-networking-like functionality, 
such as following a member, updating your status, adding skills to your profile 
and giving out endorsements), and the ability to create and share an incident 
report or to search/browse through the already submitted incidents. Submitted 
incidents are usually ranked (by users who submit them) according to their 
severity (or risk ranking) and their visibility (some members may restrict access 
to other members of the same platform – e.g. a user may submit an incident 
only visible within his/her own company or only visible to sector-specific 
institutions which are members of the platform). When creating a new report, 
users can input various details of the incident, such as its category (e.g. 
phishing, Denial of Service attack, malware etc.), the incident’s details (e.g. 
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date, scope, duration, affected systems, modus operandi and various other 
technical details) and also upload attachments, such as text files, videos or 
photographs. Regarding anonymity, the “Threatvine” platform is the only 
platform which provides the option of “anonymous” submissions. 
 
2.2.7.3. A review of existing reporting platforms  
This section provides a review of the various features and characteristics of the 
existing information security reporting platforms: 
 
a) Ease of use 
All identified platforms are relatively easy to understand and use. Authenticated 
users can access the web-based platforms through a common web browser 
(with internet connectivity) and interact with relatively simple and straight-
forward GUIs. The interfaces are clear and concise, with most platforms offering 
simple functionality explanations when a user hovers over the interface’s 
various buttons. Users can easily create, modify and delete incidents, as well as 
information related to their personalized profiles (where applicable). The GUIs 
are adequately intuitive: should an organization decide to switch to a new 
platform provider, its users would experience a very similar environment, with 
identical functionality, with maybe some features added or missing, such as 
user forums and social features. The GUIs of all platforms are generally 
consistent, across the different pages/sections of the software. Users can 
access the platforms from a variety of different devices (since the only 
prerequisite is a web browser) and most platforms offer versions of their 
software specifically designed for mobile use - a feature consistent with the 
steep increase in the overall use of mobile devices (Patel et al, 2016).  
 
b) Support  
All commercial platform providers offer initial platform functionality training for 
organizations buying their software, either for free, or at a cost. This is not the 
case for open-source platforms, however, where users are only limited to 
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downloading software manuals. Furthermore, all commercial platforms offer 
technical support to their customers, through on-site visits, telephone, online 
chat and e-mail. The typical support package is limited to office-hours support, 
but in most cases, organizations have the option of upgrading (at an extra cost) 
to an extended-hours support package. Direct technical support is generally not 
an option for open-source platforms, but users of these platforms can submit 
issues for review by the developers and also seek answers to their questions 
through the community forums available. Documentation and various manuals 
are available for both commercial and open-source platforms. 
 
c) Customization 
 Most providers can customize their reporting software according to a 
customer’s specific environment and needs. For commercially available 
software this can be done at a cost, whereas for open-source platforms, 
software modifications can be done by the user himself. Although the standard 
version of software should fit most client needs, customized software might be 
needed for various reasons, such as expanding or decreasing the 
types/categories of incidents, incorporating new features (such as offline 
reporting or social features) and more. 
 
d) Performance (responsiveness and reliability) 
In terms of software responsiveness, the GUIs in most platforms are fast and 
responsive. Although no explicit testing routine was applied, the average load, 
wait and response times are not, in any way, cause for concern - in either cloud 
or on-premise installations. In terms of software reliability, no major software 
run-time errors (faults) were identified, in any of the platforms. Again, although 
no explicit testing routine was applied, the platforms exhibited a failure-free 
operation throughout the course of their initiated demo sessions.  
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e) Scalability 
Due to the limitations imposed by the demo versions of the various platforms, 
software scalability could not be exhaustively tested. It was not possible to add 
multiple users to the platforms and submit multiple incidents, in order to 
examine how the various platforms handle increased traffic/demand, from 
multiple devices. It was also not possible to save a vast number of incidents in 
any platform’s database, in order to test how the software performs under such 
circumstances. However, because of the centralized nature and expandable 
storage capabilities of the platforms’ databases, these are expected to handle 
demand relatively effortlessly. Most platforms state that their reporting software 
is not CPU intensive and some provide metrics (such as CPU, Disk Storage and 
Memory Usage) to detect possible service degradation and take appropriate 
action. Nevertheless, an information security incident reporting platform – in any 
organization/group of organizations, regardless of size – is not theoretically 
expected to yield an enormous data volume, capable of deteriorating the 
software’s performance.   
 
f) Availability 
The deployment options for the reporting platforms include cloud or on-premise 
installations. Some platforms offer both options to their customers. Regarding 
cloud deployments, providers offer up-time availability which ranges from 95 to 
99.5 per cent, with different platforms mentioning various available resilience 
options, such as daily incremental backups, weekly full backups, real-time data 
mirroring at other sites and fail-over clusters. Regarding on-premise 
deployments, the availability figures depend on the organizational set-up and 
environment.  
 
g) Transparency 
All platforms support audit mechanisms - in the form of audit logs, which record 
user actions with relevant timestamps, read and write requests, successful and 
unsuccessful login attempts, logout information, IP addresses and other user 
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identification information. Access to these logs can be permitted to specific, 
authenticated, users by the organization itself. 
 
h) Security 
All platforms support encryption protocols (Legacy SSL and/or TLS) both for 
communication between the organization and supplier networks (for cloud 
deployments), as well as for communication within the platform network itself. 
Most of the platforms support that their systems undergo a penetration test, at 
least on a biennial basis, while some platforms also claim that their systems 
employ appropriate DDOS protection controls. Concerning physical access 
control (regarding supplier premises), some platforms claim the presence of 
controls complying with the SSAE-16 / ISAE 3402 standards. About half of the 
suppliers claim organizational conformity with the ISO 27001 standard for 
information security, including secure software development and secure 
disposal methodologies. Regarding authentication methods, all platforms 
support user authentication through pairs of usernames and passwords, while 
some platforms also offer two-factor authentication for their users. A very few 
platforms offer login identity federation with existing providers (e.g. Google 
Apps), as an additional authentication option.  
 
i) Anonymity 
Out of the 12 identified platforms, just one (Threatvine) provides the option of 
anonymous submission of incidents. While a user completes an incident 
submission form in the platform, he/she is given the option of clicking on a 
checkbox:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Anonymous posting checkbox of Threatvine reporting platform 
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No further information was, however, available in any of their technical 
specification guides, regarding the technical details of this anonymity feature. 
Therefore, direct communication was established (via Skype) in order to clarify 
the mechanism behind this anonymity feature. The call revealed that the 
anonymity feature, when selected, just removes the form fields which contain 
individual identifiers (e.g. name and organization) from an incident report form, 
but the platform owner (and/or any other actors with sufficient privileges) can 
nevertheless see all the incident information, including identifiers. 
 
j) Cost 
The identified platforms quote a vast range of pricing options, which are based 
on various factors, such as license duration, level of support, number of users, 
type of installation and many more. This is not applicable to open-source 
platforms, which are offered at no cost. It is important to note that all 
commercial platforms provide a free, limited-functionality demo version of their 
software, for evaluation purposes. In order to directly compare the various 
pricing options, a base configuration was established, which included licensing 
of the platform for twelve (12) months, for a total number of thirty (30) users, 
with the standard level of support and cloud deployment. Prices identified range 
from GBP 25,500 to GBP 150,000.  
 
k) General comments 
In general, the available, manual, information security incident reporting 
platforms seem to be easy to understand and use, utilizing simple and straight-
forward GUIs, with a good level of support and training offered by the 
commercial providers. Performance seems to be smooth, in either cloud or on-
premise deployments, although scalability could not be adequately tested, since 
the demo versions available prohibited the simulation of a resource-intensive 
environment, with many users and multiple submission of incidents. However, 
and as previously mentioned, manual information security incident reporting 
platforms are not theoretically expected to yield an enormous data volume, 
capable of deteriorating performance and efficiency. Non-constant availability is 
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certainly an issue, but this is the case with any centralized environment. 
Regarding security, the encryption supported in the communication channels is 
certainly a major plus, while two-factor authentication offered by some platforms 
suggests enhanced security. However, when it comes to logging and auditing, 
stolen credentials could easily lead to the unauthorized modification (including 
erasure) of a centralized database. The absence of the option of anonymous 
submissions is certainly an issue, since reputational concerns are a major factor 
for organizations sharing information security incidents (Line & Albrechtsen, 
2016; Jaatun et al, 2009; Hove et al, 2014; Ahmad et al, 2015; Ruefle et al, 
2014; Koivunen, 2010; Housen-Couriel, 2018). Even Threatvine platform, which 
claims the option of anonymous submissions, does not essentially provide true 
anonymity. Furthermore, the cost of acquiring and operating a commercial 
reporting platform is certainly not negligible. Due to their centralized nature and 
sensitive content, reporting platforms require major investments for ensuring 
their security (both physical and electronic). This cost, along with all other costs 
associated with a centralized database (i.e. need for increasing storage space, 
disaster recovery/business continuity arrangements and other) is, of course, 
ultimately passed on to the platform’s customers. 
 
It therefore comes as no surprise that despite the general encouragement for 
information sharing related to information security incidents, organizations 
continue to approach it with ambivalence (Aviram & Tor, 2003). According to 
Housen-Couriel (2018), current reporting platforms have many drawbacks, 
including the problematic trust relationships among participants - who may be 
competitors, as well as the absence of transparency regarding both the 
confidentiality and efficiency of the platforms, which includes the use of the 
shared data by government agencies for non-information security-related 
purposes, as identified by Johnson et al (2016).  
In addition, the exposure of organizational vulnerabilities is also thought as a 
drawback and so are the various costs related to incident reporting, such as  
operational cost, recruitment, training, and overall organizational time spent by 
an organization’s personnel on reporting, including time devoted to examining 
potential “false positives” (Etzioni, 2014). Legal liability is also a major 
organizational concern (Housen-Couriel, 2018). These various reporting 
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concerns need to be addressed by the reporting platforms themselves, because 
they have a direct impact on their own sustainability and effectiveness (Vazquez 
et al, 2012). 
 
2.2.8. Other related work to incident reporting 
A lot of identified literature deals with incident management and response – as 
a holistic process - rather than incident reporting, explicitly. This fact was also 
stated by Patrascu and Patriciu (2013), in a paper proposing a framework for 
incident response and reporting in Cloud environments; nevertheless, there 
seems to be a general need for more empirical studies in the incident response 
field (Tondel et al, 2014).  
 
Werlinger (2010), Metzger et al (2011), Hove and Tårnes (2013) and Ahmad et 
al (2012 & 2015) have all partly examined incident reporting procedures, as part 
of a wider context of empirically examining incident response in various 
organizations. Line and Albrechtsen (2016) have also examined incident 
reporting, as part of examining information security incident management, in 
comparison with industrial safety management. Moreover, Sveen et al (2009) 
examined the role of information security incident reporting systems - in the 
wider context of an information security management system - and found that 
incident reporting is a crucial component in creating information security 
awareness among users. 
 
A variety of researchers, have, however, dealt directly with incident reporting, in 
a multitude of ways. From a higher perspective, Settani et al (2017) proposed a 
collaborative cyber incident management/reporting system, utilized by 
European, inter-connected, critical infrastructure providers. Furthermore, 
Housen-Couriel (2018) analysed and compared the information sharing 
measures and modalities of the NIS and the IFC3, as well as some of the 
issues that emerge from this comparison of the two information exchange 
platforms. Wolff (2014) compared reporting policies in the US and the EU, and 
proposed templates for incident reporting, taking into consideration the nature of 
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information, the timeline for sharing and the receiving parties. Albakri et al 
(2018) analyzed the risks in cyber incident information reporting, evaluating the 
kind of information contained in the reports and the specific risks associated 
with its disclosure. Moreover, Belsis et al (2005) suggested a federated 
information sharing model for organizations, where each organization could 
hold its own database of incidents, but with a centralized system in place, able 
to collect and correlate information stored on the various databases. Joyce et al 
(2016) presented various options for consideration, when creating a cyber 
incident reporting system, in order to foster cooperative cyber defense among 
participating international parties. Furthermore, Mtsweni et al (2016) proposed a 
semantic-enabled sharing model, for exchanging timely and relevant 
cybersecurity intelligence with trusted collaborators, while Kulikova et al (2012) 
proposed a decision-support framework for organizations, in order to help them 
decide on their incident reporting/disclosure strategy. 
 
Koivunen (2010) compared the reporting recommendations provided in some 
information security standards, with the actual practice as observed through 
real-life incidents, and suggested that internet-connected organisations should 
adopt a rather agnostic approach to information security incident reporting. 
Harrison and White (2012) introduced a framework defining the information 
sharing requirements necessary for fast, effective, community cyber incident 
detection and response, and analysed a proof of concept implementation. In 
addition, Sveen et al (2007) examined how incident-reporting systems function, 
and particularly how the steady growth of high-priority incidents and the semi-
exponential growth of low-priority incidents affect reporting effectiveness - while 
also examining how social pressures can affect incident reporting. Briggs et al 
(2017) also examined reporting from a social point of view: they examined 
message influences on incident reporting rate, and found that users were more 
likely to report a technical rather than a security problem, and also that users, 
were sometimes suspicious of messages reporting a security incident – 
believing that the message itself might be a cybersecurity attack. In another 
paper and in an attempt to standardize incident reporting, Ayres et al (2010), 
suggested the use of a key for the hierarchical classification of breaches, in 
order to improve consistency. 
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Research examining incident reporting in specific sectors, has also been 
published. For example, Gonzalez (2005) introduced a cyber security reporting 
system to share cyber security data based on features from Air Safety 
Reporting System. Lee (2017) suggested a security incident response 
framework for nuclear facilities, while also introducing cyber security incident 
reporting regulations at nuclear facilities in the Republic of Korea. Leszczyna 
and Wrobel (2014) proposed an approach to developing a data model for a 
security incident sharing platform for the smart grid (a new form of electricity 
network). Furthermore, Hennin (2008) suggested a standard protocol and data 
schema for the timely reporting of actual and potential cyber-attacks on 
industrial control systems. Grimaila et al (2009), suggested the key attributes of 
a cyber incident notification process, for use in military environments, to provide 
timely incident notifications, while Makori and Oenga (2010) proposed a security 
incident reporting model for adoption by novice users from developing 
countries, like Kenya. In addition, Grispos et al (2017), investigated the ability of 
employees in a Global Fortune 500 financial organization to recognize and 
report security incidents, while Chatzigeorgiou et al (2017), presented an 
architecture for ensuring privacy and confidentiality in incident reporting, taking 
into consideration the continuously increasing number of mobile devices. 
Moreover, there are studies examining the financial impact of incident reporting 
(Garg et al, 2003; Kulikova et al, 2015; Zafar et al, 2012; Spanos & Angelis, 
2016 and more) 
 
There is also literature examining automated incident reporting. Some 
researchers investigated various features of the automatic reporting of incidents 
(Cusick and Ma, 2010; Metzger et al, 2011; Koivunen, 2010; Kampanakis, 
2014; Mtsweni et al, 2016) and others proposed automatic reporting systems, 
such as Makedon et al (2003), who presented an automatic incident 
classification and reporting system for information security incidents, called 
“SISC”. Marshall (2009) also proposed an incident modelling and reporting tool, 
for use in cyber incident preparedness exercises, called “CyberSMART”. 
Menges and Pernul (2018) proposed an incident reporting process model, 
based on a comparative analysis of identified, state-of-the-art, incident reporting 
formats, while Kacha (2014) proposed an extended taxonomies format for the 
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automatic reporting of security events, based on previous work related to the 
“IDEA” taxonomy. In addition, Kurowski and Frings (2011), created a prototype 
for a documentation system for IT incidents, utilizing computational assistance, 
while Kijewski and Pawliński (2014) presented four tools and a generic analytics 
tool in order to sustain the process of automatic incident exchange between 
nodes. Moreover, Asada et al (2006), applied a semantic web approach to 
incident reporting, in order to enable computer processing of incident reports, 
while Husak and Cegan (2014), proposed a framework for the automatic 
detection and reporting of “phishing”, a specific type of information security 
incident.  
 
2.3. The blockchain technology 
Blockchain is a peer-to-peer network that sits on top of the internet and was first 
introduced in 2008, as part of a proposal for “Bitcoin” – a virtual currency 
system - which is considered to be the first, ever, application of blockchain 
technology (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017). Although the first applications of 
blockchain mainly dealt with various virtual/crypto currencies, a blockchain can 
serve multiple other purposes, with or without the involvement of any 
virtual/crypto currencies (Greenspan, 2015a). Blockchain technology is a 
distributed transaction database, in which different nodes operate as a system, 
to store sequences of bits that are encrypted as a single unit or block and then 
chained together (Lemieux, 2016). According to Casino et al (2019), blockchain 
introduced serious disruptions to traditional business processes, since 
applications and transactions which needed trusted third parties or centralized 
architectures for verification purposes, can now operate – with the same level of 
certainty - in a decentralized way. The impact of blockchain goes beyond the 
financial sector (Hughes et al, 2019), and encompasses any business that acts 
as or relies on an intermediary between two or more parties (Morkunas et al, 
2019). The unique properties of blockchain make the technology an attractive 
idea for many areas of business, such as logistics, the pharmaceutical industry, 
record keeping, smart contracts, cyber security and more (Taylor et al, 2019). 
The inherent characteristics of blockchain architecture, besides 
decentralization, provide properties such as persistency, transparency, security, 
anonymity and auditability (Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016; Zheng et al, 2017).  
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2.3.1. How Blockchain works 
In essence, blockchain is a chained data structure that combines blocks of data 
and information in a chronological order and records the blocks in encrypted 
form, as a distributed ledger that cannot be tampered with, or forged (Lu, 2019). 
Despite the many variations of blockchain networks, most of them use common 
core concepts (Yaga et al, 2018). According to Carlozo (2017), a blockchain 
database contains two types of records: transactions and blocks. The latter hold 
batches of transactions, which are time-stamped, linked to the previous block 
and cannot be retroactively altered (Carlozo, 2017). Transactions signify an 
“agreement” between participants, which may involve the transfer of assets, the 
completion of a task, or some other mutually accepted action (Casino et al, 
2019). At least one participant digitally signs this transaction, and it is 
disseminated to neighboring blockchain nodes (Casino et al, 2019). Broadly 
speaking, a blockchain process is comprised of three steps: collecting new 
transactions and organizing them into blocks, cryptographically verifying each 
transaction in the block, and appending the new block to the blockchain (Prpić, 
2017).  
 
To get a better understanding of blockchain architecture, Casino et al (2019) 
describe blockchain as a a set of interconnected mechanisms which provide 
specific features to the infrastructure. At the first layer of this infrastructure, we 
have the signed transactions between nodes. Any entity connected to the 
blockchain is called a node. Nodes that verify all the blockchain rules are called 
full nodes and they are responsible for grouping the transactions into blocks and 
determining whether the transactions are valid, which is actually the purpose of 
the second layer, the “Consensus” layer (Casino et al, 2019). Different 
consensus mechanisms exist for various types of blockchains (Mingxiao et al., 
2017). The “Compute Interface” layer, allows blockchains to offer more 
functionality, by having the ability of storing complex states, which are updated 
dynamically, using distributed computing. The “Governance” layer, outspreads 
the blockchain architecture to cover human interactions taking place in the 
physical world, since blockchain protocols are affected by various inputs from 
diverse groups of people who integrate new methods, improve the blockchain 
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protocols and patch the system (Casino et al, 2019). The following figure 
depicts this architecture: 
 
 
Figure 2.7. An overview of blockchain architecture by Casino et al (2019) 
 
According to Zheng et al (2017), a block consists of the block header and the 
block body. The block header includes the block’s version, the hash value of all 
the transactions in the block (Merkle), a timestamp, the threshold of a valid 
block hash (nBits), a nonce, and the parent block hash, a value that points to 
the previous block (if a previous block exists), whereas the block body includes 
a transaction counter and transactions (Zheng et al, 2017). The following figures 
depict a typical block’s structure, as well as an example blockchain of a 
sequence of blocks: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Block structure by Zheng et al (2017) 
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Figure 2.9. Example blockchain sequence of blocks by Zheng et al (2017) 
 
Blockchain can also be thought as a table with three columns (where each row 
signifies a different transaction): the first column stores the transaction's 
timestamp, the second column stores the transaction's details, and the third 
column stores a hash of the current transaction, the transaction’s details and 
the hash of the previous transaction (Di Pierro, 2017).  
 
According to Casey and Vigna (2018), what makes blockchain “special”, is that 
instead of the database being managed by a single centralized authority, 
transactions are stored in several copies, on several independent computers, 
within a decentralized network, with no single entity controlling this database 
and thus eliminating the need for a trusted authority (Christidis and 
Devetsikiotis, 2016; Tasca & Tessone, 2017). Changes can be made by any of 
the participating computers of the blockchain, but only by following rules 
dictated by a “consensus protocol,” a mathematical algorithm that requires the 
majority of the other computers on the network to agree with the change (Casey 
& Vigna, 2018). Once “consensus” between the participants has been achieved, 
all participants update their copies of the chain simultaneously - while entries 
submitted without consensus are being rejected by the blockchain, thus 
ensuring that all copies of the distributed database are synchronized (Lipton, 
2018). The following figure provides a high-level visualization of how blockchain 
works:  
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Figure 2.10. Visualization of a blockchain  
 
Christidis & Devetsikiotis (2016) explain how the blockchain network works, in 
greater detail: 
 
a) Users/nodes interact with the blockchain with a pair of private/public keys – 
users sign transactions with their private key, while their public key (or a hashed 
version of it) is used for addressing purposes on the network. According to the 
authors, the use of asymmetric cryptography brings authentication, integrity, 
and non-repudiation into the network and every signed transaction is 
broadcasted by a user's node to its neighboring nodes. 
1
• A node registers a transaction
2
• Transaction is represented as a block in the ledger
3
• This block gets broadcast to all nodes
4
• Nodes approve the validity of the trancaction (consensus)
5
• Block is added to the blockchain
6
• The (updated) blockchain is available to all nodes
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b) Neighboring nodes confirm the validity of the transaction (consensus) and 
discard invalid transactions (based on preconfigured rules of the network), 
whereas, eventually, the transaction is spread across the whole network.  
c) Transactions collected and validated by the network, during a specific, time 
interval, are sorted into a time-stamped candidate block, which is then 
broadcasted back to the network. 
d) The nodes verify that the candidate block contains valid transactions, and 
references (via hash) the correct previous block on their chain. If that is the 
case, the block is added to the chain, and its transactions applied – or else the 
block is discarded.   
 
Thus, a blockchain system allows users to transact directly and securely, 
through public key cryptography, while also creating an immutable, publicly 
shared, publicly collected, and publicly verified (and verifiable) record of 
transactions in the process, through public key cryptography signatures (Prpić, 
2017). Every transaction is time-stamped, verified, added in sequence, and 
made public; and every blockchain node maintains, and can access, a copy of 
the entire history of a Blockchain, while knowing that this history cannot be 
altered, except through new transactions (Reijers et al, 2016). 
 
2.3.2. Public, private and hybrid blockchains 
According to Mougayar (2016), blockchains – depending on their application – 
can be classified as public, private, or hybrid. According to the same author, 
public (or permission-less) blockchains are visible by anyone, have no single 
owner, are fully decentralized, and their consensus process/protocol is open to 
all nodes for participation. Some well-known implementations of public 
blockchains are Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin and, in general, most virtual/crypto 
currencies (Haferkorn & Diaz, 2014). Private (or permissioned) blockchains, on 
the other hand, do have a central authority, usually include a whitelist of allowed 
nodes with particular characteristics and permissions over the network (Casino 
et al, 2019), their transactions are editable - as long as their participants have 
reached an agreement - and their consensus process/protocol need not be as 
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strong as that of a public blockchain (Vranken, 2017). The various, available, 
consensus protocols are presented in section “2.3.5”. In private blockchains, 
main applications include database management, auditing and, in general, 
performance demanding solutions (Zheng et al, 2016). An example of a 
platform for building and deploying private blockchains is Multichain 
(Greenspan, 2015b) – although private blockchains are also supported by other 
platforms, such as Ethereum. A hybrid (or consortium/federated) blockchain is 
partially decentralized, where transactions are validated by a selected set of 
nodes (Vranken, 2017). A hybrid blockchain can be viewed as a combination of 
public and private blockchains solutions (Zheng et al, 2016), which allows a 
group of trusted nodes (entities) for the validation of actions, rather than having 
a single owner (Mougayar, 2016). This allows for a partially decentralized 
design, where “leader” nodes can grant permissions to other nodes (Casino et 
al, 2019). This type of blockchains are popular in the industry and banking 
sectors and examples include the Hyperledger project and Corda’s R3 (Casino 
et al, 2019). 
 
2.3.3. Blockchain variety 
No discussion of blockchain is practical without referring to “Bitcoin” (Sultan et 
al, 2018), since blockchain technology is the name given to the design 
underpinning the operation of the particular virtual currency (Ammous, 2016). In 
fact, Bitcoin’s creator, never explicitly mentioned “blockchain” in his paper, but 
rather a software design based on several current technologies, in order to 
create a “purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash” (Ammous, 2016, p.1). 
In his paper, Nakamoto (2008) describes Bitcoin as a mean to achieve direct 
online payments between parties, without the need of an intermediary, such as 
a bank. It is crucial to note, that while Bitcoin refers to the Bitcoin protocol and 
the Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network of participating nodes, people tend to use it to 
refer to the native token of the transaction, the Bitcoin token – “BTC” (Shermin, 
2017).  
 
Although the Bitcoin blockchain is considered to be the first application of the 
Blockchain technology (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017), various alternatives have 
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emerged since. Their philosophy and underlying core functionality, however, 
remains the same: a blockchain is a decentralized, peer-to-peer chain of blocks, 
each cryptographically linked to the previous, using a hash digest (Sultan et al, 
2018). Cryptocurrencies can be considered to have emerged as the first 
generation of blockchain technology (Alharby & van Moorsel, 2017) and they 
represent a considerable percentage of the existing blockchain networks 
(Casino et al, 2019). Cryptocurrency can be described as “a virtual coinage 
system that functions much like a standard currency, enabling users to provide 
virtual payment for goods and services, free of a central trusted authority” 
(Farell, 2015). According to Alharby & van Moorsel (2017), other blockchains 
such as the “Ethereum” blockchain, have emerged as the second generation of 
blockchain, which support functionality for building complex distributed 
applications. This functionality is often referred to as “smart contracts”, which is 
basically executable code, that runs on the blockchain, in order to facilitate, 
execute and enforce the terms of an agreement/contract (Xu et al, 2016). 
Besides Bitcoin and Ethereum, other blockchain examples include “Ripple” - 
which although shares most of the properties of Ethereum and Bitcoin, it was 
specifically designed “to facilitate fast and cheap global transfer of money” 
(Schwartz et al, 2014), “Fabric” by “Hyperledger” - a consortium formed by the 
Linux foundation, and many other partners such as IBM, Intel, SAP, Cisco, 
Daimler, and American Express, to design and develop enterprise blockchains 
(Androulaki et al, 2018), R3’s “Corda” - a distributed ledger platform for 
recording and processing financial agreements (Brown et al, 2016) and 
“Multichain” - an open source blockchain platform that enables the setup, 
configuration, and deployment of a private, public, or hybrid blockchain 
(Greenspan, 2015c). 
 
2.3.4. Blockchain evolution 
Blockchain technology has undergone rapid incremental evolutions, since its 
debut in 2008; the technology initially was not programmable, but later versions 
incorporated such functionality, which consequently expanded the scope for 
general market decentralization (Angelis & Da Silva, 2019). The different 
versions of blockchain technology can be characterized by the following three 
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stages (Swan, 2015; Zhao et al, 2016; Chen et al, 2018; Angelis & Da Silva, 
2019): 
 
a) Blockchain 1.0. 
The first version of blockchain is focused on transactions, with the deployment 
of virtual/crypto currencies in applications related to cash management, such as 
transfers and digital payment systems (Swan, 2015; Luu et al, 2016; Zhao et al, 
2016), with “Bitcoin” prevailing as the most well-known example (Angelis & Da 
Silva, 2019). 
 
b) Blockchain 2.0. 
Blockchain 2.0, an extension of Blockchain 1.0, is acknowledged as a generally 
programmable infrastructure, with the ability of recording computational results 
(Xu et al, 2016), and including features such as privacy, smart contracts, as well 
as the emergence of non-native, asset, blockchain tokens and capabilities 
(Schuster, 2018). Well-known examples of platforms with the ability of running 
smart contracts are Ethereum (Buterin, 2018), IBM-Maersk partnered 
blockchain, supporting global shipping (Kamath, 2018) and the trade finance 
blockchain consortium “we.trade” (Morris, 2018).   
 
b) Blockchain 3.0. 
Blockchain 3.0 further expands the technology’s capabilities with the 
introduction of “decentralized applications - DApps” (Angelis & Da Silva, 2019). 
According to the same authors, a DApp consists of back-end code that runs on 
a decentralized peer-to-peer network, connecting users and providers directly 
(via a front-end interface), and is implemented on decentralized blockchains 
using cryptographic tokens. According to Raval (2016), DApps should be 
designed to be transparent, flexible and resilient, and should have a clear 
structure.  
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In addition to the above three versions, Angelis and Da Silva (2019) indicate the 
emergence of a newer version/stage of blockchain technology, “Blockchain 4.0”. 
This new version involves the inclusion of artificial intelligence (AI) to blockchain 
technologies, and is particularly useful in environments in which traceability and 
immutability are of high importance (Angelis & Da Silva, 2019). According to the 
same authors, the benefits of both worlds can be combined, as Artificial 
Intelligence allows computers to learn from data, while blockchain provides data 
accuracy, which is useful for feeding data into the AI system and for recording 
its outputs. 
 
2.3.5. Blockchain consensus algorithms  
Blockchain is updated via the consensus protocol, which ensures a common, 
unambiguous ordering of blocks and transactions, while also guaranteeing the 
integrity and consistency of the ledger across geographically distributed nodes 
(Baliga, 2017). Since “consensus” literally means “agreement”, consensus 
algorithms are those algorithms that help a decentralized network to 
unanimously take a decision, whenever necessary (Sankar et al, 2017). 
Blockchain nodes achieve consensus by using the prior agreement of the 
blockchain rules and following the principle of majority dominance (Mingxiao et 
al, 2017). Achieving consensus in a decentralized system is a challenging task, 
as consensus algorithms need to be resilient to any failures of nodes, to 
corrupted messages, messages reaching out of order or general message 
delays, and to the partitioning of the network; while also capably handling 
“selfish” or deliberately malicious nodes (Baliga, 2017). Their features include 
ensuring decentralized governance, minimum structure, performance, integrity 
and authentication, as well as non-repudiation and byzantine fault tolerance 
(Seibold & Samman, 2016). Since the consensus mechanism preserves the 
sanctity of the blockchain’s data, a poor choice of a consensus algorithm can 
render the blockchain platform useless (Baliga, 2017). There are several 
algorithms available for a blockchain implementation project, with each 
algorithm making the required set of assumptions, in terms of performance, 
synchrony, message broadcasts and security, as well as handling of failures 
and malicious nodes. (Baliga, 2017). The most widely adopted algorithm is the 
Proof of Work (PoW), however, there are numerous others (Bach et al, 2018). A 
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short description of the properties of the most dominant algorithms (Bach et al, 
2018), both in permissioned and permission-less blockchains, follows: 
 
a) Proof of Work (PoW) 
In both Bitcoin and Ethereum implementations, PoW is the consensus algorithm 
in use. In both implementations, the core idea is the same: participating nodes 
must calculate the solution of a difficult mathematical problem - based on 
information obtained through the previous block - and the first participant that 
solves the problem can create the next block - a process also known as 
“mining” (Mingxiao et al, 2017). PoW algorithms have received heavy criticism 
due to their time-consuming processes and power-intensiveness (Baliga, 2017). 
 
b) Proof of Stake (PoS) 
PoS algorithms attempt to overcome the disadvantages of PoW algorithms, in 
terms of intensiveness and associated power consumption (Baliga, 2017). PoS 
do not utilize a mining process, but adopt a rather alternative approach, which 
involves a user’s stake or ownership of virtual currency in the blockchain 
(Baliga, 2017). The concept of “coin age” is used, where the longer a node 
holds the coins, the more rights it can get on the blockchain (Mingxiao et al, 
2017). PoS, therefore, encourages participants to hold their currencies and the 
blockchain is not entirely relying on a proof of work process (Baliga, 2017). 
 
c) Ripple Protocol consensus algorithm (RPCA) 
RPCA is a low-latency Byzantine agreement protocol, capable of achieving 
consensus without the complete agreement of participating nodes (Chase & 
MacBrough, 2018). Each server places all valid transactions to a public list and 
then votes on the veracity of each transaction, in a series of one or multiple 
rounds; all transactions with a minimum of 80% positive votes, are eventually 
recorded to the ledger (Bach et al, 2018). 
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d) Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) and variants 
In permissioned blockchains, where the environment is considered to be more 
confined and trusted, blockchains tend to rely on message-based consensus 
schemas, rather than hashing procedures, which are lighter and considerably 
speed up the consensus process (De Angelis et al, 2018). In these settings, 
Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) algorithms, such as the Practical BFT (PBFT) and 
Proof of Authority (PoA), prevail (De Angelis et al, 2018). The PBFT algorithm is 
based on the assumption that less than one-third of the nodes are faulty (f), 
which means that the network should consist of at least n = 3 f + 1 nodes to 
tolerate f faulty nodes (Castro & Liskov, 2002). Thus f = [(n −1)/3] and the 
network requires 2 f + 1 peers to agree on the block of transactions (Sukhwani 
et al, 2017). The PoA algorithm, differently from PBFT, has drawn attention due 
to the fact that it requires less message exchanges, and thus provides better 
performance and fault-tolerance (Dinh et al, 2017).  
 
e) Other consensus algorithms  
As previously mentioned, there is no shortage of different consensus 
algorithms, for both permissioned and permission-less blockchains. Based on 
their requirements and intended use, blockchain developers can select from a 
wide variety of algorithms for blockchain implementations, which include, in 
addition to those described above, the Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) 
algorithm, the Proof-of-Capacity (PoC or Proof-of-Storage), Proof-of-Existence 
(PoE), Proof-of-Importance (PoI), Proof-of-Burn (PoB), Proof-of-Validation 
(PoV), Round Robin (RR), Proof-of Elapsed Time (PoET), and various others 
(Mattila, 2016).  
 
2.3.6. Blockchain suitability  
Although blockchain technology is becoming increasingly relevant to real-world 
applications (Zhao et al, 2016), its use is not a silver bullet (Yaga et al, 2018). It 
is, essentially, a novel way to manage data, and it therefore competes with the 
traditional, established, data-management systems, such as relational 
databases (Peck, 2017). While Swan (2015) predicts that blockchain will lead to 
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a great wave of disruption, as it extends to the various segments of economy, 
general blockchain development and acceptance is still in the early stages, and 
its overall impact, as a disruptive new technology, is still to be seen (Pilkington, 
2016). Blockchain should therefore not be considered as panacea, or as a 
universally applicable solution, to every possible problem. Yaga et al (2018, 
p.vi) likewise argue that blockchain technology is new and should not be treated 
with the mindset of “how can we make our problem fit into the blockchain 
technology paradigm?”, but rather with the mindset of “how could blockchain 
technology potentially benefit us?”. 
 
2.3.6.1. Advantages of blockchain technology 
The use of blockchain comes with plenty of benefits, which can bring cost 
savings to organizations, as well as improve overall efficiency (Zheng et al, 
2017):  
 
a) Decentralization 
While in a centralized database storage device are all connected to a common 
processor, in a distributed database, they are independent (Lipton, 2018). 
According to Lu (2019), information in blockchain networks is automatically 
shared and distributed between nodes - subject to the fulfilment of specific 
conditions - without any third-party intervention, while all participants could 
potentially join transactions and activities. For public blockchains, there is no 
integration point or central authority required to set rules, or approve 
transactions, and no single point of trust (Tasca & Tessone, 2017). In 
centralized environments, each transaction needs to be validated through a 
central trusted agency – in blockchain, consensus algorithms are utilized to 
maintain data consistency (Zheng et al, 2017). The failure of a blockchain node 
does not affect the operation of the whole network, thus ensuring the resilience, 
availability and reliability of applications built on blockchain, by avoiding single 
points of failure (Zheng et al, 2017; Chen et al, 2018; Gatteschi et al, 2018). 
Both public and private blockchain implementations are used to eliminate single 
sources of failure (Taylor et al, 2019). Nonetheless, traditional, centralized, 
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database environments can also cope with single points of failure, through the 
utilization of redundancy mechanisms and fail-over systems. However, by 
design, blockchain keeps all nodes updated with the current content. Each node 
holds a single copy of the database. To achieve the same level of redundancy 
with traditional databases, a large number of redundancy mechanisms would 
have to be employed, equivalent to the number of nodes a blockchain would 
have. 
 
b) Anonymity 
Each user interacts with blockchain through a generated address (a public key 
or a hash of it), which does not reveal the explicit identity of the user (Zheng et 
al, 2017) - although it is pseudonymous in nature, rather than truly anonymous. 
This is presented as a disadvantage as well, in later sections, although 
solutions exist to increase user privacy (Zheng et al, 2017). Blockchain uses 
asymmetric encryption in the form of data encryption and digital signatures – 
the former ensures the security of transaction data and reduces the risk of 
losing or falsifying transaction data, while the latter is used to digitally sign 
transactions (Lu, 2019). It is unnecessary to disclose the true identity of the user 
associated with the node, which is a controversial feature, as it may sometimes 
assist illegal activities (Reid & Harrigan, 2013; Narayanan et al, 2016).   
 
c) Transparency 
Blockchain records are auditable by a predefined set of participants, albeit the 
set can be more (public blockchain) or less (private blockchain), open (Tasca & 
Tessone, 2017). The blockchain technology ensures that nodes record and 
transfer records on the network, and all participants can query these records, 
which makes information in the decentralized network both consistent and 
transparent (Lu, 2019). Each node can not only read the final state of the 
transactions, but also the history of the previous transactional states (Gatteschi 
et al, 2018), while each participant has the same permissions and obligations to 
access records, and also allow other nodes – on the same network - to access 
this data (Bonneau et al, 2015; Lin & Liao, 2017). Consensus mechanisms 
77 
 
implemented in blockchain structures enable multiple writers to modify the 
database, and provide an authoritative transaction log, in which all nodes 
provably agree (Casino et al, 2019). 
 
d) Immutability/Security 
Blockchain is a shared, tamper-proof, replicated, ledger, where records are 
irreversible and cannot be forged, because of the use of one-way cryptographic 
hash functions (Tasca & Tessone, 2017; Chen et al, 2018; Gatteschi et al, 
2018). A newly generated block strictly follows the linear sequence of time 
(Chen et al, 2018), with applied timestamps allowing the node to both keep the 
order of transactions, as well as to create traceable data - therefore not only 
guaranteeing the originality of the data, but also reducing the cost of transaction 
traceability (Lu, 2019). Transactions need to be reviewed by most of the nodes 
of the system, before they can be recorded (Lu, 2019) – but once data has been 
recorded in the ledger, it cannot be modified without letting the whole network 
know, thus permitting tamper-resistant data (Zheng et al, 2017). Blocks that 
contain invalid transactions can be discovered immediately (Zheng et al, 2017). 
Users can transfer data only if they possess a private key, which is used to 
generate a signature for each transaction a user sends out, which is, in turn, 
used to confirm both the origin and integrity of the transaction (Tasca & 
Tessone, 2017). Theoretically, blockchain immutability could be violated, if 
attackers could gather enough resources to outpace the block creation rate of 
the rest of the blockchain network, an attack called the “51% attack” – however 
this attack is not only very difficult to conduct, but is also only applicable to 
public blockchains, as private blockchains could remove malicious nodes from 
the network (Yaga et al, 2018). Furthermore, Zyskind and Nathan (2015) state, 
that compared to decentralized structures, centralized databases are generally 
more vulnerable to malicious attacks. 
 
e) Trust 
According to Casino et al (2019), blockchain avoids the use of trusted third 
parties - on which centralized databases rely on – and therefore enhances 
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reliability and verifiability of contents. Unlike centralized trust we take for 
granted (e.g. central banks issuing currencies), the blockchain network acts as 
trust bearer with decentralized ledgers (Underwood, 2016). Blockchain provides 
trust between participants, since digital signatures ensure that every node 
behaves appropriately, without needing intermediaries (Gatteschi et al, 2018). 
Trust is a factor that plagues participants in trading, and blockchain employs 
hash functions and consensus protocols to solve any trust issues (Chen et al, 
2018). According to Lu (2019), participants don't need to take care of mutual 
trust relationships in the blockchain system – the network does it for them. 
 
f) Efficiency 
According to Chen et al (2018), since all blockchain data are run automatically 
through pre-set procedures, blockchain technology can improve efficiency and 
significantly reduce the cost of labor. It can speed up the clearing and 
settlement of transactions, by reducing (or eliminating) the number of 
intermediaries involved (Chen et al, 2018), and it can also make reconciliation 
processes faster (Wang et al, 2016). In addition, since blockchain does not 
require hosting, due to its decentralized structure, it can provide significant cost 
reductions to organizations (Casino et al, 2019). 
 
g) Automation 
Blockchain technology allows – without the need for any human interaction – 
conflicting or double transactions not to be permanently written on the 
blockchain, since any conflicts are automatically reconciled, and valid 
transactions are only written once (Tasca & Tessone, 2017). Furthermore, 
various blockchains support the development and deployment of “smart 
contracts”, a series of commitments defined in digital form, which contain 
execution conditions and execution logic – with the logic automatically executed 
as soon as the condition is met (Lu, 2019). The payoff of these commitments 
depends on the use of algorithms, which are self-executable, self-enforceable, 
self-verifiable and self-constrained. (Tasca & Tessone, 2017). Smart contracts 
are the core technology behind the evolution of “Blockchain 2.0” (Tasca & 
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Tessone, 2017), and also have the capability of processing data, operating 
asset transactions, and managing smart assets (Luu et al, 2016).  
 
2.3.6.2. Disadvantages of blockchain technology 
According to Christidis and Devetsikiotis (2016), although blockchain 
technology brings many advantages to the table, it also comes with 
disadvantages: 
 
a) Performance and storage 
Due to its decentralized nature, a blockchain solution will generally 
underperform, compared to a properly configured centralized database, 
resulting in higher latencies and lower transaction processing throughput. 
(Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016). Performance is, of course, heavily dependent 
on the consensus algorithm employed by the blockchain, but for major public 
blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, a maximum of seven (Bitcoin) and 
around twenty (Ethereum) transactions per second (Peck, 2017), means adding 
information to the ledger is slow: creating a Bitcoin block of transactions takes 
from ten to sixty minutes, while Ethereum needs around 15 seconds (Gatteschi 
et al, 2018). Storage space on the blockchain can be used both for storage and 
exchange of arbitrary data structures, with the storage of data having some size 
limitations: the maximum block size in Bitcoin is 1MB, whereas Ethereum block 
size depends on the complexity of contracts being run, but is usually under 2KB 
in size (Zheng et al, 2017). Furthermore, with the amount of transactions 
increasing every day, data replication requires considerable space for 
blockchain nodes who have to locally store all transaction history: about 105GB 
for Bitcoin and 70GB for Ethereum (Gatteschi et al, 2018), and these numbers 
keep growing every day. All in all, if performance is an issue, or a vast amount 
of data needs to be saved as part of an implementation, centralized databases 
are considerably a better choice than blockchain implementations (Gatteschi et 
al, 2018).  
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b) True anonymity 
According to Tasca and Tessone (2017), a common misunderstanding of the 
anonymity level provided in blockchain, is that the majority of users do not 
distinguish between anonymity and the pseudo-anonymity. Blockchain can, 
indeed, provide a certain amount of privacy for its users, since for each 
transaction a user conducts, only his public key – or a hash of it - is revealed 
(Zheng et al, 2017). However, by analyzing publicly available data (on-chain 
and off-chain) patterns and connections created between addresses can be 
identified, allowing an interested party to make informed inferences about the 
user’s actual identity (Meiklejohn et al, 2013; Ron & Shamir, 2013; Ermilov et al, 
2017; Zheng et al, 2017). Ways for increasing a user’s privacy in blockchain 
have been proposed, such as “mixing”, a kind of service which provides 
anonymity by transferring funds from multiple input addresses to multiple output 
addresses (Bonneau et al, 2014; Zheng et al, 2017), “transaction remote 
release”, which hides the IP address of the transaction's author (ShenTu & Yu, 
2015) and using “ZeroCoin” (Miers et al, 2013) or “ZeroCash” (Sasson et al, 
2014) blockchain implementations, which utilize “zero-knowledge proof” and 
“zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge” protocols, 
respectively (Zheng et al, 2017). 
 
c) Perpetuity 
As far as blockchain and smart contracts are concerned, “what’s done, is done”. 
Since following their creation smart contracts become autonomous entities 
(Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016; Gatteschi et al, 2018), unless specific 
provisions have been included during the contract’s creation, the contract can 
never be modified (Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016). Therefore, before 
deploying a smart contract, one should inspect it carefully and include fail-safe 
mechanisms (Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016).  If code bugs are identified after 
deployment, new contracts have to be created by developers, and all data and 
pointers should be transferred from the old to the new contracts (Gatteschi et al, 
2018). 
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 d) Power-intensiveness 
Due to their inherent characteristics, blockchain implementations utilizing 
consensus algorithms such as “Proof of Work -PoW” require expensive 
hardware, while most of the computing power is wasted (Gatteschi et al, 2018). 
Utilizing an alternative consensus algorithm in a blockchain implementation, 
such as “Proof of Stake – PoS” or “Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance – PBFT” 
significantly reduces the power/cost involved (Lin & Liao, 2017).  
 
e) Limited understanding and support 
 As evident in the next sections of this report, although more and more 
blockchain implementation projects/applications gradually find their way into the 
market, blockchain is still a very new technology. While its impact is predicted to 
be enormous, the process of its adoption is not expected to be sudden, but 
rather gradual and steady; it is expected to take decades for it to find its way 
into our economic and social infrastructure (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017). It therefore 
comes as no surprise, that the technology is currently understood just by a few, 
and support is provided by even fewer. Moreover, the variation of blockchain 
designs and all possible configurations represent a burden for blockchain 
developers and software architects, making it difficult to measure and compare 
the performance and quality of different blockchain implementations (Tasca & 
Tessone, 2017).  
 
2.3.6.3. Blockchain decision models 
While the potential of blockchain technology is clear, what is not so clear, is the 
kind of innovation blockchain is: is it simply a new technology, a small step in 
the wider context of innovation, or can it be the next General-purpose 
Technology? (Kane, 2017). Although businesses around the world are excited 
about this new technology and its potential in solving real-world problems 
(Umeh, 2016), blockchain utilization/implementation decisions should be taken 
with care, as this is not a “one-size-fits-all” technology. According to Casino et al 
(2019), several decision-makers and developers around the globe visualize 
using blockchain in almost every project; what they fail to understand, however, 
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are the fundamental reasons for using it, especially from a data management 
perspective. For example, blockchain is appropriate when parties require 
transactions between trustless sources or a permanent historical record (Casino 
et al, 2019); it is not appropriate in cases where just a single writer in a given 
system is foreseen, where a centralized database would be a far better option, 
particularly from a performance perspective (Greenspan, 2015b). It is, indeed, 
one of the most common critics raised to blockchain, that many existing 
blockchain applications could be better implemented using traditional 
technologies, such as centralized databases (Gatteschi et al, 2018). 
Therefore, and in order to aid decision-makers, a number of “blockchain 
decision models” have been proposed, to help examine whether blockchain 
technology could be an appropriate fit for a project: 
a) Decision model by Peck (2017)  
Peck (2017) proposed a yes/no flowchart, with a total number of seven 
questions, with the first question prompting an individual to consider whether 
“traditional technologies can meet their needs” and leading to three, different, 
final options: “No need for a blockchain”, “might need a permissioned 
blockchain” or “might need a public blockchain”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11. Blockchain decision model by Peck (2017)  
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b) Decision model by Wust and Gervais (2018) 
Along the same lines, Wust and Gervais (2018) proposed a similar yes/no 
flowchart, with a total number of six questions, with the first question prompting 
an individual to consider whether “they need to store state” and leading to four, 
different, final options: “permission-less blockchain”, “public permissioned 
blockchain”, “private permissioned blockchain” and “don’t use blockchain”. 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Blockchain decision model by Wust and Gervais (2018) 
 
c) Decision model by DHS in Yaga et al (2018) 
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed a decision model 
which has been adopted by NIST, in their “Blockchain Technology Overview” 
publication, by Yaga et al (2018). This yes/no flowchart is somewhat different 
from the other, as it does not differentiate between the possible types of 
blockchain implementations, but rather generically indicates that “you may have 
a blockchain use case”, should all outcomes to the six available questions 
suggest “yes”, as an answer. If “no” is provided as an answer - to any stated 
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question - suitable alternative options are suggested, such as the use of 
“email/spreadsheets”, “encrypted database”, “managed database” or simply, 
“database”.  
 
Figure 2.13. Blockchain decision model by DHS in Yaga et al (2018) 
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d) Other models 
There is no shortage of proposed blockchain decision models. Koens and Poll 
(2018) literally identified thirty of them, available both in literature and on the 
web, before proposing their own model. The same authors identified 
inconsistencies between the different decision models, where same decisions 
could lead to different outcomes, or, conversely, similar outcomes could be 
reached with opposing decisions (Koens & Poll, 2018). In general, however, 
most of the schemes do have one thing in common: they take a critical view 
upon the utilization of blockchain technology for new developments, with most 
chart options leading to suggestions for the use of alternative/traditional 
technologies, rather than blockchain. According to Yaga et al (2018), this critical 
stand on blockchain technology is the appropriate one for organizations to take; 
they should first examine whether existing technology can provide a better 
solution to their problem. Along the same lines, it seems that most of the current 
advise surrounding blockchain technology is to thoroughly investigate its 
appropriateness, and not just use it because it is new and exciting (Yaga et al, 
2018). 
 
2.3.7. Blockchain applications 
According to Yli-Huumo et al (2016), interest in Blockchain technology has been 
increasing since the idea was developed in 2008. In a literature review, 
regarding the on-going research activity on Blockchain, conducted by the 
aforementioned authors in 2016, they identified that the majority of the current 
research on Blockchain is focused on finding and identifying improvements to 
the current challenges and limitations in Blockchain, with a focus on security 
and privacy issues. Other research topics identified included wasted resources, 
computational power and usability, while their findings in this mapping study 
showed that the majority of research was conducted in the Bitcoin environment. 
In a paper by Gatteschi et al (2018), the existing blockchain applications 
identified in different business sectors are described, with various applications 
found in identity management, intellectual property rights, verifiable voting 
systems for the government, ownership of diamonds and others. The most 
recent literature review on multisectoral blockchain applications, is the one 
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conducted by Casino et al (2019), identifying 260 distinct blockchain-
application-related research items, over a period of four years (2014-2018), in 
11 different domains: “financial applications”, “integrity verification”, 
“governance” (including “citizenship and user services”, “public sector”, and 
“voting” subsections),  “Internet of Things”, “healthcare management”, “privacy 
and security”, “business and industrial applications”, “supply chain 
management”, “energy sector”, “education”, “data management” and other 
“miscellaneous applications”. The following figure provides an overwhelming 
visualization of the disparity of all the various blockchain applications: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Different types of blockchain applications in Casino et al (2019) 
87 
 
2.3.7.1. Blockchain applications and data management 
Regarding utilizing blockchain in various data management solutions, including 
recording/reporting, examples include Garcia-Barriocanal et al. (2017) 
proposing a blockchain-based solution for metadata - supporting key functions 
towards the management and sustainability of digital archives. Also, Yang et al. 
(2018), proposed a blockchain-based, big data, sharing model, for the safe 
circulation of data resources. Do and Ng (2017) proposed a system that 
enables distributed client data management in a secure manner, using 
cryptographic primitives, with the owner able to grant search and read 
permissions of data to third parties. Moreover, Jiang et al (2017) proposed 
“Searchain”, a blockchain-based, keyword, search system with efficient private 
search of keywords, in decentralized storage. Cebe et al (2018) proposed 
constructing a blockchain infrastructure to provide forensic services for accident 
investigations, with the ledger recording data related to vehicles, such as 
maintenance information/history, car diagnosis reports and more. Furthermore, 
Goharshay et al (2018) proposed an approach for maintaining and reporting 
credit history records on the Blockchain, while Kavassalis et al (2017) proposed 
a financial risk reporting application, based on distributed computing and 
decentralised data management technologies. Other examples include the 
proposal by Lemieux (2016), who presented a blockchain-based solution for 
creating and preserving trustworthy digital records, for use by civil registries of 
births, deaths and marriages, land registries, repositories of financial 
transactions and others, as well as the “Vizsafe” platform, which enables users 
to upload incident reports about physical security threats or faulty infrastructure 
on a decentralized ledger, within the broader concept of a “smart city” (Mottur & 
Whittaker, 2018). 
 
2.3.7.2. Blockchain applications and information security 
Regarding utilizing blockchain in cyber/information security solutions, a variety 
of proposals can be found in literature, including a proposal by Fan et al (2017) 
for utilizing blockchain to enhance security and reliability in distributed networks, 
an anti-malware, blockchain-based, solution by Noyes (2016), a proposal for a 
privacy-aware public key infrastructure for protecting against single points of 
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failure and other malicious attacks (Axon, 2015), and a proposal for using a 
blockchain-based protection framework for enhancing the security of power 
systems against cyber-attacks (Liang et al, 2018). In addition, Rodrigues et al 
(2017), proposed a blockchain-based architecture for a DDoS mitigation 
solution, while methods for improving anonymity in blockchains have also been 
proposed (Moser, 2013; Zheng et al, 2017). Furthermore, Schackelford & Myers 
(2016), analysed the potential impact of blockchain technology on advancing 
cybersecurity, with a particular focus on certificate authorities and the critical 
infrastructure context. Moreover, a recent literature review about blockchain 
applications in the area of cyber-security, by Taylor et al (2019), identified 30 
distinct papers, in various categories, such as Internet of Things (IoT), web 
applications, networks and machine visualization, public key cryptography, 
certification schemes and the secure storage of personally identifiable 
information (PII). However, the authors state that a sizeable portion of the 
identified primary studies are either experimental proposals, or theoretical 
concepts, with limited practicality in solving real-world problems (Taylor et al, 
2019). 
 
2.3.7.3. Blockchain applications and incident reporting 
Regarding, specifically, information security incident reporting and the 
blockchain, the available literature is very limited. A relevant work regarding 
blockchain and incident management (not reporting) was conducted by Graf & 
King (2018), who used a Blockchain smart contract technique to provide an 
automated trusted system for incident management workflow, that allows 
automatic acquisition, classification and enrichment of incident data. They 
demonstrated how their solution can be applied to support incident handling 
tasks, performed by security operation centres, and can assist analysts by 
protecting critical infrastructure against increasing cyber threats. Their work, 
however, is focused on developing a solution that could replace human input, 
by facilitating automatic cyber incident classification, in order to enable analysts 
to focus on other tasks. Other examples include Blockchain-based Security 
Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems - for storing and accessing 
information security events - utilized by multiple devices, within the broader 
concept of the Internet of Things (Mesa et al, 2019; Miloslavskaya & Tolstoy, 
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2019), as well as a blockchain-based risk and information system control 
framework, able to register risk registration data on the ledger, thus ensuring 
traceability and irreversibility of entries (Ma et al, 2018).  
 
The most directly relevant work regarding incident reporting and blockchain was 
published very recently (April, 2019) by Adebayo et al (2019), in an article titled 
“Blockchain‐enabled Information Sharing Framework for Cybersecurity”, which 
was also featured as a chapter in a book by Shetty et al (2019), named 
“Blockchain for distributed systems”. In their 10-page long article, Adebayo et al 
(2019) propose a theoretical framework for information sharing based on 
blockchain, called “BIS”, which utilizes a “blockchain protocol over the public 
internet”. The authors support that since blockchain has been successfully used 
in privacy-aware systems, such as Bitcoin, blockchain could also be used for a 
cyber-incident sharing system for organizations who highly value their 
anonymity. They thus propose a framework for a public, blockchain, 
implementation, with no central authority, where any security-conscious 
organization could join as a member, and could also include various security 
vendors (e.g. antivirus companies) which could, in-turn, offer applicable 
solutions (e.g. patches) to participating organizations, via a cloud configuration, 
also accessible via the blockchain. Although the authors explain what 
blockchain is by using the Bitcoin blockchain an as example, they do not 
explicitly examine or propose any of the various available blockchains for 
implementing such a solution, but provide a rather theoretical implementation 
framework. They also propose the theoretical utilization of a consensus 
algorithm called “Proof-of-Attack-Detection (PoAD)”, which involves the 
verification and approval of transactions by all participating nodes of the public 
ledger. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
Although the exchange of incident-related information with other business 
entities can generally improve an organization’s cyber defense (Hausken, 
2007), it seems that organizations commonly find it difficult to disseminate 
information related to security incidents (He and Johnson, 2012; Grispos et al., 
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2015). The fear of the incident’s consequences, including negative publicity, 
possible financial penalties, reprimands and even possible retribution attempts 
(Johnson, 2002; Metzger et al, 2011; Ahmad et al, 2012) are some of the 
reasons which may lead to the under-reporting of information security incidents, 
amongst organizations. It therefore comes as no surprise that despite the 
general encouragement for information sharing related to information security 
incidents, organizations continue to approach it with ambivalence (Aviram & 
Tor, 2003). The utilization of incident reporting platforms, for reporting purposes, 
is considered of high value to organizations (Cusick & Ma, 2010; Metzger et al, 
2011); however, not a great number of platforms is generally available - 
especially with regards to manual incident reporting - while most of the 
platforms require a considerable financial investment on behalf of an 
organization. The absence of the option of anonymity regarding incident 
submissions is certainly an issue, since reputational concerns are a major factor 
for organizations sharing information security incidents (Line & Albrechtsen, 
2016; Jaatun et al, 2009; Hove et al, 2014; Ahmad et al, 2015; Ruefle et al, 
2014; Koivunen, 2010; Housen-Couriel, 2018). 
 
Even though blockchain technology initially focused on crypto/virtual currencies 
(Di Pierro, 2017), it has now witnessed the development of applications in a 
variety of fields, including data management, information security, and even 
incident reporting, although the available literature for the latter area is rather 
limited. It is important to acknowledge, that a number of these identified 
applications do not necessarily fulfil the criteria set by the various blockchain 
decisions models, as those were presented in this chapter. This may indicate, 
that in some cases, developers aim to force their problem fit into the blockchain 
technology paradigm, whereas traditional technologies might provide a better 
solution. 
 
Finally, regarding the research question that this project attempts to resolve, the 
literature identifies various reasons which contribute to the current issue of 
incident under-reporting. The candidate solution, blockchain technology, can 
certainly not resolve all of them: it cannot increase an organization’s IS maturity 
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level, it cannot change organizations which are resistant to change, it cannot 
increase an organization’s level of corporate responsibility and it can certainly 
not compel organizations to report an incident first, and then initiate any 
mitigation efforts. However, blockchain, can possibly provide a resolution 
towards some other known issues, by confronting organizational concerns, such 
as negative publicity, through the inherent anonymity features that the 
technology offers. Furthermore, it may be able to significantly reduce the 
various high costs associated with reporting and its processes. These features, 
could create the necessary value, which along with the various positive features 
identified through the evaluation of the existing reporting solutions (e.g. ease of 
use, efficiency, security, accessibility, social features and other), could possibly 
create an, overall, attractive solution for the organizations to utilize towards their 
reporting needs, based on this new technology. Blockchain also comes with 
additional, inherent, characteristics, such as increased availability, immutability 
and transparency levels. Even though the lack of these additional 
characteristics was not, in any way, identified by literature as a contributor to the 
problem of incident under-reporting, their presence in a proposed solution, 
although trivial, could potentially be regarded as beneficial. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
DePoy and Gitlin (2015, p.3) define research as “a multiple, systematic strategy, 
to generate knowledge about human behaviour, human experience, and human 
environments,” which the researcher conducts through applying and following 
an explicit process. While there may exist various definitions about what 
constitutes “research”, Hassani (2017) states that the characteristics of each 
research field require a particular adaptation of the research concepts, through 
a thorough understanding of the nature of the research at hand. In the context 
of research, “ research methodology”, can be described as the scientific 
approach which investigates, compares, contrasts, and explains the various 
ways that research could be conducted, as well as the various “methods” that 
could be utilized in the process (Hassani, 2017). The research methodology 
aims to both explicate the reasons for selecting a particular approach to 
address a research problem, as well as to explain how this approach would be 
implemented (Hassani, 2017). “Research methods”, on the other hand, could be 
described as the specific procedures and guidelines used in conducting 
research, which might utilize various instruments and tools (Hassani, 2017). 
According to the same author, the research methodology should reflect on the 
nature of the research and the researcher should identify the research category 
and research paradigm which best serve his intended research (Hassani, 
2017).  
 
Every field of science requires an adaptation of the overall research approach, 
in order to perform a research activity; a particular research project should 
adjust the generalized research approach to suit the particular problem 
(Hassani, 2017). However, information systems/computing research seems not 
to be supported by globally accepted methods - unlike most well-established 
science disciplines – due to both its infancy and ambiguity in its definition, as 
well as due to its extensive coverage and overlap with other fields (Hassani, 
2017). Although, paradigmatically, computing/information systems discipline 
can be argued to belong in the positivism/realism paradigm, which is the main 
paradigm of natural and life sciences (Denicolo and Becker, 2012), 
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computing/information systems science can be described as suffering from a 
“lack of identity” (as a fairly new discipline), although it combines the experience 
of its main roots, mathematics and engineering (Demeyer, 2011). According to 
Hasan (2003), to reach maturity as a discipline in its own right, the new field of 
computing/information systems borrows research approaches from a wide 
variety of older disciplines, the closest comparative fields being the engineering 
traditions and the design sciences.  
 
According to Nunamaker et al (1991), some research domains are sufficiently 
broad to embrace an extensive range of methodologies; this is particularly true 
in engineering and systems, where the concept at issue is likely to be viewed 
for its applications value rather than for its intrinsic value. As an example, 
Hasan (2003) proposes that, due to its nature, information systems 
development can be a knowledge creating activity, when those systems relate 
to emergent knowledge processes (EKP) (Markus et al 2002), and that, in those 
cases, information systems development is a legitimate research methodology. 
During the process of information systems development, the author argues, not 
only is knowledge created about the development process itself, but also a 
deeper understanding about the organisational problem that the system is 
designed to solve. Much of information systems research demonstrates a 
research life cycle of the form “concept, development and impact” (Nunamaker 
et al, 1991). Developed systems can serve both as a proof-of-concept for the 
fundamental research and provide an artefact that becomes the focus of 
expanded and continuing research (Nunamaker et al, 1991). According to 
Hasan (2003), many such projects can be considered a piece of “original” 
research, should the requirements, design and implementation keep their 
“originality”, and provide new knowledge, as to the ways of productively 
managing data in complex situations.  
 
Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) argue that scientists are abandoning the 
“quantitative vs qualitative” conflict and are rather focusing on the combination 
which brings the most benefit to the research question in hand. Along the same 
lines, O’Leary (2004, p.8) argues that “what was relatively simple to define thirty 
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or forty years ago, has become far more complex in recent times, with the 
number of research methods increasing dramatically”. In that sense, the rather 
‘traditional’ research approaches can be substituted by alternative approaches, 
such as Development research, Action Science research and Design Science 
research, which are described in this chapter.  
 
3.2. Types of research  
According to Saunders et al (2007), there are two basic types of research, Basic 
(or fundamental) and Applied. Basic research can be defined as “experimental 
or theoretical work, undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the 
underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any 
particular application or use in view” (OECD, 2015). It is undertaken 
predominantly in universities, as part of academic agendas (Saunders et al, 
2007), its aim is purely theoretical, and it is considered successful when it 
discovers new phenomena or new ideas of general interest (Roll-Hansen, 
2009). Applied research, on the other hand, is original investigation primarily 
directed towards a specific, practical aim or objective (OECD, 2015). It is 
directly relevant to practitioners, as it addresses issues that they see as 
important (Saunders et al, 2007), and produces possible applications to 
products, operations, methods, or systems (OECD, 2015). Applied research 
considers available knowledge, in order to solve actual problems, and therefore 
gives operational form to ideas (OECD, 2015); it may be undertaken to 
determine possible uses for the findings of basic research, or to determine new 
methods/ways of achieving pre-determined objectives. Applied research is 
considered successful, when an actual contribution to the solution of specific 
practical problems, is produced (Roll-Hansen, 2009). 
 
Information systems can be considered to be an applied research discipline, in 
the sense that “theory is frequently applied from other disciplines, such as 
economics, computer science, and the social sciences, to solve problems at the 
intersection of IT and organizations” (Peffers et al, 2007, p.2). However, 
researchers such as Kitcher (2001), have argued that the distinction between 
fundamental and applied research is essentially based on the “myth” of pure 
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science - the idea that “basic” science should be isolated - and thus no 
significant distinction can be made between the two types, either in the 
descriptive or the normative dimension. Furthermore, Nieswiadomy (2011) 
argues that many research studies combine elements from both types of 
research, and a quest starting off as basic research could, eventually, have an 
impact on a matter of professional practice. 
 
Saunders et al (2007), provide a useful diagram, to illustrate the differences 
between the basic and applied research, although they do argue that it is 
possible to situate projects somewhere between the two extremes: 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Basic vs Applied research by Saunders et al (2007) 
 
This research project can be situated towards the applied research discipline, 
since it aims to provide a solution to a problem of professional practice. More 
particularly, it aims to provide a solution to the identified problem of incident 
under-reporting, by presenting an incident reporting solution based on a new 
technology, with distinct characteristics. 
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3.3. Research philosophy   
There are three major ways of thinking about research: Ontology, Epistemology 
and Axiology (Saunders et al, 2007; Collis & Hussey, 2013; Vaishnavi et al, 
2004/19). A description of each way of thinking can be found in Appendix J. The 
research philosophy adopted in this project will become evident in the following 
sections of this chapter. 
 
3.4. Research paradigms 
Paradigm may be defined as the philosophical intent or motivation for 
undertaking a study (Cohen & Manion, 1994) or as a “loose connection of 
logically related assumptions, concepts, or propositions, that orient thinking and 
research” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1998, p.22). Some of the most common paradigms 
referred to in research, include the positivist, the interpretivist, the 
transformative and the pragmatic paradigms (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). A 
description of these paradigms can be found in Appendix J. This research 
project is situated within the pragmatic paradigm, as it places the problem of 
incident under-reporting as central and attempts to provide a solution. 
 
3.5. Research approaches 
In general, research methods, which involve activities of design and 
construction, relate to grounded approaches to research – such as pragmatism 
– where the notion of “truth is what works in practice”, prevails (Hasan, 2003). In 
Information Systems research, when designing and constructing a system are 
involved, typical methods include observation, action or participant research 
and prototyping (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1998). Hasan (2003) argues, that 
in terms of knowledge creation, the validity evidence of this type or research is 
typically referred to as “proof of concept”. 
 
A criticism among the research community, is the perceived lack of relevance of 
information systems research for practice (Benbasat and Zmud, 1999; Dennis, 
2001; Kock et al, 2002). The argument behind this criticism, according to Cole 
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et al (2005), is that research must contribute to both academia and practice; 
research should, therefore, add to existing theory - to make a scientific 
contribution - and should also assist in solving practical problems of the 
industry, anticipated or current (Cole et al, 2005). Examples of information 
systems research methods, which fulfill the criteria of this dual orientation, are 
“Development research” (Hasan, 2003), “Design Science research” (Hevner et 
al, 2004) and “Action research” (Davison et al, 2004), and the research 
community eventually seems to become more accepting of these diverse – or 
“untraditional” - research approaches (Boland & Lyytinen, 2004). A description 
of these approaches can be found in Appendix J. 
 
3.6 Selected research approach  
Although any of the above-mentioned research approaches could, potentially, 
have been utilized for this research project, development research was 
excluded, mainly because of the considerably less available resources (both 
general resources discussing development research in IS, as well as process 
models/frameworks for conducting such research) identified in literature, in 
comparison to both Action research and Design Science research. Between the 
latter two approaches, Design Science research was, eventually, selected as 
the research approach of choice; although CYCSO did display a vigorous, 
initial, interest into utilizing the reporting platform, the solution/artefact needed to 
be as customer-neutral as possible. Furthermore, besides the early interest of 
the organization, no contractual (or any other form of) agreement was pursued 
by either parties, nor could the organization provide any resources towards this 
project, such as funding, or the human resources necessary to establish the 
“client-researcher relationship”, a prerequisite of Action research (Iivari & 
Venable, 2009, p.4). Furthermore, according to Baskerville (2008, p.442), 
whereas Action research focuses on “problem solving through social and 
organizational change”, Design science research is focused “on problem solving 
by creating and positioning an artefact in a natural setting”. Therefore, and since 
for this research project an artefact would be created and consequently 
positioned and evaluated in a natural setting (i.e. in an organizational 
environment), Design Science research emerged as the most suitable research 
approach.  
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Design science research is constantly winning a wider audience (Jarvinen, 
2007). It is motivated by the desire to introduce new and innovative artefacts 
and the processes for building these artefacts, thus improving the environment 
(Simon, 1996). According to Vaishnavi et al (2004/19), the metaphysical 
assumptions of design science research are unique, since none of the axiology, 
ontology or epistemology of the paradigm is derivable from any other paradigm. 
The following table displays the philosophical assumptions of three research 
perspectives, including Design science:   
 
 
Table 3.1. Philosophical assumption of three research perspectives by 
Vaishnavi et al (2004/19) 
 
According to Vaishnavi et al (2004/19), ontologically, Design science research 
changes the state-of-the-world, through the introduction of novel artefacts, and 
therefore design science researchers are comfortable with alternative world-
states. The creation of an artefact with a problem-solving functionality, the 
incident reporting platform, in this case, requires a natural-science-like belief in 
a single, fixed, grounding reality (Vaishnavi et al, 2004/19). Epistemologically, 
the Design science researcher acknowledges that information is factual, and 
further acknowledges what that information means, through the process of 
development (Vaishnavi et al, 2004/19). The Design science researcher is a 
pragmatist; an artefact - the platform - is developed, and its behaviour is the 
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result of interactions between the various components. Descriptions of the 
interactions are information, and should the platform behave predictably, that 
information is true (Vaishnavi et al, 2004/19). Axiologically, the researcher 
values creative manipulation and control of the environment, over more 
traditional values such as the quest for truth or understanding, and he/she ought 
to have a higher tolerance for ambiguity (Vaishnavi et al, 2004/19).  
 
The cognition that takes place during a Design science research cycle is 
evident in the following figure: 
 
Figure 3.2. Cognition in a Design science research cycle by Vaishnavi et al 
(2004/19) 
 
Research begins with awareness of the problem, the incident under-reporting, 
in this case. Suggestions/requirements for providing a potential solution to this 
problem are drawn from existing knowledge (Peirce, 1931), and using this 
existing knowledge, a creative solution to the problem is attempted (Vaishnavi 
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et al, 2004/19), the blockchain-based incident reporting platform. After the 
platform was created, it was evaluated, through a structured procedure. The 
researcher’s reflections of this project are evident in the conclusion chapter of 
this report. The following figure displays a knowledge contribution framework for 
Design science research, which describes the various types of knowledge 
contribution a research project may achieve: 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Knowledge contribution framework for Design science research by 
Gregor and Hevner (2013) 
 
According to Gregor and Hevner (2013), there are four types of knowledge 
contribution: Invention is inventing new solutions/knowledge for new problems, 
Improvement is developing new solutions/knowledge for known problems, 
Adaptation concerns the innovative adaptation of known solutions/knowledge 
for new problems, and Routine Design is applying known solutions to known 
problems, which, by itself, would not usually be considered as a research 
contribution (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). According to the same authors, a 
research project can make more than a single type of contribution. This 
research project belongs in the Improvement segment of the framework, as it 
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applies an innovative solution, towards the known problem of incident under-
reporting. 
 
As previously mentioned, although a generally accepted process for carrying 
out Design Science research does not exist (Peffers et al, 2007), there is a 
number of different process models/frameworks applicable towards conducting 
Design science research. Regarding this research project, and after careful 
consideration of the available options, the framework by Peffers et al (2007) 
was identified as the most appropriate choice, as it incorporates principles, 
practices and procedures necessary to conduct such research, while being 
consistent with prior literature (Peffers et al, 2007). In order to develop their 
methodology, Peffers et al (2007, p.11) looked at “influential prior research and 
current thought, to determine the appropriate elements, seeking to build upon 
what researchers have said in key prior literature about what design science 
researchers did or should do”, and designed a methodology that could serve as 
“a commonly accepted framework for carrying out research based on Design 
science”. This framework provides a nominal process model for undertaking 
Design science research, as well as a mental model for presenting and 
evaluating such research, in the Information Systems domain (Peffers et al, 
2007). According to the authors, their Design Science Research Methodology 
(DSRM), allows researchers to present their work by referencing a commonly 
understood framework, instead of justifying the research paradigm on an ad-hoc 
basis, for every different project/paper (Peffers et al, 2007). The authors utilized 
a consensus building approach in creating DSRM, in the sense of including 
various identified common features of other proposed frameworks in their own 
framework, rather than focusing on the differences in views about Design 
science among the various researchers. According to the authors, “Archer’s 
(1984) process for industrial design, Takeda et al.’s (1990) “design cycle” 
solution for intelligent computer aided design systems, Nunamaker et al’s 
(1991) five-step methodology, Eekels and Roozenburg’s (1991) process for 
engineering design, Walls et al.’s (1992, 2004) “components of an information 
system design theory,” Rossi and Sein’s (2003) steps, and Hevner et al.’s 
(2004) guidelines for the required elements of Design research, are all 
consistent with DSRM” (Peffers et al, 2007). 
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DSRM includes six, distinct, activities/steps, and it is structured in a nominally 
sequential order, although there is no expectation that the researcher should 
always proceed in sequential order; according to the authors, a researcher may 
begin at any step and move outward (Peffers et al, 2007). The following figure 
depicts the six steps of the methodology, as well as the possible research entry 
points, based on the researcher’s particular approach:    
 
Figure 3.4. DSRM process model by Peffers et al (2007) 
 
As the authors explain, a problem-centred research approach should begin with 
the first activity (“Problem identification and motivation”), and sequentially move 
through the other activities. An objective-centred solution, initiating effort at 
activity two, (“Define objectives of a solution”), could be prompted by “an 
industry or research need that could be addressed by developing an artefact”, 
whereas design and development-centred and demonstration-centred 
approaches, would begin with activities three and four, respectively. This 
research project begun at the very first activity/step of the model, as it intended 
to provide a solution towards the problem of incident under-reporting.  
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A synopsis of the six activities undertaken as part of this research project can 
be seen below: 
 
Activity 1: Problem identification and motivation: “Define the specific research 
problem and justify the value of a solution” (Peffers et al, 2007, p.12) – During 
this activity, the problem of security incident under-reporting was identified and 
analysed, the research question was formed, research motivation was 
explained and a rigorous literature review was conducted, while also describing 
the value of the proposed solution. Evidence of this activity can be found in 
chapters one (Introduction) and two (Background, literature review & reporting 
means evaluation) of this report.  
 
Activity 2: Define the objectives for a solution: “Infer the objectives of a solution 
from the problem definition and knowledge of what is possible and feasible” 
(Peffers et al, 2007, p.12) – During this activity, the objectives of the 
decentralized solution were inferred rationally from the problem specification. A 
justification and qualitative explanation of each stated objective was provided. 
Evidence of this activity can be found in chapter four (The decentralized 
solution: Objectives). 
 
Activity 3: Design and development: “Create the artefact. Such artefacts are 
potentially constructs, models, methods, or instantiations or “new properties of 
technical, social, and/or informational resources” (Peffers et al, 2007, p.13) – 
During this activity, the solution’s desired architecture, functional and non-
functional requirements were determined, and the decentralized reporting 
platform was developed. Evidence of this activity can be found in chapter five 
(The decentralized solution: Design and development). 
 
Activity 4: Demonstration. “Demonstrate the use of the artefact to solve one or 
more instances of the problem” (Peffers et al, 2007, p.13) – During this activity, 
verification and validation procedures were performed. Verification procedures 
ensured that the developed artefact met its predefined objectives. As part of the 
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validation procedures, a working prototype of the reporting platform was 
presented to six organizations, which voluntarily tested the software, using a 
number of test scenarios, and provided appropriate feedback. Evidence of this 
activity can be found in chapter six (The decentralized solution: Demonstration). 
 
Activity 5: Evaluation: “Observe and measure how well the artefact supports a 
solution to the problem” (Peffers et al, 2007, p.13) – During this activity, the 
Venable et al (2012) evaluation framework, applicable specifically to DSR 
projects, was followed. Two evaluation methods were utilized. During the first 
evaluation method, users who also participated in the demonstration activities of 
the artefact, were called to complete evaluations, by completing, two, identical, 
Likert-style questionnaires, initially assessing the capabilities of their current (or 
previously used) incident reporting platform, and then assessing the capabilities 
of the newly developed artefact. The results obtained from these questionnaires 
were tested for significance, using the non-parametric, Wilcoxon-Pratt signed 
ranked test. The second evaluation method aimed to assess the quality of the 
developed software (artefact), and included a high-level, qualitative, 
assessment of the developed software (performed solely by the researcher), 
against the requirements posed by the international standard “ISO/IEC 
25010:2011 - Systems and software engineering — Systems and software 
Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE). Evidence of this activity can 
be found in chapter seven (The decentralized solution: Evaluation). 
 
Activity 6: Communication: “Communicate the problem and its importance, the 
artefact, its utility and novelty, the rigor of its design, and its effectiveness to 
researchers and other relevant audiences, such as practicing professionals, 
when appropriate” (Peffers et al, 2007, p.14)  – During this activity, the 
aforementioned activities were documented, as part of this report. The structure 
of the document followed the flow of activities described in the DSRM model, 
and also borrowed some elements out of the nominal structure of an empirical 
research process, including the literature review, the description of the selected 
research methodology, as well as the “discussion and conclusion” chapter. 
Evidence of this activity can be found in all of the chapters of this report.  
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3.7. Research ethics and other research considerations  
According to Iivari (2007), Design science research implies an ethical 
transformation from “describing and explaining the existing world”, to actually, 
“shaping it”. According to the same author, research in the Information Systems 
domain, may serve the interests of particular groups, such as those of 
businesses and organizations, professionals, users and various others. This 
research project aimed to provide an alternative solution to organizations and 
users alike, for reporting information security incidents, using a different 
approach from existing solutions and by utilizing a new technology. 
This research project strictly followed the University of East London’s research 
guidelines/procedures, as well as the Concordat (UK) for research integrity 
(2012), applying the “highest standards of rigour and integrity”, in all aspects of 
this research, and ensuring that research was conducted ethically, legally, 
transparently, and according to standards. Ethical approval was gained from the 
university’s relevant committee (Appendix D). Information confidentiality was 
assured throughout this project, and no organization or user/participant was 
named. Generic identification codes were used instead, thereby assuring no 
data is traceable to a particular individual or organization. All participants were 
adequately informed about this project’s aims and scope, and provided their 
input voluntarily, free from coercion.  
In general, with regards to the entire work conducted as part of this research, 
and in particular, during the artefact’s design and development procedures, a 
controlled environment was utilized, in the existing lab the researcher uses for 
his consultancy profession, with all required health, safety and security 
measures and procedures in place – as specified by local and European 
regulations and standards.  
Furthermore, since every research project assumes a particular level of inherent 
risk taken on by the researcher, a risk assessment was carried out, specifically 
for this project, prior to its commencement. A risk assessment matrix, containing 
the risk factors, their likelihood and potential impact, as well as the associated 
mitigating measures, can be found in Appendix A. 
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4. THE DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION: OBJECTIVES 
4.1. Introduction 
According to Peffers et al’s (2007) Design science research (DSR) framework, 
the second activity in a problem-centered DSR project, involves defining the 
objectives of the proposed solution. According to the authors, these objectives 
should be inferred from the problem definition, while having adequate 
knowledge about what is “possible and feasible”. The researcher should 
understand the state of the problem(s), as well as the current solution(s) and 
its/their efficacy (Peffers et al, 2007). Acquiring such knowledge, required 
identifying and evaluating existing incident reporting methods and practices, 
activities which are evident in the second chapter of this report. During this set 
of activities, it was identified that information security incidents can be reported 
automatically, without human intervention (e.g. through mechanisms 
implemented in IDS/IPS systems, firewalls and other tools), or manually, 
through e-mails, forms, or even verbally, through the phone. Reporting 
platforms can be utilized for both automatic and manual reporting. The 
identification and evaluation of existing incident reporting options/solutions, 
including their functionality and features, as well as their advantages and 
disadvantages, allowed the consequent establishment of the objectives of this 
research project. Since this project aimed to suggest a resolution towards the 
recognized problem of incident under-reporting, the objectives included 
producing a solution which would, on one hand, suggest an innovative 
approach towards the problem, but would also, on the other hand, incorporate 
all identified features and characteristics of existing approaches, which were 
deemed as both useful and effective. 
 
According to Peffers et al (2007), the objectives set during this activity can be 
quantitative or qualitative, in nature. Quantitative objectives refer to terms in 
which a desirable solution would be better than existing ones, whereas 
qualitative objectives describe how a new artefact could support solutions to not 
previously addressed problems. In this chapter, the project’s objectives are 
stated, and a justification and qualitative explanation of each objective is 
provided. 
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4.2. Objectives 
The objectives of this project derive directly from the problem definition. It is 
therefore useful, at this point, to revisit the relevant research question: 
 
Is there a way to create an innovative information security incident 
reporting solution, which will utilize the positive features offered by 
existing solutions, but will also provide added value to users, in order to 
increase their level of motivation towards the reporting of incidents? 
 
Although some authors state that incident reporting “typically represents a 
situation with unknown return on investment (Briggs et al, 2017, p.9), most of 
the literature agrees that information security incident reporting is beneficial to 
organizations (NIST, 2012; Gordon et al, 2003; ENISA, 2013; Gordon et al, 
2015; Line & Albrechtsen, 2016; Gonzalez, 2005). Through work evident in the 
previous chapters of this report, it was identified, that while information security 
incidents are, generally, on the rise - thus creating major implications for 
organizations - organizations themselves tend to under-report these incidents. 
Despite the current availability of a variety of incident reporting tools and 
methods (e-mail, verbal, platforms and various automatic and manual tools), as 
well as the fact that the exchange of incident-related information with other 
business entities can generally improve an organization’s cyber defense 
(Hausken, 2007), organizations approach incident reporting with ambivalence 
(Aviram & Tor, 2003), and find it difficult to disseminate information related to 
security incidents (He and Johnson, 2012; Grispos et al, 2015). Therefore, it 
was initially necessary to identify the reasons which prevent organizations from 
reporting. As identified through the available literature, these reasons include 
the organizational fear of the incident’s consequences, including negative 
publicity, legal liability, regulatory incompliance and possible financial penalties 
and reprimands, the exposure of organizational vulnerabilities, possible 
retribution attempts, the various costs related to incident reporting, such as 
operating costs, recruitment and training, the organization’s overall IS maturity 
level, as well as the overall organizational time spent by an organization’s 
personnel for reporting purposes (Johnson, 2002; Metzger et al, 2011; Ahmad 
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et al, 2012; Etzioni, 2014; Ruefle et al, 2014; Humphrey, 2017; Housen-Couriel, 
2018).  
The aforementioned reasons, led to the forming of the first objective of this 
research project: 
 
• O 1: Create an incident reporting solution which enables and encourages 
the reporting of information security incidents amongst organizations, 
thereby reducing organizational demotivation for reporting. 
 
Reporting statistics confirm the under-reporting of information security incidents 
and indicate that very few of them are indeed being reported (IOD & Barclays 
Policy report, 2016; Symantec, 2016; Newman, 2018; Ipsos MORI, 2017; 
SentinelOne, 2016; ENISA, 2012). In order to increase the motivational level of 
organizations towards the reporting of incidents, a number of, current, concerns 
need to be tackled: the designed solution should enable organizations to 
anonymously report incidents, without the fear of facing any fines or reprimands 
from authorities, or exposing organizational vulnerabilities to non-trusted 
parties. It should also reduce the financial cost of reporting for organizations, by 
providing a, generally, non-expensive option towards the operation and 
maintenance of a reporting system/solution, as well as minimize any personnel 
training costs. The solution should be in the form of an artefact (instantiation) 
and should fit in the “Detection and Reporting” phase of the overall incident 
response procedure/lifecycle, as defined by the ISO/IEC 27035 international 
standard on “Information Security incident management”. 
 
The research question, however, also dictates the incorporation of the positive 
aspects/features offered by existing solutions, into the designed solution. 
Therefore, the second objective of this research project is as follows: 
 
• O 2: Create an incident reporting solution which utilizes the positive 
features offered by existing reporting solutions. 
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As identified through the evaluation of existing reporting solutions, evident in the 
second chapter of this report, existing solutions do have positive features: they 
seem to be easy to understand and use, utilizing simple and straight-forward 
GUIs, with a good level of support and training offered by the commercial 
providers. Performance seems to be smooth, in either cloud or on-premise 
deployments, although scalability could not be adequately tested, since the 
demo versions available prohibited the simulation of a resource-intensive 
environment, with many users and multiple submissions of incidents. However, 
and as previously mentioned, manual information security incident reporting 
platforms are not theoretically expected to yield an enormous data volume, 
capable of deteriorating performance and efficiency. Regarding security, the 
encryption supported in the communication channels is certainly a major plus, 
while two-factor authentication offered by some platforms suggests enhanced 
security. Therefore, the designed solution should offer a secure environment for 
participants, without any sacrifices in both efficiency and performance. It should 
be easy to use, widely accessible and location independent, while also offering 
adequate customer support. Social features identified in some existing 
solutions, such as forums or chatrooms, are deemed as useful, since they offer 
the opportunity for the immediate communication between users. They can aid 
in the direct coordination of actions and the immediate exchange of feedback, 
between participants (e.g. in the case of a same/similar threat targeting multiple 
participating organizations, at the same time), but they can also aid in the build-
up of mutual trust, between them. 
 
Despite the important benefits that current solutions offer, there is certainly area 
for improvement. The research question dictates providing “added value” to 
users, and thus, the third objective is as follows: 
 
• O 3: Create an incident reporting solution which provides added value to 
users, in comparison to existing solutions. 
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The evaluation of existing reporting solutions acknowledged some issues, such 
as the lack of participants’ anonymity, the non-constant availability and the 
limited auditability/transparency of these solutions. Providing users’ and 
submissions’ anonymity, which is also a requirement of the first objective, will 
certainly deliver added value to users. Moreover, non-constant availability, an 
inherent characteristic of centralized environments, can be tackled with a 
decentralized reporting solution. Regarding auditability/transparency, although 
current solutions offer adequate audit mechanisms, stolen credentials could 
easily lead to the unauthorized modification (including erasure) of 
transactions/submissions, in a centralized database. A decentralized solution 
provides an environment where successful submissions of incidents are 
immutable, thereby increasing overall auditability and transparency.  
 
4.3. Implementation targets 
The implementation targets (ITas) described in this section aim to enhance the 
overall functionality, usability and reliability of the designed solution, by dictating 
specific implementation tasks which were identified by the literature review 
(chapter two) as being the most suitable: 
 
• ITa 1: Create a manual incident reporting solution.  
 
As previously stated, automation in incident reporting, does not come trouble-
free and the automated reporting tools have their limitations (Tondel et al, 
2014). Werlinger et al (2010) identified a lack of accuracy in automated tools, 
with high false positive rates, as a result. In addition, the automated tools’ 
usability is also a concern, with researchers identifying an organizational need 
for often customization/adjustments of these tools. (Werlinger et al, 2008, 2010; 
Metzger et al, 2011). Furthermore, information needs to be sanitized before 
automated exchange can take place, while sharing all available security data 
could lead to performance and scaling concerns in organizations (Kampanakis, 
2014). Although nobody debates that automation can generally benefit 
organizations (Line, 2013), it seems that manual reporting methods still prevail, 
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and organizations prefer manual reporting methods (Metzger et al, 2011; Hove 
et al, 2014; Grispos et al, 2015). Therefore, the designed solution should be 
manual, rather than automated, with physical entities (i.e. humans) submitting 
transactions (incidents), instead of automated tools, such as firewalls, IDS/IPS 
systems and/or other automated monitoring systems. 
 
• ITa 2: Create a software platform for the manual reporting of incidents  
 
As previously stated, researchers have indicated a variety of methods that 
employees use for the manual reporting of incidents, including e-mail, 
telephone, other verbal communications, help desk functions and incident 
reporting software/platforms (Cusick & Ma, 2010; Metzger et al, 2011; Ahmad et 
al, 2012; Grispos et al, 2015, 2017; Hove and Tårnes, 2013; Line, 2013). 
Communicating incidents though e-mail, telephone or other informal tools might 
become problematic: e-mails could be delivered to the wrong recipients (or not 
delivered at all), telephones might not be answered, and verbal communications 
might be ignored, or even deliberately neglected. The utilization of an incident 
reporting platform, for reporting purposes, is considered of high value to 
organizations: Metzger et al (2011) stated that organizations should use such a 
tool and recommended to collect all data related to the incident into such a 
system, while Cusick and Ma (2010) praised the use of an incident reporting 
platform for reporting incidents. An incident reporting platform, with an 
accessible, clean and easy to navigate, interface, and with clear submission 
instructions, can aid the incident reporting capability of an organization. It can 
eliminate the possibility of delivering a report to unauthorized recipients (since 
the platform’s users would be pre-authorized), while it can also enable the 
possibility of extracting statistics and reports, viewing historic trends, and 
submitting queries in a searchable database. The designed solution should, 
therefore, take the form of a software reporting platform. 
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• ITa 3: Create a private incident reporting platform.  
 
The reporting platform cannot be open for anyone to join. A trusted, central, 
authority is necessary both for the pre-authorization of participating members, 
as well as for the overall administration of the platform, by performing tasks 
such as removing misbehaving participants, for example. An open platform 
could allow the submission of irrelevant, false, or invalid incidents, while it could 
even permit malicious parties wasting network and storage resources (e.g. in 
the form of “spam” submissions), or deliberately submitting false incidents, in 
order to confuse participants, while preparing for a dissimilar attack. This 
misinformation could eventually demotivate true participants from submitting 
incidents, thus defying the original purpose of the designed solution, to increase 
incident reporting. In such an environment, mutual trust between participants 
(including the validity of their submissions) would be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve. The necessity of the presence of a central authority, in 
the designed solution, is therefore evident. The platform, however, could allow 
more than one partaker to form an authority, in the form of a consortium. Two or 
more, designated, businesses/ organizations, for example, could act as a joint 
authority, and could take necessary decisions, based on mutual consensus. 
Nevertheless, this could add to the complexity and cost of the solution, 
increasing overhead, time-spent on taking decisions and overall administration 
effort. It could also create a sense of inequality amongst members, since the 
consortium participants would inevitably possess an elevated status. Therefore, 
it was decided that a single, commonly trusted, organization, should act as the 
central authority. This organization could be CYCSO for example, or could even 
be a designated department of management, in case the designed solution is 
implemented internally within an organization/business. 
 
• ITa 4: Create a familiar environment for platform users 
 
Apart from utilizing the positive features currently offered by existing reporting 
solutions (PO 2), the designed platform should “feel” and “look” familiar to users. 
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This means that the overall “experience”, structure, graphical user interface 
(GUI), functionality, and the typical sequence of actions of the designed 
platform, should match (or very much approach) the existing operational 
environment of the current reporting platforms. Furthermore, familiar, 
standardized, and widely accepted reporting templates, should be utilized for 
the reporting of incidents. The combination of these elements is expected to 
enhance the uniformity (and potentially, the overall acceptance) of the designed 
solution.  
  
4.4. Aggregated table of objectives and implementation targets 
The following table summarizes the objectives and implementation targets of 
this research project: 
 
Research 
question 
 
 
 Is there a way to create an innovative information 
security incident reporting solution, which will utilize the 
positive features offered by existing solutions, but will 
also provide added value to users, in order to increase 
their level of motivation towards the reporting of 
incidents? 
 
Objectives 
 
No. Description 
 
Keywords 
1 Create an incident reporting solution which 
enables and encourages the reporting of 
information security incidents amongst 
organizations, thereby reducing organizational 
demotivation for reporting. 
 
Anonymity, Cost reduction, Artefact 
(instantiation) 
2 Create an incident reporting solution which 
utilizes the positive features offered by existing 
reporting solutions. 
 
Efficiency, Performance, Ease of 
use, Ease of understanding, 
Accessibility, Security, Support, 
Social features 
 
114 
 
3 Create an incident reporting solution which 
provides added value to users, in comparison 
to existing solutions. 
 
Anonymity, Availability, 
Auditability/transparency/immutability 
Implementation targets 
 
No. Description 
 
Keywords 
 
1 Create a manual incident reporting solution. 
 
Manual solution 
2 Create a software platform for the manual 
reporting of incidents 
 
Reporting software/platform 
3 Create a private incident reporting platform. 
 
Private reporting software/platform 
4 Create a familiar environment for platform 
users. 
 
Familiar structure, functionality, GUI, 
standardized reporting templates 
 
 
Table 4.1. Aggregated table of objectives and ITas 
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5. THE DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION: DESIGN AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
The previous chapter set the objectives that the proposed solution should fulfil. 
This chapter describes the design and implementation details of the solution, 
which are grounded on these objectives. According to Peffers et al (2007) 
framework, the “Design and Development” activity involves the creation of the 
innovative artefact, which could be an instantiation, a construct, a method, a 
model, or “new properties of social, technical, and/or informational resources” 
(Jarvinen, 2007). The outcome of this research project is an instantiation, a 
working prototype of an incident reporting platform, based on the blockchain 
technology. According to the framework, during the “Design and Development” 
phase, the artefact’s desired functionality and architecture should be 
determined, followed by the creation of the actual artefact. The produced 
instantiation aims to deliver a positive response to the research question, as it 
attempts to create an innovative incident reporting platform, which will utilize the 
positive features offered by existing solutions on one hand, while providing 
added value to users on the other hand, and thereby motivating them towards 
the reporting of information security incidents. 
 
5.1. Blockchain suitability 
Even though blockchain technology initially focused on crypto/virtual currencies 
(Di Pierro, 2017), it has now witnessed the development of applications in a 
variety of fields, including data management, information security, and even 
incident reporting, although the available literature for the latter area is rather 
limited. Blockchain technology, with its decentralized structure and its various 
inherent characteristics, including security, anonymity and integrity (Yli-Huumo 
et al, 2016), could possibly provide an alternative option/solution for incident 
reporting to organizations. Nonetheless, and despite the fact that blockchain 
technology is becoming increasingly relevant to real-world applications (Zhao et 
al, 2016), its use is not a silver bullet (Yaga et al, 2018). Taking into 
consideration the project’s objectives and before instinctively utilizing blockchain 
as the preferred implementation technology, it would be wise to initially examine 
whether blockchain could, indeed, be used for fulfilling the purposes of this 
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project. As already mentioned in chapter two, a number of “blockchain decision 
models” have been proposed by various authors, to help examine whether 
blockchain technology could be an appropriate fit for a project. The blockchain 
decision model by Wust and Gervais (2018), was eventually selected to 
evaluate the appropriateness of applying the blockchain technology for this 
project. The selection of this model was based on the fact that, according to the 
authors, “it is the first structured methodology to decide which technological 
solution is the most appropriate, considering the required trust assumptions, 
application requirements, involved parties and technical characteristics” (Wust 
&Gervais, 2018, p.9). It also differentiates between the possible use of a public 
or private blockchain and contrasts their properties against those of a traditional 
database model.   
The outcome is presented below:  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Wust and Gervais (2018) Blockchain decision model flow  
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Figure explanations: 
• 1*: The state of the transactions/incidents submitted needs to be stored. 
• 2*: There are multiple writers, as more than one users/organizations 
should be able to view and submit incidents. 
• 3*: The trusted third party (TTP) available does not have the ability of 
always being online. 
• 4*: All writers (users/organizations) need to be pre-approved by the TTP 
before being allowed to have access to the platform and to view/submit 
incidents. 
• 5*:  Although all writers are known and pre-approved (only from the 
TTP), they cannot be blindly trusted. Participating organizations might 
not essentially trust each other and in addition, an organization might 
misbehave, thus necessitating its removal from the platform  
• 6*: Public verifiability is not required since only the pre-approved 
platform’s users should be able to view and verify transactions. 
 
Therefore, and according to Wust and Gervais’ (2018) model, a private, 
permissioned, blockchain would be a suitable candidate for this research 
project. According to Cai et al (2018), a private blockchain implements access 
control and functions under a specific organization. Although a “hybrid” 
blockchain could also be selected for implementation – where a group of trusted 
entities, instead of a single owner, would have control over the blockchain 
(Mougayar, 2016) – the selection of a single owner/authority for the reporting 
platform appeared as the most attractive option, in order to both increase 
overall platform efficiency and also reduce complexity in taking various actions, 
such as approving new members, removing misbehaving entities and other 
administration-related tasks. 
 
5.1.1. Blockchain of choice 
Although the Bitcoin blockchain is considered to be the first application of the 
Blockchain technology (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017), various alternatives have 
emerged since. Since the reporting platform would be based on a private 
blockchain operation, relevant implementation technologies were examined, in 
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order to select a suitable blockchain for implementing this project. According to 
Sajana et al (2018), “Ethereum”, “Hyperledger Fabric”, “R3 Corda” and 
“Multichain”, are all popular options for implementing private blockchains. 
According to its whitepaper, Ethereum is a blockchain-based distributed, 
computing platform and operating system, with “smart contract” functionality, 
which provides the ability of building decentralized applications in situations 
where “rapid development time, security, and the ability of different applications 
to very efficiently interact, are important” (Buterin, 2014). “Fabric” by 
Hyperledger, is a consortium formed by the Linux foundation and many other 
partners, such as IBM, Intel, SAP, Cisco, Daimler, and American Express, to 
design and develop enterprise blockchains (Androulaki et al, 2018), whereas 
R3’s “Corda”, is a distributed ledger platform for recording and processing 
financial agreements (Brown et al, 2016). “Multichain” is an open source 
blockchain platform, that enables the setup, configuration, and deployment of a 
private, public, or hybrid blockchain (Greenspan, 2015c), and like “Corda”, it is 
also mainly intended for the financial industry (Cachin & Vukolic, 2017).  
 
In theory, any of the above blockchains could be utilized for this project. 
However, it seems that Ethereum and Fabric are those that present themselves 
as “utterly independent of any specific field of application” (Valenta & Sandner, 
2017, p.1), whereas Corda and Multichain appear to have been “consciously 
designed for the financial services industry” (Valenta & Sandner, 2017, p.7). 
Corda’s use cases are drawn for the financial services industry and according to 
Valenta and Sandner (2017), even efforts for integrating Corda into the 
Hyperledger project exist, thus considering Corda as complementary to Fabric, 
rather than a direct competitor. Along the same lines, Multichain is intended for 
private blockchains in the financial industry and for multi-currency exchanges in 
a consortium, aiming at being compatible with the Bitcoin ecosystem (Cachin & 
Vukolic, 2017). On the other hand, Fabric provides a modular and extendable 
architecture, and is applicable in various settings and industries, and so is the 
case with the Ethereum blockchain (Valenta & Sandner, 2017). Therefore, 
regarding this particular project, Fabric and Ethereum were the strongest 
candidates.   
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According to Cai et al (2018), when selecting a potential blockchain technology, 
one should select an implementation which is stable but also flexible. Both 
Fabric and Ethereum possess the above qualities, since their stability and 
extendibility have been tested (Cai et al, 2018). Both technologies utilize smart 
contracts (written in Java or Go for Fabric and Solidity, Serpent or Vyper for 
Ethereum) and both are open-source initiatives. However, Ethereum blockchain 
is considered to be the most popular blockchain, for developing smart contracts 
(Alharby & van Moorsel, 2017), and also boasts a significantly greater number 
of completed projects, as well as a bigger and more active community (Cai et al, 
2018). Furthermore, “mainstream” blockchains, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, 
have undergone major scrutiny throughout the past years, unlike other 
blockchains (Cai et al, 2018).  
In conclusion, any of the aforementioned “popular” blockchains (even Corda 
and Multichain) could, theoretically, have been utilized for this project: they can 
all be used for the creation of a private chain, they all offer the possibility of 
creating “smart contracts”, and they all feature suitable consensus algorithms to 
fit the needs of this project. However, due to Ethereum’s bigger publicity, active 
community and overall positive reputation, it was eventually selected as the 
blockchain of choice regarding this project. 
 
5.1.2. Consensus algorithm of choice 
As previously mentioned (Chapter 2), Blockchain is updated via the consensus 
protocol, which ensures a common, unambiguous ordering of blocks and 
transactions, while also guaranteeing the integrity and consistency of the ledger 
across geographically distributed nodes (Baliga, 2017). Consensus algorithms 
help a decentralized network to unanimously take a decision, whenever 
necessary (Sankar et al, 2017) and ensure decentralized governance, minimum 
structure, performance, integrity and authentication, as well as non-repudiation 
and byzantine fault tolerance in a blockchain implementation (Seibold & 
Samman, 2016). Regarding the Ethereum blockchain, the public chain (which 
begun its operation in 2015) utilized the Proof of Work (PoW) algorithm, which 
is still in use, although there are plans for the chain to move to the utilization of 
the Proof of Stake (PoS) algorithm (Buterin & Griffith, 2017). The PoW algorithm 
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is a “heavy” and resource-intensive algorithm, where participating nodes must 
calculate the solution of a difficult mathematical problem: the first participant 
that solves the problem can create the next block - a process also known as 
“mining” (Mingxiao et al, 2017). PoW algorithms have received heavy criticism 
due to their time-consuming processes and power-intensiveness (Baliga, 2017), 
and therefore, a move to the PoS algorithm seems rational. PoS does not utilize 
a mining process, but adopts a rather alternative approach, which involves a 
user’s stake or ownership of virtual currency in the blockchain (Baliga, 2017). 
The concept of “coin age” is used, where the longer a node holds the coins, the 
more rights it can get on the blockchain (Mingxiao et al, 2017). PoS, therefore, 
encourages participants to hold their currencies and the blockchain is not 
entirely relying on a proof of work process (Baliga, 2017).  
 
However, in private blockchains, where the environment is considered to be 
more confined and trusted, blockchains tend to rely on message-based 
consensus schemas, rather than hashing procedures, which are lighter and 
considerably speed up the consensus process, since there is no need for 
mining (De Angelis et al, 2018). In these settings, Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) 
algorithms, such as the Practical BFT (PBFT) and Proof of Authority (PoA) 
prevail (De Angelis et al, 2018). PBFT algorithm is based on the assumption 
that less than one-third of the nodes are faulty (f), which means that the network 
should consist of at least n = 3 f + 1 nodes to tolerate f faulty nodes (Castro & 
Liskov, 2002). Thus f = [(n −1)/3] and the network requires 2 f + 1 peers to 
agree on the block of transactions (Sukhwani et al, 2017). The PoA algorithm, 
differently from PBFT, has drawn attention due to the fact that it requires less 
message exchanges, and thus provides better performance and fault-tolerance, 
while still retaining Byzantine fault tolerance (Dinh et al, 2017). According to 
Tasca and Tessone (2017), in a PoA implementation, some blockchain nodes 
are exclusively allowed to create new blocks and secure the blockchain. These 
nodes “sign” the new blocks with a set of private keys, thus acting as “trusted 
signers” and every block can be matched against this list of trusted signers 
(Tasca & Tessone, 2017). The PoA algorithm was proposed as part of the 
Ethereum ecosystem for the creation of private blockchains and was 
implemented in Ethereum through algorithms “Aura” and “Clique” (De Angelis et 
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al, 2018), utilized by “Parity” and “Geth” respectively, two well-recognized 
clients for Ethereum private networks (Dinh et al, 2017).  
  
Since the incident reporting platform will feature an administrative authority 
performing tasks, such as pre-authorizing participants and other general 
administration tasks, a PoA algorithm seems like a great fit. Participants are not 
required to “fight” for mining rewards and tokens (i.e. an example of a token is 
“Ether”, the native token of the Ethereum network) and they can thus focus on 
their core goal: to report and review incidents. The selection of a PoA algorithm 
for this project significantly increases the overall performance and efficiency of 
the platform, as well as minimizes the power/resource-intensiveness of the 
solution.  
 
5.1.3. Smart contracts and development language of choice 
The Ethereum blockchain, which has emerged as the second generation of 
blockchain, supports functionality for building complex distributed applications 
(Alharby & van Moorsel, 2017). This functionality is often referred to as “smart 
contracts”, which is basically executable code, that runs on the blockchain, in 
order to facilitate, execute and enforce the terms of an agreement/contract (Xu 
et al, 2016; Wohrer & Zdun, 2018). Ethereum was the first blockchain to offer 
such functionality (Hung et al, 2019); according to Bragagnolo et al (2018, p.9), 
“smart contracts are what embedded procedures are for databases: programs 
executed in the blockchain to manage and transfer digital assets”.  
 
The development of smart contracts is necessary for creating the incident 
reporting platform, as they will incorporate the business logic of the application. 
Data received through the front-end of the application will trigger the execution 
of these smart contracts, which will interact with the blockchain and more 
specifically with the “Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)”, after the contract’s high-
level code has been compiled into bytecode. The EVM is a network of discrete 
machines in constant communication, although it can be thought as a global 
decentralized computer, on which all smart contracts run (Wohrer & Zdun, 
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2018). It handles the state of contracts and computations and is built on a stack-
based language, with a predefined set of instructions (opcodes) and arguments 
(Wood, 2014). Essentially, a contract is a series of opcodes, which the EVM 
executes in sequential order (Wohrer & Zdun, 2018).  
 
Ethereum contracts can be developed in various supported languages, such as 
“Low-level Lisp-like Language (LLL)”, “Serpent”, “Vyper” and “Solidity” (Chen et 
al, 2017). In any case, the source of a smart contract will be complied into 
bytecode which will be executed by the EVM (Chen et al, 2017). According to 
various sources (Chen et al, 2017; Bragagnolo et al, 2018; Wohrer & Zdun, 
2018; Hung et al, 2019), “Solidity” is the most popular language amongst 
developers for the creation of smart contracts, within the Ethereum 
environment. It is a Turing-complete language, with a syntax similar to common 
object-oriented languages (Hung et al, 2019) and, as already mentioned, is 
considered to be the predominant programming language for the creation of 
Ethereum smart contracts (Bragagnolo et al, 2018). Given Solidity’s popularity, 
many open-source contract-code samples exist, which underwent heavy 
scrutiny, since a mistake (e.g. a bug) can be very costly after the contract’s 
deployment. As mentioned in chapter two, smart contracts become autonomous 
entities following their creation (Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016; Gatteschi et al, 
2018) and before deploying a smart contract, one should inspect it carefully and 
include fail-safe mechanisms (Christidis & Devetsikiotis, 2016). The smart 
contracts necessary for the incident reporting platform were developed using 
the Solidity programming language. 
 
5.2. The decentralized reporting platform: functional requirements 
Through the fundamentals described in the previous sections of this chapter, 
the designed solution has begun to take shape. Essentially, the incident 
reporting platform will be an application, with a backend and a front-end, 
accessible to users through the internet. Applications developed on the 
Ethereum blockchain are usually referred to as “DApps”, which stands for 
“Decentralized Applications” (Warren & Bandeali, 2017).  Consequently, this 
incident-reporting DApp, will be built for the purposes of reporting and reviewing 
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information security incidents, functionalities which will be made available 
through Solidity smart contracts. The reporting DApp will be deployed on a 
private Ethereum ledger and will utilize the Proof-of-Authority consensus 
algorithm. 
 
5.2.1. Basic DApp functionality 
The DApp should be easy to navigate and use, and the incident reporting 
procedures should be straight-forward for all authorized users of the platform. 
There will be two kinds of users, members and administrators. At the initial 
stages of the platform there will only be one administrator (the designated 
authority), but more administrators can be added to the platform, upon need. In 
order to gain access to the platform, members would have to use an offline 
procedure to contact the authority, by submitting a registration request to the 
administrator, via e-mail or any other designated means, and providing all 
necessary documentation (participation criteria may vary between authorities) 
for authentication and authorization purposes. The authority would examine the 
request and consequently approve or deny access to the platform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Potential member access request use case  
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An approved member should be able to login to the DApp (with relevant 
credentials) and perform tasks such as submit an incident, view submitted 
incidents and search through submitted incidents. The member should also be 
able to contact the administrator and participate in a live, anonymous, chat.  
 
 
Figure 5.3. Authenticated member available actions use case 
 
A platform administrator should also be able to chat, view, submit and search 
through incidents, but in addition he/she should also be able to add and remove 
members from the platform, as well as perform other administrative tasks, such 
resetting users, increasing the platforms computational capacity etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Administrator available actions use case 
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5.2.2. Matching objectives and implementation targets to design elements 
In chapter four, the objectives and implementation targets of this research 
project were set. Consequently, the design procedure should aim to fulfill these 
objectives and targets, through a careful selection of design/implementation 
elements. This section lists the objectives and targets, and explains the 
design/implementation elements which should be utilized in order to fulfill the 
project’s objectives. 
 
a) Objectives 
 
1) “Create an incident reporting solution which enables and encourages the 
reporting of information security incidents amongst organizations, thereby 
reducing organizational demotivation for reporting” (keywords: Anonymity, Cost 
reduction, Creation of artefact) 
 
The proposed incident reporting solution will take the form of an artefact 
(instantiation). It will be a software implementation in the form of a reporting 
platform, and more specifically, a private, decentralized application (DApp), on 
the Ethereum blockchain, accessible to users through the internet. Regarding 
users’ anonymity, each user will interact with the blockchain through a 
generated address (a public key or a hash of it), which should not reveal the 
explicit identity of the user. Although, in absolute terms, this functionality 
ensures pseudonymity, rather than true anonymity of the users, this design 
decision has been made after taking into consideration that the owner/authority 
of the platform should be able to identify and take appropriate action towards 
misbehaving participants. It is important to note that various solutions are 
available for ensuring the true anonymity of the participants, such as “mixing 
services”, which utilize the grouping of several transactions into a single one 
(Tasca & Tessone, 2017), “secret sharing”, which stores data in a decentralized 
manner across N parties such that any K parties can work together to 
reconstruct the data, but K-1 parties cannot (Tasca & Tessone, 2017), and 
other solutions, such as “ring signatures” (Noether & Mackenzie, 2016) and 
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“stealth addresses” (Courtois and Mercer, 2017). However, true anonymity, in a 
private environment, could be potentially exploited by misbehaving parties. 
These parties could deliberately submit spam incidents, or even fabricated 
incidents, in order to confuse participants, while preparing for a dissimilar 
attack. This misinformation could eventually demotivate true participants from 
submitting incidents, thus defying the original purpose of the designed solution, 
to increase incident reporting. In such an environment, mutual trust between 
participants (including the validity of their submissions) would be very difficult, if 
not impossible, to achieve. True anonymity must be sacrificed, in order to create 
an effective solution. Nevertheless, it is important to note, that besides the 
central authority, no other participant will be able to identify any other members 
of the platform, since the only identifiable information, in an incident submission, 
would be the user’s hash of his public key. This provides an overall acceptable 
anonymity level and does not compromise the objective of providing an 
anonymous reporting environment for the users of the platform, since no 
member can explicitly identify any other member and/or their incident 
submissions. 
 
Regarding cost reduction, the proposed solution should be easy to understand 
and use (to minimize training costs) and this can be achieved through designing 
straight-forward reporting procedures, as well as designing a simple, “clean” 
and easy to navigate, graphical user interface (GUI). Furthermore, the cost of 
owning and operating the platform should be significantly less for the 
participants, compared to existing reporting platforms. This can be achieved by 
selecting an appropriate development and operating environment for the 
platform. Details of this environment can be found in section “5.2.4.” of this 
report. 
 
2) “Create an incident reporting solution which utilizes the positive features 
offered by existing reporting solutions” (keywords: Efficiency, Performance, 
Ease of use, Accessibility, Security, Support, Social features) 
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Regarding efficiency and performance, the selection of a private blockchain 
implementation - instead of a public one - significantly increases both. In a 
public implementation, both transactions, as well as the consensus procedure 
would be slow and resource-intensive. Private blockchain implementations 
increase the network’s performance, efficiency and scalability (Cai et al, 2018) 
and the selection of the PoA consensus algorithm moves towards the same 
direction. Regarding ease of use and accessibility, the solution – as already 
mentioned – should be easy to navigate and use and should be widely 
accessible: this will be established by creating a DApp accessible from any 
world-wide location, through the internet. 
 
Regarding security, Blockchain is a shared, tamper-proof replicated ledger 
where records are irreversible and cannot be forged thanks to the use of one-
way cryptographic hash functions (Tasca & Tessone, 2017; Chen et al, 2018; 
Gatteschi et al, 2018). Transactions need to be reviewed by most of the nodes 
of the system before they can be recorded (Lu, 2019) – but once data has been 
recorded in the ledger, it cannot be modified without letting the whole network 
know, thus permitting tamper-resistance data (Zheng et al, 2017). Blocks that 
contain invalid transactions can be discovered immediately (Zheng et al, 2017). 
Users can transfer data only if they possess a private key, which is used to 
generate a signature for each transaction a user sends out, which is, in turn, 
used to confirm both the origin and integrity of the transaction (Tasca & 
Tessone, 2017). Furthermore, all communication channels should be encrypted, 
and multi-factor authentication should be utilized for authentication purposes. 
 
Regarding user support, a button/link should be made available, through the 
platform’s GUI, for users to contact the platform’s administrator. Regarding 
social features, a live, anonymous, chat room should be implemented and 
become available to platform users, for them to instantly discuss any incidents. 
The “Whisper”, decentralized communications protocol (Wood, 2015), seems 
like a good candidate for this task. 
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3) “Create an incident reporting solution which provides added value to users, in 
comparison to existing solutions” (keywords: Anonymity, Availability, 
Auditability/transparency/immutability) 
 
Anonymity has already been discussed above. Regarding availability, constant 
availability is ensured by the inherent characteristics of the blockchain 
technology. The failure of a blockchain node does not affect the operation of the 
whole network, thus ensuring the resilience, availability and reliability of 
applications built on blockchain, by avoiding single points of failure (Zheng et al, 
2017; Chen et al, 2018; Gatteschi et al, 2018). Both public and private 
blockchain implementations are used to eliminate single sources of failure 
(Taylor et al, 2019). Auditability, transparency and immutability are also inherent 
characteristics of the blockchain technology: As already mentioned, blockchain 
is a shared, tamper-proof replicated ledger where records are irreversible and 
cannot be forged thanks to the use of one-way cryptographic hash functions 
(Tasca & Tessone, 2017; Chen et al, 2018; Gatteschi et al, 2018). Blockchain 
records are auditable by a predefined set of participants, the platform’s 
members. The blockchain technology ensures that nodes record and transfer 
records on the network and all participants can query these records, which 
makes information in the decentralized network both consistent and transparent 
(Lu, 2019). Each node can not only read the final state of transactions, but also 
the history of the previous transactional states (Gatteschi et al, 2018), while 
each participant has the same permissions and obligations to access records, 
and also allow other nodes – on the same network - to access this data 
(Bonneau et al, 2015; Lin & Liao, 2017). Consensus mechanisms implemented 
in blockchain structures enable multiple writers to modify the database and 
provide an authoritative transaction log in which all nodes provably agree 
(Casino et al, 2019). A private blockchain implementation also prevents the 
theoretical “51% attack”  (which is applicable to public implementations, and 
could allow the breach of the blockchain’s immutability, should attackers gather 
enough resources to outpace the block creation rate of the rest of the 
blockchain network), since misbehaving nodes can be removed from the 
network (Yaga et al, 2018). 
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b) Implementation targets 
 
1) “Create a manual incident reporting solution” (keywords: Manual) 
 
The proposed DApp will be designed to accept data (incidents) only through 
human input, through rationally designed forms, and not through automated 
mechanisms/tools. 
 
2) “Create a software platform for the manual reporting of incidents” (keywords: 
Reporting platform) 
 
The proposed DApp will feature a reporting platform for the registration of 
incidents, with an accessible, clean and easy to navigate interface, and with 
clear submission instructions.  
 
3) “Create a private incident reporting platform” (keywords: Private platform) 
 
The proposed reporting platform will not be open to all. Therefore, a private 
blockchain implementation will be implemented.  As previously mentioned, in 
order to gain access to the platform, members would have to use an offline 
procedure to contact the authority, with a registration request. Once approved, 
members will be able to register their account on the platform. 
 
4) “Create a familiar environment for platform users” (keywords: Familiar 
structure, functionality, GUI, standardized reporting templates) 
 
The proposed platform will “feel” and “look” familiar to users, as the overall 
“experience”, structure, graphical user interface (GUI), functionality, and the 
typical sequence of actions of the designed platform, will match (or very much 
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approach) the existing operational environment of the current reporting 
platforms. Furthermore, familiar, standardized, and widely accepted reporting 
templates, will be utilized for the reporting of incidents. The internationally 
recognized “ISO 27035:2016” incident reporting template (ISO/IEC 27035:2016, 
2016) will be utilized for creating the reporting forms, with a minor alteration. 
This alteration entails replacing the ISO’s proposed incident 
categories/taxonomy, with the “eCSIRT.net mkVI” taxonomy (Stikvoort, 2015), 
since the latter is endorsed by ENISA, its categories are universal and practical, 
and it is widely used amongst European CSIRTs (ENISA, 2018). Since the 
CYCSO is a possible first candidate for utilizing the proposed artefact, it seems 
rational to use a taxonomy favourable by both ENISA and the rest of the 
European CSIRTS.  
 
5.2.3. DApp GUI: content pages & forms 
As previously stated, major design requirements for the reporting DApp, are 
simplicity, ease of use and navigation, as well as creating an overall familiar 
environment (both visually and in terms of functionality) for the users. When 
users initially access the DApp, they should be presented with an authentication 
page, in order to register/authenticate themselves. After successful 
authentication, they should have access to the homepage of the DApp, with the 
options of submitting an incident, viewing previously submitted incidents, asking 
for help, participating in a live, anonymous, chat with other authenticated 
members, and logging-out of the platform. 
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Figure 5.5. Homepage of decentralized incident reporting platform 
 
a) “Submit incident” page 
Upon clicking on the “Submit incident” button/link located on the homepage, a 
separate page will appear to the user. The page will include a simple form with 
various fields, which follows the structure of the “ISO 27035:2016” incident 
reporting template, with the addition of the “eCSIRT.net mkVI” taxonomy. It is 
important to note, that although the ISO reporting template and the “eCSIRT” 
taxonomy are both well-known and widely-used for incident reporting purposes, 
users of the platform who are unfamiliar/inexperienced with using these 
standards, should be adequately trained before using the platform. This training 
should aid in avoiding the occurrence of any misinformed and/or false 
positive/negative incident submissions. The fields included in the form are 
presented in the following table: 
 
 
 
 
Incident Reporting DApp  
Welcome! 
View incidents 
Ask for 
help 
Submit incident 
Logout 
incident
s 
Live  
chat 
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No. Field name Field type Required 
field 
(Yes/No) 
 
Notes 
1 Title of incident Text Yes  
2 Incident classification Radio button (Options: 
major, minor, suspected) 
Yes  
3 Category of incident Drop-down list Yes *See note 1 
4 Date/time of incident 
occurrence 
Date/time Yes  
5 Date/time of incident 
discovery 
Date/time Yes  
6 Date/time of incident 
reporting 
Date/time Yes  
7 Short description of 
incident 
Text Yes  
8 Further description of 
incident 
Text No *See note 2 
 
9 Is the incident over Radio button (Options: 
Yes, No) 
Yes  
10 If yes, how long the 
incident has lasted? 
Text No  
11 Effect of incident Checkbox 
(Options: Breach of 
confidentiality, breach of 
integrity, breach of 
availability, breach of non-
repudiation, Destruction) 
Yes *See note 3 
12 Person(s)/Perpetrator(s) 
involved 
Radio button (Options: 
Person, organized group, 
Legally established 
organization/institution, 
accident, No perpetrator 
e.g. human 
error/disaster/failure, 
Other) 
Yes  
13 Description of 
perpetrator(s) 
Text No  
14 Actual or perceived 
motivation 
Checkbox (Options: 
Criminal/financial gain, 
political/terrorism, 
No *See note 3 
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pastime/hacking, revenge, 
other 
15 Details of actual/perceived 
motivation 
Text No  
16 Actions taken to resolve 
incident 
Text No  
17 Actions planned to resolve 
incident 
Text No  
18 Other entities notified (e.g. 
police, regulatory 
authority) 
Text No  
 
Table 5.1. Fields of “submit incident” form in “submit incident” page 
*Note 1: The available options are described in Table 2.1. “eCSIRT.net mkVI Classification 
Scheme by Stickvoort (2015)” in chapter two of this report. 
*Note 2: This field includes the following notice to the user: “Consider including what occurred, 
how it occurred, why it occurred, initial views on components/assets affected, adverse business 
impacts and any vulnerabilities identified”. 
*Note 3: Users can select all options that apply (i.e. more than one). 
 
At the bottom of the page there will be two options for the user: “Preview & 
submit” and “Clear form”. 
It is important to note, that since information submitted on the blockchain 
through this form will be immutable, they should not contain any sensitive 
identifiers which may require alterations, such as Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII). Considering the privacy regulations applicable around the 
world (e.g. GDPR in Europe) and also the user anonymity requirement of this 
project (as stated in chapter four), the “submit incident” page has been 
designed in a way not to explicitly require any such data. However, since some 
form fields allow users to freely submit content (e.g. field 13 – “Description of 
perpetrator(s)”), users should be very cautious as to avoid the submission of 
any such identifiers. 
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b) “View incidents” page 
Upon clicking on the “View incidents” button/link located on the homepage, a 
separate page will appear to the user. This page will contain a simple, 
searchable, array, presenting previously submitted incidents, in chronological 
order (newest on top), by all platform users. Users will be able to search 
through the array, by using appropriate keywords. Moreover, clicking on a 
displayed result will reveal the complete incident form. The following table 
presents the fields of the “view incidents” array: 
Field name Field type Notes 
 
Number of 
incident 
Numeric Each submitted incident will be assigned a unique 
number, in ascending order, beginning with integer 
number 1. Newer incidents should appear first in the 
array 
Title of incident Text This field will contain the title of the incident, as 
submitted through the incident’s individual form 
Incident 
classification 
Text This field will contain the classification of the incident 
(e.g. “major”) 
Category of 
incident 
Text This field will contain the category of the incident (e.g. 
“phishing”) 
Date/time of 
incident 
Text This field will contain the date/time of the incident 
Short description 
of incident  
Text This field will contain the short description of the incident 
Person/perpetrator 
involved 
Text This field will contain the perpetrator of the incident (e.g. 
“person”) 
Actual/perceived 
motivation 
Text This field will contain the motivation of the incident (e.g. 
“criminal/financial gain”) 
 
Table 5.2. Fields of “view incidents” array in “view incidents” page 
 
c) “Ask for help” page 
Upon clicking on the “Ask for help” button/link located on the homepage, a 
separate page will appear to the user. This page will contain a simple, 
standardized contact form, in order to enable the user to contact the platform’s 
administrator. Communication submitted through this form will be sent to the 
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administrator’s designated e-mail address. The following table presents the 
fields of the contact form: 
Field name Field type Required field (Yes/No) 
 
Name Text No 
E-mail Text Yes 
Message Text Yes 
 
Table 5.3. Fields of “contact us” form in “Ask for help” page  
 
d) “Live chat” page 
Upon clicking on the “Live chat” button/link located on the homepage, a 
separate page will appear to the user. The “Whisper”, decentralized 
communications protocol (Wood, 2015), will enable authenticated platform 
users to instantly chat between them, while on the platform. The inherent 
properties of this communication protocol allow users to remain anonymous 
while chatting.  
 
e) Registration/login page 
The registration/login page should appear to non-authenticated users. Users 
should be able to create an account (subject to limitations presented in 5.2.7) 
using their e-mail address, a password and a one-time-password/token 
(provided by an authentication service). Registered users should be able to 
login to the platform using their previously registered e-mail and password, 
along with a newly-generated one-time-password. 
 
f) Administration pages 
The platform’s administration page should allow an administrator to view 
existing users of the platform and add/remove users from the platform. Through 
the Azure administration console, an administrator will be able to perform 
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additional tasks, such as increasing capacity, adding/removing blockchain 
nodes and viewing network/utilization statistics. 
 
5.2.4. Development environment of choice 
a) Blockchain as a Service (BaaS)  
The proposed artefact could have been developed and deployed in a local 
environment. However, the emergence of various “Blockchain as a Service 
(BaaS)” platforms, with similar functionality to the widely known “Software as a 
Services (SaaS)” model, seemed to have brought many advantages to 
blockchain development. According to Samaniego and Deters (2016), local 
blockchain installations could lack sufficient computational resources and 
bandwidth, as well as consume significantly more power. Utilizing a BaaS 
approach, means that an external provider is responsible for configuring all 
underlying infrastructure for a blockchain deployment, with a small (usually, 
monthly) fee. The provider caters for hosting requirements, while properly 
manages bandwidth and the allocation of resources. Furthermore, the overall 
level of security is enhanced, since the BaaS operator usually offers advanced 
security features for its infrastructure, compared to local environments. 
However, some organizations approach the cloud model with caution, since 
along with all the benefits it brings, it may also introduce new security risks 
(Rebollo et al, 2015), especially regarding the confidentiality of data. Thus, the 
forms of the incident reporting DApp have been designed in a way to minimize 
the risk of exposure of confidential data, should a breach occur. Since the forms 
do not to contain any personal/organizational identifiers (other than the hash of 
the public key of a participant), even if the incident data eventually end up in the 
wrong hands, there would be no way for the malicious party to associate the 
data with a particular user/organization, since the user/ key pair would only be 
known by the platform’s central authority and it would be stored in an offline 
location. 
 
By utilizing a BaaS model, the developer can freely focus on building the core 
blockchain product, without having to worry about performance and other 
137 
 
infrastructure-related issues. BaaS providers may also offer additional services, 
such as blockchain authentication, governance and storage features/modules. 
The BaaS model, with its various features, can save time and reduce cost for a 
developer. Many world-renowned companies offer BaaS: Microsoft, with its 
“Azure Blockchain-as-a-Service product” (Microsoft, 2019), Amazon, with its 
“Blockchain on AWS” product, (Amazon, 2019) IBM, with its “IBM Blockchain 
Platform” (IBM, 2019), and Oracle with its “Oracle Blockchain Platform” (Oracle, 
2019) are just a few examples. The proposed reporting solution will be built and 
deployed on the Azure BaaS platform, since Microsoft offers support for 
creating private Ethereum blockchains utilizing PoA consensus algorithms, and 
also offers some other useful features, including a set of pre-configured Solidity 
smart contracts for blockchain deployment, as well as a portal for the 
governance of private blockchains. Regarding portability (i.e. moving to another 
BaaS provider, if deemed necessary), it is certainly not the easiest of tasks, 
since each provider offers its own, distinct, environment and operational 
settings. This lack of standardization is by some means expected, since the 
BaaS model is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, Azure allows the direct 
download of any previously created custom configurations, including the 
configuration settings of any blockchain services, nodes, virtual machines, 
networks and interfaces. The DApp’s incident data and smart contracts can also 
be traced/downloaded from the blockchain itself. Utilizing the above information 
and settings, an organization would be able to recreate the blockchain 
environment using a different BaaS provider, although seamless integration is 
still not possible, under the current circumstances.  
 
The solution will be built on the Quorum blockchain, a permissioned ledger 
implementation of Ethereum, developed by JP Morgan (Baliga et al, 2018) and 
offered by the Azure BaaS. Quorum utilizes a PoA type of algorithm, called 
IBFT, and supports privacy and confidentiality of both transactions and smart 
contracts (Baliga et al, 2018).  
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b) Development frameworks  
Microsoft’s Visual Studio Code (VS Code), configured to use “Azure’s 
Blockchain Development Kit for Ethereum” extension, will be used for creating, 
connecting, building, and deploying the smart contracts to the Quorum ledger. 
The extension includes the necessary packages for the installations of Node.js, 
Git, Python, Truffle and Ganache, all of which are required throughout the entire 
contract’s lifecycle, from coding to deployment.  
The application’s front-end will be build with HTML, CSS and JavaScript. 
Firebase development platform (offered By Google) will also be used for 
authentication-related tasks. 
 
c) Web3.js libraries 
Web3.js is a collection of libraries facilitating connections to Ethereum nodes. 
Web3.js will be utilized to relay the blockchain transactions to the underlying 
peer-to-peer network. Furthermore, in the web interface, Web3.js will be 
combined with Metamask (a popular Ethereum wallet and Web3-enabled 
browser), to enable interaction with the Quorum network. 
 
5.2.5. Code re-use and editing of incident submissions 
Due to its inherent characteristics, the internal logic of an Ethereum smart 
contract cannot be altered, once it has been deployed (Warren & Bandeali, 
2017). Thus, extreme care should be taken by the contract’s developer(s), 
before deployment, to ensure that the contract code both fully satisfies the 
intended business logic, as well as is free from any programming bugs or 
security vulnerabilities. Code-reuse (as regards to code which has undergone 
heavy scrutiny) is therefore highly recommended in the Ethereum community, 
while the initial vision of the smart contract ecosystem included contract 
reusability (Pontiveros et al, 2018). Consequently, the practice of code re-use 
will be utilized as much as possible throughout the development of smart 
contracts for the incident reporting DApp, by using well-known and open-
source, libraries and code repositories.  
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Along the same lines, and to increase the platform’s transparency, the users’ 
confidence level and their overall sense of trust towards the platform, it was 
decided to disallow the editing of previously submitted incidents, although such 
functionality was, indeed, programmatically feasible. Instead, a notice/warning, 
which will appear after the user clicks on the ““Preview & submit”” button of the 
incident submission form, will alert users towards carefully reviewing their form’s 
content, before proceeding to the final (and non-amendable) submission of the 
incident. 
 
5.2.6. Storage considerations  
Although data submitted on the blockchain will be stored in a decentralized 
fashion, the front-end components of the application will be stored in a 
traditional, centralized environment, utilizing the researcher’s hosting provider. 
 
5.2.7 Authentication considerations 
There will be four levels of user verification/authentication. Initially, the user 
should submit an offline verification form, which needs to be approved by the 
administrator. Secondly, the approved user will have to create an Ethereum 
wallet and forward his/her public key to the administrator. The administrator will 
include this key in a “white-list”. If a user’s key is not included in the 
authentication server’s white-list, the user will not be able to register an account 
on the DApp’s homepage. The user will then have to register an account, using 
an e-mail address, a password and a one-time-password, received from 
Firebase’s authentication service. 
Registered users will be able to login to the platform using their previously 
created e-mail address and password, as well as a one-time-password. 
 
5.2.8. Viewing blockchain transactions 
Since transactions are going to be private, they will not appear into Ethereum’s 
main network and thus users cannot view them using popular Ethereum 
transaction search engines, such as “Etherscan” or “Ethplorer”. It is, however, 
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necessary, at least for the administrator, to have access to the history of the 
transactions (which include details such as the transactions’ hash values and 
the associated users’ and Ethereum contract addresses), in order to detect 
misbehaving nodes and reprimand/remove them. A way for viewing 
transactions, would be to use Ethereum’s “Geth” client, in order to download the 
blockchain’s data blocks and then extract (and examine) the transactions from 
each block. Nevertheless, Azure supports the integration of a third-party tool, 
called “Epirus Azure Blockchain Service Explorer”, which appears to be a better 
option, since it provides a convenient GUI for viewing all details of the 
transactions submitted on the blockchain. “Epirus” will therefore be integrated 
into the Azure BaaS implementation and will be used for viewing/examining the 
transactions submitted through the platform. 
 
5.2.9. DApp architecture and ecosystem 
The following figures depict the high-level architecture of the decentralized 
incident reporting platform, as well as the DApp’s ecosystem: 
 
 
  
   User          DApp browser            GUI 
 
          
                               
                                                                                               
    
                                                                                   
 
Figure 5.6. Architecture of decentralized platform     
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Figure 5.7. Ecosystem of decentralized platform 
 
5.3. The decentralized reporting platform: non-functional requirements 
a) Usability 
The GUI will have a clean design - it will be easy to understand, use and 
navigate the reporting DApp. Menus will be easily identifiable and situated in 
noticeable locations. Text fonts will be the same throughout the DApp, while the 
images, buttons, background colours and notices will have a uniform look and 
feel across the platform. 
 
b) Accessibility 
The platform will be accessible through common web browsers (e.g. Google 
Chrome, Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox), with the appropriate Web3.0 
extensions. Although every effort will be taken to cater for mobile-device 
accessibility, such a feature cannot be guaranteed to users of the platform. 
 
 
 
DApp 
 
Smart contract 
HTML, CSS, JavaScript 
Web3.js 
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c) Availability 
The blockchain will be constantly and uninterruptedly available to users (100% 
availability). However, since the front-end GUI will not be stored in a 
decentralized fashion, its availability is guaranteed at 99.9% (provided by the 
researcher’s hosting provider).  
 
d) Reliability 
The platform will be easily recoverable and portable, in case a change of 
operating environment and/or provider is deemed necessary. Adequate care will 
be taken to ensure that the platform and its associated software are free from 
programming errors (bugs) and the developed code is well-commented. 
 
d) Performance 
The platform will provide service/performance monitoring statistics and will be 
capable of handling an average of 100 transactions per second, with a network 
deployed across purely European regions. 
 
e) Security  
Communication between the users and the platform will be encrypted using 
adequate and up-to-date cryptographic standards. Multi-factor authentication 
will be required for platform registration/login purposes. Regarding 
development, secure coding practices will be utilized throughout the project, 
with a heavy investment in code-reuse. Infrastructure security shall be managed 
by Microsoft, which “invests over a billion dollars every year regarding security” 
and has “over 3500 cyber security experts” in its employment (Ben-Menahem, 
2018). Furthermore, and according to Ben-Menahem (2018), Microsoft-
managed networks and customers networks are isolated in Azure, while, “the 
network cabling, the equipment to support and secure the network, and the 
integration of systems for monitoring the network are managed by Microsoft”. 
According to the same author, customer networks are also isolated from each 
other, through virtualization methods, while Azure also employs built-in 
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mechanisms to protect against DDoS attacks. In addition, security controls are 
integrated into the firmware and hardware of Azure, while the platform offers 
support for both software and hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments 
(TEEs).  
 
5.4. The decentralized reporting platform: Implementation  
This section describes the implementation activities undertaken, in order to 
create the decentralized, incident reporting platform. 
 
5.4.1. Deploying Azure Blockchain Service (ABS) 
The initial activity for creating the platform, was to deploy the managed 
blockchain service of Azure. This was established through the Azure portal. 
Quorum was selected as the desired deployment blockchain, as well as a basic 
environment configuration, which included a validator and a transaction node, 1 
vCore VPS and 5GB of storage. These resources (and all other resources 
deployed throughout this project) were deployed in locations described by 
Microsoft as “West Europe”, in an effort to keep all data within the European 
geographical area. By default, ABS ensures that the nodes are patched with the 
latest host operating system and blockchain software stack updates, while 
transaction nodes are secured through firewall rules and data in motion is 
encrypted through TLS.     
A new consortium was created, with a single blockchain member. Since this is a 
proof-of-concept artefact, rather than a production-ready software, no other 
nodes were added to the consortium, due to cost considerations. In an ideal 
scenario, however, each member of the blockchain would have its own node. 
ABS provides built-in governance controls for the consortium, through pre-
defined Solidity smart contracts, which allow consortium management actions, 
such as adding and removing members (nodes). These actions can be initiated 
through PowerShell (and a REST API) and therefore the administrator can 
programmatically manage a consortium using common interfaces, rather than 
through submitting smart contracts. The ABS environment also provides 
metrics, through the Azure Monitor Service, which provide details about the 
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nodes’ storage usage, memory and CPU utilization, as well as blockchain 
network activity, such as active connections and count of transactions and 
blocks.  
 
5.4.2. Creating and deploying the smart contract 
In order to create and deploy the required smart contract, Microsoft’s Visual 
Studio Code (VS Code) was utilized, which was configured to use “Azure’s 
Blockchain Development Kit for Ethereum” extension. Through the development 
kit, a connection to the previously created consortium was established. Only 
creating a simple, storage, contract was required, for the needs of this project 
(since ABS deployment includes a number of pre-deployed, administration-
related smart contracts).Thus, it was sufficiently straight-forward to identify an 
existing, audited, and publicly scrutinized sample, and modify its content 
accordingly. The sample contract used, was created by ChronoBank, and is 
available in their Github repository (ChronoBank, 2018).  
 
The contract for this project was written in the Solidity language and features 
three basic functions: 
 
The “submitReport” function displayed above, is activated when a user submits 
a new incident through the DApp’s GUI. The “ttl” and “reportJSON” hold the 
data the user has submitted, which the contract saves in “_reports”, while “emit” 
triggers the event.  
    function submitReport (string calldata _ttl, string calldata _reportJSON) external { 
        _index++; 
        _reports[_index] = Report(_ttl, block.timestamp, _reportJSON); 
        emit EvtReport(_index);  } 
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The “getReport” function displayed above, returns the incident report data (the 
title and details of the incident, along with the timestamp) according to the report 
ID. 
 
Finally, the “getReportsCount” function, simply returns the count of the 
submitted reports. 
 
The entire contract is available in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     function getReport(uint256 reportID) external view returns ( 
        string memory ttl, 
        uint256 dtsubmit, 
        string memory reportJSON 
    ) { 
        Report memory report = _reports[reportID]; 
        return ( 
            report.ttl, 
            report.dtsubmit, 
            report.reportJSON 
        );    } 
    function getReportsCount() external view returns (uint256 ret) { 
        return _index; 
    } 
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Furthermore, Unit testing was performed, to ensure that the contract behavior 
was as intended, before deployment. A total number of eight tests were 
performed, and calls from test-users were emulated. Two tests checked the 
state of the chain before adding a report (pre-submit tests), three tests checked 
the state after adding a report (submit report), and three tests checked the state 
after submitting a second report (submit 2nd report). All scenarios were 
successful, as evident in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Unit testing results of smart contract  
 
The JavaScript code used for executing the tests can also be found in Appendix 
B. 
 
The final step involved uploading the contract’s code to Azure’s Blockchain 
Development Kit, compiling the contract with Truffle, and deploying the contract 
to the blockchain, utilizing Truffle’s migration scripts.  
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5.4.3. Creating the GUI  
The application’s GUI was built using HTML, CSS and JavaScript and hosted 
on a server which the researcher utilizes under his professional capacity. The 
GUI can be accessed at https://alexis-michael.eu/reporting. All requirements, as 
defined during the design phase of the project, were successfully implemented. 
The rest of this section presents a selection of implementation activities:     
 
a) Login/register page 
The authentication page was created using the Firebase development platform, 
owned by Google. Firebase has ready-made (boilerplate) scripts, for easily 
integrating authentication mechanisms (including modules for multi-factor 
authentication), in both web and mobile applications. The following figure 
depicts the GUI component created for handling user authentication: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Firebase authentication component  
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b) Homepage  
The below code segment is a snippet of the full code, which in conjunction with 
other scripts (e.g. CSS), were used to create the members’ homepage:  
 
The following page is displayed to the user after successful login:  
 
Figure 5.10. Incident Reporting DApp’s homepage 
     <div id=pagehome> 
         <div id=homehead> 
            <h1> Incident Reporting DApp</h1>  </div> 
         <div id=homeuser> 
            <div id=hiuser>Welcome!</div> </div> 
         <div id=homesubm><input type=button class=homebtn data-open='submit' value='Submit incident' id=opensubmit 
title='Click to submit a new incident report'></div>  
         <div id=homelist><input type=button class=homebtn data-open='list' value='View incidents' id=openlist title='Click to 
see the list'></div> 
         <div id=homehelp><input type=button class=homebtn data-open='help’ value='Ask for help' id=openhelp title='Click to 
send us a message'></div> 
         <div id=homechat>  
            <input type=button class=homebtn data-open='chat' value='Live chat' id=openchat title='Click to chat'>  
<span id=chatunread data-open='chat' class=hidden></span> </div> 
         <div id=homebye> <input type=button class=homebtn data-open='bye value='Logout' id=logout title='Click to log 
out'></div>   </div> 
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c) Submit incident page 
The below code segment is a snippet of the full code, which in conjunction with 
other scripts (e.g. CSS), were used to create the submit incident page:  
The following page is displayed to the user for submitting an incident: 
 
Figure 5.11. Submit incident page 
 
     <div class=wincontentw> 
            <div class=block> 
               <div class="screen-title"> 
                  <h2>Report new incident</h2> 
               </div>  <div id=thetable class='grid2 gridtable'> 
                  <div class='gridline gridline1 required' data-rown='1'><span id=ttlttl>Title of incident</span>:</div> 
                  <div class='gridline gridline1' data-rown='1'> 
                     <textarea name=inpttl id=inpttl class=textareasmall required></textarea> 
                  </div>  <div class='gridline gridline2 required' data-rown='2'><span id=ttllevel>Incident 
classification</span>:</div> 
                  <div class='gridline gridline2 spacebetween' data-rown='2'> 
                     <div><input type=radio name=inplevel id=inplevelmajor value='major'> <label for=inplevelmajor 
id=vallevelmajor>Major</label></div> 
                     <div><input type=radio name=inplevel id=inplevelminor value='minor'> <label for=inplevelminor 
id=vallevelminor>Minor</label></div> 
                     <div><input type=radio name=inplevel id=inplevelsuspected value='suspected'> <label 
for=inplevelsuspected id=vallevelsuspected>Suspected</label></div> </div> 
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d) View incident page 
As per design requirements, a list of all the incidents appears to the user. The 
user can click on each table entry to view the full report. 
 
Figure 5.12. View incidents page 
e) Chat page 
A simple chat window was created for implementing the GUI of Whisper chat:  
The following page is displayed to the user when selecting to chat: 
 
Figure 5.13. Chat page 
<h2>IRDA chat</h2> </div> <div id=chatroom> <div id=chat> 
                     <div class=hint>There were no messages since you've signed in</div> 
                  </div> <div id=chatbox> <input name=chatsend id=chatsend placeholder='Your message' 
onkeyup='chatTyping(event);'> 
                     <input id=chatsendbtn type=image src='assets/img/sendbl.png' onclick='chatSend();' title='Send message'>  
</div> <div id=emojis class=flexy></div> 
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5.4.4. Utilizing Web3 
In order to connect the web interface to the smart contract, the utilization of a 
lightweight, stateless, RPC protocol was necessary. JSON-RPC is such a 
protocol, and Web3 is the Ethereum-compatible API, built using the JSON-RPC 
specifications. Initially, Web3.js was installed through Node.js. Since smart 
contracts operate on large integer numbers, the “Bignumber” library was utilized 
for JavaScript compatibility reasons. The next step involved creating a Web3 
instance and setting a provider, to allow users to interact with the contract from 
the web interface. This provider, once installed by the users of the platform, 
adds an Ethereum object to the browser’s main window object. If no such object 
is detected by the platform, the user is instructed to install Metamask (or other 
compatible browser). Metamask has an “enable()” function, which returns the 
user’s public key (after the user has approved the action), which is necessary 
both for authentication purposes, as well as for signing transactions. In order to 
allow the JavaScript front-end to communicate with the smart contract, the “ABI 
definition” of the contract was needed. This ABI definition file was automatically 
created by Truffle (in VS Code) and was then imported into the JavaScript code. 
 
Web3 was also utilized for building Whisper, the anonymous chat of the 
platform. Whisper is a peer-to-peer messaging protocol for DApps and provides 
a simple API (called “web3.shh”) for sending and receiving messages in 
secrecy. The chat instance was created using sample code from “Status”, an 
open source messaging platform to interact with decentralized applications that 
run on the Ethereum Network (Status Network, 2017). The first step involved 
creating a new virtual machine in Azure, which would act as a Whisper node, 
exposing an RPC interface. The next step involved creating a Web3 connection 
with this newly created node. A keypair was then created, for the signing of 
messages to be sent. A symmetric key was also created, to encrypt messages 
which should be received by anyone listening to the channel. A public key was 
also generated, in order to identify messages that are sent over the channel. In 
order to send a message, the “web3.shh.post” function is used, which signs the 
message with the previously created keypair. In order to view messages, the 
“web3.shh.subscribe” function is used, which subscribes to the messages 
received by the symmetric key.  
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A final use of Web3 in this project is for authentication purposes, and more 
specifically, to detect whether a visitor’s public key is white-listed and the visitor 
can therefore proceed to the registration/login procedure of the platform. The 
Web3 function returns the public key of the visitor’s provider (e.g. Metamask). 
The key is then compared to the entries of the authentication database 
(Firebase). If a match is found, the visitor can proceed to register/login to the 
platform or else the visitor is informed that his/her wallet address is not white-
listed. 
 
5.4.5. Other implementation actions 
a) Authentication procedure 
As already mentioned, Firebase was used for implementing the various 
authentication features of the platform. The platform was registered to a new 
Firebase project, the necessary authentication JavaScript libraries were 
installed and “alexis-michael.eu” was listed as an authorized domain. A firebase 
database was also created to store the authorized users. Firebase supports a 
variety of authentication methods including “Email/password”, “Phone”, 
“Google”, “Facebook” and many more. For the incident reporting platform, a 
combination of “email/password” and “phone” was selected (enabled through 
the Firebase console), in addition to the whitelisting of the public key. This 
means, that in order for a user to register/login to the platform, he/she would 
need to have a valid public key, a valid e-mail/password combination, as well as 
a valid one-time-password (in the form of a six-digit code, received through an 
SMS). The Firebase free account allows sending up to 500 SMS messages, per 
IP address, per hour, which are more than enough for the working prototype 
version. A “white-listed” user can register for a new account, through the DApp’s 
GUI. He/she would need to provide an e-mail address, a password and a 
mobile phone number, for receiving the one-time-passwords. One-time-
passwords received by the users, need to be typed in a drop-in widget, which 
appears to the screen, after either a successful registration request, or after an 
e-mail/password match (during a login attempt). All authentication credentials of 
a user are linked to a single Firebase user ID, which enables swift user 
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management. Finally, Firebase's “reCAPTCHA verifier” was also implemented, 
to avoid misuse of authentication tokens.  
 
b) Administration panel 
Firebase was configured to provide administration-related functionality to the 
incident reporting platform, such as adding and removing users and 
administrators. The firebase database contains two levels of users: 
administrators and common users. As previously mentioned, all authentication 
credentials of a user are linked to a single Firebase user ID, including the user’s 
public key. This simplifies the task of removing users from the platform, since 
they can be removed with a single action, through Firebase’s simple GUI. 
However, when it comes to adding new users to the platform, through 
Firebase’s GUI, the task gets more complex: the administrator needs to add a 
new document to the database, and define four different fields (name, id, 
timestamp, address), as evident in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14. Adding new user through Firebase’s GUI 
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Although the process is not particularly difficult for IT literate administrators, it 
might seem complex for some users. Therefore, a separate administration 
panel was created, which is accessible at: https://alexis-michael.eu/reporting 
/admin. This panel, which is linked to the same Firebase database, displays a 
simple list of the users (name and public key) and the administrator can add or 
remove users, as well as search the database based on a user’s public key:   
 
 
Figure 5.15. IRDA admin panel 
 
The reporting platform’s administrator can therefore simply add a new user 
through this panel (stating only the user’s name and public key) and the 
Firebase database will automatically be populated with this new user. In this 
way, the administrator essentially “white-lists” a user. The user then needs to 
register through the platform’s GUI (by providing an e-mail/password/mobile 
phone number) and he/she will be able to immediately use the platform. The 
administrator can also remove a user through this panel, by deleting his public 
key from the list. The next time a non-whitelisted (but registered) user tries to 
login to the incident reporting platform, a script will detect this activity and 
automatically remove that account from the Firebase database. Users can also 
be manually deleted, through the Firebase console. 
 
c) Contact page 
The incident reporting platform features a simple contact form, where users can 
communicate (through e-mail) with the administrator:  
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Figure 5.16. Contact/ask for help page 
The form was configured to operate with “Mailgun”, an automation service 
offering e-mail related services for websites and applications (Nabors, 2017), 
since Mailgun both offers an intuitive API, as well as allows the delivery of ten 
thousand e-mails for free, per month. 
 
d) Blockchain explorer 
In order to view the transactions in the private blockchain, “Epirus Blockchain 
Service Explorer” was deployed in the Azure environment, which required a 
separate virtual machine. The GUI of Epirus (available at: http://epirus-
8ea3d7.westeurope.cloudapp.azure.com) allows both the administrators and 
the users of the platform to view the transactions submitted on the blockchain. 
 
 
Figure 5.17. Epirus Blockchain Service Explorer with sample transactions 
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6. THE DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION: DEMONSTRATION 
According to Peffers et al (2007) framework, the fourth activity of a design 
science research project involves demonstrating how the produced artefact 
solves one, or more, instances of the defined problem, and this could involve 
the artefact’s use in a case study, a simulation, in experimentation, or any other 
appropriate activity. It is, in fact, considered as an early evaluation activity (Prat 
et al, 2014). As part of this activity, six organizations accepted to use the 
decentralized incident reporting platform and were called to perform a series of 
pre-defined actions, in order to confirm the platform’s intended functionality. 
These participants were later called to evaluate the artefact, an activity 
described in the subsequent chapter of this report. This chapter describes the 
verification and validation activities performed in order to demonstrate the 
artefact’s validity and effectiveness. All functional and non-functional 
requirements of the reporting platform were satisfied. 
 
6.1. Verification 
According to Geisler (2010), verification refers to the “act of demonstrating that 
design outputs match design inputs”. Therefore, and before initiating any testing 
activities, it was necessary to confirm that the developed artefact met its 
predefined objectives. The following table presents the predefined objectives 
and implementation targets of this project, as those were set in Chapter four of 
this report, with a corresponding confirmation of actual implementation success 
or failure, for each objective, as well as the specific implementation details 
which determined the success/failure outcome: 
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Objectives 
 
No. Description Keywords Implementation result (Success/failure) 
Implementation details 
1 Create an 
incident 
reporting 
solution which 
enables and 
encourages 
the reporting of 
information 
security 
incidents 
amongst 
organizations, 
thereby 
reducing 
organizational 
demotivation 
for reporting. 
 
Anonymity, 
Cost 
reduction, 
Artefact 
(instantiation) 
Success 
 
- Created artefact (instantiation) in the form of a 
DApp 
 
- Anonymity of participants is ensured through 
blockchain’s (Quorum) inherent characteristics. 
Only the public key of each participant is publicly 
visible and no other identifiable data. 
 
- Produced artefact is easy to understand and use, 
utilizing a simple GUI and standardized features 
and reporting templates, which minimizes any 
training costs. In addition, the cost of owning and 
operating the platform sums up to the yearly 
amount of approximately GBP 5.000, which is 
significantly lower than that of other commercially 
available platforms (excluding open-source 
platforms). The total cost involves all the services 
purchased through the Azure BaaS and the cost of 
the hosting provider for the front-end components. 
Furthermore, a variety of no-cost services have 
been utilized for this project: Mailgun for free e-mail 
delivery, Firebase for free database provision and 
multifactor authentication processes, Epirus 
Explorer for viewing transactions. 
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2 Create an 
incident 
reporting 
solution which 
utilizes the 
positive 
features 
offered by 
existing 
reporting 
solutions. 
 
Efficiency, 
Performance, 
Ease of use, 
Accessibility, 
Security, 
Support, 
Social features 
 
Success 
 
- The selection of creating a private blockchain 
implementation, as well as utilizing a less resource-
intensive consensus algorithm (PoA/IBFT), increase 
the solution’s performance, efficiency and 
scalability. 
 
- The platform is easy to navigate and use 
 
- The platform is easily accessible throughout the 
world (over the Internet), and only requires a 
Web3.0-capable browser and an Ethereum wallet. 
 
- Incidents submitted over the platform are 
irreversible and cannot be forged (due to one-way 
cryptographic hash functions) 
 
- Origin and integrity of submitted incidents are 
ensured through the signing of each incident 
(transaction) with the user’s private key. 
 
- All communication channels are encrypted using 
up-to-date cryptographic standards 
 
- Multifactor authentication has been implemented 
utilizing three levels of user authentication: a) User 
public key white-listing b) E-mail/password 
combination c) One-time-password received 
through SMS. 
 
- The option of user support/communication with 
platform administrator has been implemented 
through the creation of an easy to use contact form 
 
- A live, anonymous, chat has been implemented as 
part of providing adequate social features to the 
platform users 
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3 Create an 
incident 
reporting 
solution which 
provides added 
value to users, 
in comparison 
to existing 
solutions. 
 
Anonymity, 
Availability, 
Auditability/tra
nsparency/im
mutability 
 
Success 
 
- Anonymity of participants is ensured through 
blockchain’s (Quorum) inherent characteristics. 
Only the public key of each participant is publicly 
visible and no other identifiable data. 
 
- Constant blockchain availability is ensured 
through the inherent characteristics of the 
technology. Front-end availability currently stands 
at 99.9% 
 
- Incidents are auditable and all participants can 
query the submitted incidents, through the use of 
the Epirus Blockchain explorer. Incidents are 
therefore both consistent and transparent. 
 
- Incidents submitted over the platform are 
immutable: they and cannot be forged (due to one-
way cryptographic hash functions). 
 
Implementation targets 
 
1 Create a 
manual 
incident 
reporting 
solution. 
 
Manual 
solution 
Success 
- The produced incident reporting solution, accepts 
data (incidents) only through human input, through 
rationally designed forms, and not through 
automated mechanisms/tools. 
2 Create a 
software 
platform for the 
manual 
reporting of 
incidents 
 
Reporting 
software/platfo
rm 
Success 
- The produced incident reporting solution is in the 
form of a software platform, featuring an accessible, 
clean and easy to navigate, interface 
3 Create a 
private incident 
reporting 
platform. 
 
Private 
reporting 
software/platfo
rm 
Success 
- The produced incident reporting platform is only 
accessible by pre-authorized participants (allowed 
by a designated authority). 
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4 Create a 
familiar 
environment 
for platform 
users. 
 
Familiar 
structure, 
functionality, 
GUI, 
standardized 
reporting 
templates 
 
Success 
- The platform “feels” and “looks” familiar to users, 
as the overall “experience”, structure, graphical 
user interface (GUI), functionality, and the typical 
sequence of actions of the platform, matches (or 
very much approaches) the existing operational 
environment of other reporting platforms. 
 
- The reporting of incidents is conducted through, 
familiar, standardized, and widely accepted 
reporting templates. The internationally recognized 
“ISO 27035:2016” incident reporting template was 
utilized, with a minor alteration. This alteration 
included replacing the ISO’s proposed incident 
categories/taxonomy, with the “eCSIRT.net mkVI” 
taxonomy (Stikvoort, 2015), since the latter is 
endorsed by ENISA, its categories are universal 
and practical, and it is widely used amongst 
European CSIRTs (ENISA, 2018). 
 
 
Table 6.1. Implementation results of set objectives 
 
6.2. Validation Tests  
According to ISO/IEC 15288 (2015), software validation activities act towards 
the confirmation that the requirements for an application or a specific intended 
use have been met, through the provision of “objective evidence”. According to 
the same international standard, validation activities should provide confidence 
that a software can accomplish its pre-set objectives and intended use, while 
operating in its intended environment. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to 
seek a number of external actors, who would, in conjunction with the 
researcher, execute a number of pre-determined test cases/scenarios, in order 
to obtain this necessary “objective evidence”. This “evidence” would confirm 
that the developed incident reporting platform behaved according to its pre-set 
objectives and intended use.    
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6.2.1. Introduction 
Utilizing CYCSO’s businesses database, a “call-for-participants” e-mail 
(Appendix C) was sent to organizations, in order to identity potential interest for 
testing the produced incident reporting platform. The participating organizations 
could be of any size and operate in any business sector. The only major 
eligibility prerequisite was that the participating organizations should at that 
point be using (or have used, at some point in the past) an existing incident 
reporting platform, either commercially available, or open source/free. The 
reason for setting this prerequisite, was that participating organizations should 
be familiar with using an incident reporting platform and thus be able to 
compare and evaluate available features and functionality. Seven organizations 
expressed interest in testing the platform, out of which one was disqualified, 
since it did not have any prior experience in using any other reporting platform. 
 
6.2.2. Profiles of participants 
Six organizations were therefore eligible to participate in testing the platform. 
Out of these six, one operates in the retail sector (hereinafter referred to as 
“Company A”), one in the higher education sector (“Company B”), three in the 
financial sector (“Companies “C”, “D”, “E”) and one is a group of companies 
operating in both the hospitality and construction sector (“Company F”). All 
participants had previous experience with one, or more, commercial incident 
reporting platforms, although, at that point of time, only one of them was still 
utilizing such a platform. Furthermore, a distinct set of activities were executed 
by the researcher himself, who is an information security professional and 
professional doctorate student at the University of East London. 
 
6.2.3. Purpose 
The purpose of these tests was the assessment of the platform’s intended 
functionality, by six, external, business actors, who were called to follow 
specific, predetermined, test cases, prepared by the researcher. In addition, a 
distinct set of activities were executed by the researcher himself, in order to test 
the functionality of specific, administration-related, tasks of the platform. These 
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administrative tasks could not have been executed by an external actor, since 
no contractual agreement was in place with any organization to act as an 
administrator. If admin privileges were given to external parties, there was a risk 
of unintentional or intentional damage to the platform: they could have 
added/deleted users at will, they could have altered any platform/blockchain 
settings or they could have obtained copies of any platform/blockchain 
configurations for their own use. Therefore, and since only a single instance of 
the platform was developed, for the proof of concept purposes of this project, 
the admin test cases had to be executed by the researcher, in a controlled 
environment. 
 
6.2.4. Roles & Responsibilities 
The test cases had to be executed by qualified personnel of the participating 
organizations, who were directly involved in the operation/management of the 
incident reporting platform of the organization, currently (or previously) in use. 
The following table summarizes the roles and responsibilities of the participants: 
Participant Capacity No. of test 
cases to be 
executed 
 
Responsibility 
Company A CIO, CISO or similar 
role 
5 Perform user test cases and 
report results (Success/Fail) 
 
Company B CIO, CISO or similar 
role 
5 Perform user test cases and 
report results (Success/Fail) 
 
Company C CIO, CISO or similar 
position 
5 Perform user test cases and 
report results (Success/Fail) 
 
Company D CIO, CISO or similar 
role 
5 Perform user test cases and 
report results (Success/Fail) 
 
Company E CIO, CISO or similar 
role 
5 Perform user test cases and 
report results (Success/Fail) 
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Company F CIO, CISO or similar 
role 
5 Perform user test cases and 
report results (Success/Fail) 
 
Alexis Michail Researcher, 
Developer 
5 Perform admin test cases and 
report results (Success/Fail) 
 
 
Table 6.2. Roles and responsibilities of participating organizations 
 
6.2.5. Test Prerequisites 
Before initiating any testing activities, the relevant ethical approval was obtained 
from the University’s Ethics Committee (Appendix D). The participating 
organizations were informed about their required contribution to this research 
project and signed a consent form. They were also given written instructions for 
performing the test cases (Appendix E). Participants were also given two 
questionnaires to complete, one before commencing their test activities, and 
one after their completion. The results of these questionnaires are described in 
“chapter 7 – Evaluation”. 
 
6.2.6. Test requirements and testing schedule 
Test cases by participants would be executed at their own organizational 
premises, in their usual operating environment, at any time between 02/12/2019 
and 06/12/2019. Participants would have to strictly follow the specified test 
instructions and report a “success” or “fail” outcome for each, distinct, test case, 
through electronic mail/chat or through verbal communication, upon the tests’ 
cessation. Should a test case present “fail” as an outcome, participants should 
include a detailed description of their actions, leading to this outcome, as well 
as any error messages presented throughout the test activity. 
The following table summarizes the schedule of the various testing activities, in 
sequential order: 
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No. Test activity 
 
Responsibility Date(s) 
1 Design and develop test cases 
 
Alexis Michail 01-10/11/2019 
2 Call for participants  
 
Alexis Michail 18-22/11/2019 
3 Evaluate participants 
 
Alexis Michail 23-24/11/2019 
4 Review test cases and other test 
instructions for completeness and 
accuracy 
 
Alexis Michail 25/11/2019 
5 Confirm availability of participants 
 
Alexis Michail 26/11/2019 
6 Admin test cases execution by developer 
 
Alexis Michail 27/11/2019 
7 Take corrective action in case of “failed” 
admin test case and repeat execution by 
developer 
 
Alexis Michail 27-29/11/2019 
8 Provide test cases and instructions to 
participants 
 
Alexis Michail 02/12/2019 
9 User test cases execution by participating 
organizations 
 
Company A, Company 
B, Company C, 
Company D, Company 
E, Company F 
 
03-05/12/2019 
10 Provide tests outcome by participating 
organizations 
 
Company A, Company 
B, Company C, 
Company D, Company 
E, Company F 
 
03-05/12/2019 
11 Record and evaluate all tests outcome 
 
Alexis Michail 03-05/12/2019 
12 Take corrective action in case of “failed” 
test case and repeat execution 
 
Alexis Michail and 
affected company 
03-05/12/2019 
13 Provide test outcome and repeat step 12 
in case of “failed” test case 
 
Alexis Michail and 
affected company 
03-05/12/2019 
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14 Document test outcome 
 
Alexis Michail 03-05/12/2019 
 
Table 6.3. Schedule of testing activities 
 
6.2.7. Type of testing and testing environment  
Since the overall aim of this testing activity was to exhibit and validate the 
proper functionality of the decentralized incident reporting platform, a “black 
box” type of testing was deemed as the most appropriate. In a “black box” type 
of test, the tester solely focuses on the system output - which is generated by 
selected input and specific execution conditions - and does not have access to 
the source code or any other internal functions of the system (Liu & Tan, 2009). 
On the other hand, in a “white box” type of test, test cases aim to investigate the 
internal logic and the structure of the code (Khan & Khan, 2012). “Grey box” 
testing combines both “black box” and “white box” testing techniques (Khan & 
Khan, 2012). Since the developed artefact is a prototype, and not yet targeted 
towards a production environment, a black box type of test should suffice, at 
this stage. However, “grey box” testing should be utilized, before the developed 
incident reporting platform is addressed towards a greater audience.  
Regarding the testing environment, all testing activities were performed in an 
online (internet-enabled) environment.   
 
6.2.8. Test assumptions 
In order for the participants to successfully perform the test activities, a number 
of assumptions needed to be satisfied: 
 
a) Participants should have access to the Internet and operate internet-enabled 
devices (terminals) with suitable browsers. 
b) Participants should first complete the evaluation questionnaire (presented in 
chapter seven) regarding their alternative incident reporting platform, before 
initiating any testing activities. 
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c) Participants should thoroughly read the applicable test instructions (Appendix 
E) before initiating any test activities. 
d) Participants should complete the testing activities and report the subsequent 
results within the applicable timeframe (evident in section “6.2.6.”). 
e) Upon the test’s cessation, participants should be available and accessible for 
a further period of one week, in case further clarifications are necessary.   
 
6.2.9. Test cases  
The following section describes the various test cases that both the participants 
(users) and the researcher (admin) were called to sequentially perform: 
a) User test cases 
i) User login 
Test case title 
 
User login 
ID UTC-01 
 
Purpose To authenticate the user of the platform and provide access to 
its functionality. 
 
Preconditions Metamask plugin, Ethereum wallet, mobile phone to receive 
SMS OTP, white-listed Ethereum public key, successful 
registration to the platform.   
 
Description of events 1. Access the platform’s webpage through suitable browser. 
2. Login to Metamask wallet and allow connection. 
3. Insert e-mail and password in designated fields. 
4. Request token for multi-factor authentication. 
5. Insert token received through SMS in designated field. 
6. Press login button. 
 
Expected result Authentication is successful and the platform’s homepage is 
displayed to the user. 
 
 
Table 6.4. User login test case 
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ii) User submit incident 
Test case title 
 
User submit incident 
ID UTC-02 
 
Purpose To complete an incident reporting form and submit an incident. 
 
Preconditions Successful execution of UTC-01.  
 
 
Description of events 1. After successful login and while on platform’s homepage, 
click on the “submit incident” button. 
2. Fill in all available fields of the form with details of a mock 
incident. 
3. Click “Preview & submit” button. 
4. Review content of form and if satisfied with content click 
“submit” button, otherwise click “edit form” button. 
5. Sign transaction with Metamask plugin or similar. 
6. View transaction ID on your screen. 
 
Expected result Incident is successfully submitted and stored on the blockchain 
and the transaction ID is displayed to the user. 
 
 
Table 6.5. User submit incident test case 
 
iii) User view incidents 
Test case title 
 
User view incident 
ID UTC-03 
 
Purpose To view the incident previously submitted (following the 
successful execution of UTC-02) recorded in the “view 
incidents” table. 
 
Preconditions Successful execution of UTC-01 and UTC-02. 
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Description of events 1. While on platform’s homepage, click on the “view incidents” 
button. 
2. The incident submitted through UTC-02 should be evident in 
the relevant table and located at the top of the list. 
3. Click on any field of the specific row of the incident. 
4. Confirm the data displayed is identical to the data submitted 
as part of UTC-02 execution. 
 
Expected result Incident is successfully displayed in “view incidents” table. 
 
 
Table 6.6. User view incident test case 
 
iv) User ask for help  
Test case title 
 
User ask for help 
ID UTC-04 
 
Purpose To submit a message to the administrator through the “ask for 
help” form.  
 
Preconditions Successful execution of UTC-01.  
 
Description of events 1. While on platform’s homepage, click on the “ask for help” 
button. 
2. Fill-in the details required by the form. 
3. Click on the “submit” button. 
4. Wait for admin confirmation regarding message receival. 
 
Expected result “Ask for help” form submitted and successfully received from 
the administrator. 
 
 
Table 6.7. User ask for help test case 
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v) User chat 
Test case title 
 
User chat 
ID UTC-05 
 
Purpose To successfully connect to the anonymous chat room of the 
platform and submit a mock message. 
 
Preconditions Successful execution of UTC-01.  
 
Description of events 1. While on platform’s homepage, click on the “live chat” button. 
2. Notify researcher to join the chat session. 
3. After the researcher has joined the chat and sent an 
acknowledgment message, type a message with content: “Hello 
fellow anonymous!” 
4. Click on the “submit” button. 
5. The researcher should reply with a second acknowledgment 
message. 
 
Expected result Messages from researcher and user successfully displayed in 
chat window. 
 
 
Table 6.8. User chat test case 
 
b) Admin test cases 
 
i) Admin add new user 
Test case title 
 
Admin add new user 
ID ATC-01 
 
Purpose To add a new user to the incident reporting DApp. 
 
Preconditions Successful login to the administration console of the DApp 
(alexis-michael.eu/reporting/admin) 
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Description of events 1. Enter user’s public key in database/white-list. 
2. Click the add button. 
3. Login to Metamask account 
3. Go to the platform’s homepage (select sign up option).   
4. Add registration details of new user (e-mail, password, mobile 
phone) 
5. Insert token received through SMS in designated field. 
6. Press “Get started” button. 
 
Expected result New user is added to the incident reporting DApp. 
 
Table 6.9. Admin add user test case 
 
ii) Admin remove user 
Test case title 
 
Admin remove user 
ID ATC-02 
 
Purpose To remove a user from having access to the incident reporting 
DApp 
 
Preconditions Successful login to the administration console of the DApp 
(alexis-michael.eu/reporting/admin) 
 
Description of events 1. Search for database row containing the user’s public key or 
name. 
2. Click on “delete” button in relevant row. 
3. Login to Firebase database and delete matching user 
credentials (removal method 1). 
4. Repeat execution of ATC-01. 
5. Repeat execution steps 1,2 of ATC-02 
6. Login to the platform’s main application and confirm that 
functionality is now disabled for the user. Confirm that user 
credentials have been automatically removed from Firebase 
database. 
 
171 
 
Expected result Selected user is removed from having access to the incident 
reporting DApp. 
 
 
Table 6.10. Admin remove user test case 
 
iii) Admin submit incident  
Test case title 
 
Admin submit incident 
ID ATC-03 
 
Purpose To complete an incident reporting form, submit an incident and 
view the incident through Epirus Explorer. 
 
Preconditions Admin successfully logged in, Metamask plugin for signing the 
transaction, access to Epirus Explorer. 
Description of events 1. After successful login and while on platform’s homepage, 
click on the “submit incident” button. 
2. Fill in all available fields of the form with details of a mock 
incident. 
3. Click “Preview & submit” button. 
4. Review content of form and if satisfied with content click 
“submit” button, otherwise click “edit form” button. 
5. Sign transaction with Metamask plugin or similar. 
6. View transaction ID on your screen. 
7. Trace transaction through Epirus Explorer 
 
Expected result Incident is successfully submitted and stored on the blockchain 
and the transaction ID is displayed to the user. The submitted 
transaction is successfully viewed through Epirus Explorer. 
 
 
Table 6.11. Admin submit incident test case 
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iv) Admin view incident  
Test case title 
 
Admin view incidents 
ID ATC-04 
 
Purpose To view the incident previously submitted (following the 
successful execution of ATC-03) recorded in the “view 
incidents” table. 
 
Preconditions Successful execution of ATC-03. 
 
Description of events 1. While on platform’s homepage, click on the “view incidents” 
button 
2. The incident submitted through ATC-03 should be evident in 
the relevant table and located at the top of the list. 
3. Click on any field of the specific row of the incident. 
4. Confirm the data displayed is identical to the data submitted 
as part of ATC-03 execution. 
 
Expected result Incident is successfully displayed in “view incidents” table. 
 
 
Table 6.12. Admin view incident test case 
 
v) Admin chat 
Test case title 
 
Admin chat 
ID ATC-05 
 
Purpose To successfully connect to the anonymous chat room of the 
platform and submit a mock message. 
 
Preconditions Admin successfully logged in, separate user account logged in. 
 
Description of events 1. While on platform’s homepage, click on the “live chat” button. 
2. Establish a separate connection to the chat session with a 
different user. 
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3. Type a message with content: “Can you see me?” from the 
admin account and click on the “submit” button. 
4. Through the other user account, acknowledge the admin 
message and reply with a message stating “Yes I can”.  
 
Expected result Messages should be successfully displayed in both sessions. 
 
 
Table 6.13. Admin chat test case 
 
6.2.10. Test cases execution results   
The following two tables summarize the results of the test cases execution by 
both the participants (users) and the researcher (admin): 
 
a) Admin test cases execution results 
Admin test cases execution results 
Test case title Add new 
user 
Remove user Submit 
incident 
View 
incident 
Chat 
Test case ID ATC-01 ATC-02 ATC-03 ATC-04 
 
ATC-05 
Execution date 27/11/2019 
 
27/11/2019 27/11/2019 27/11/2019 27/11/2019 
Reporting date 27/11/2019 27/11/2019 27/11/2019 27/11/2019 27/11/2019 
Execution 
result 
Success Success 
 
Success Success Success 
 
Table 6.14. Admin test cases execution results 
 
b) User test cases execution results 
User test cases execution results 
Test case title Login Submit 
incident 
View incident Ask for help Chat 
Test case ID UTC-01 UTC-02 UTC-03 UTC-04 
 
UTC-05 
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Execution date 
 
 
Company A 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 
Company B 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 
Company C 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 
Company D 03/12/2019 03/12/2019 03/12/2019 03/12/2019 03/12/2019 
Company E 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 
Company F 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 
Reporting date 
 
 
Company A 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 
Company B 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 04/12/2019 
Company C 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 
Company D 03/12/2019 03/12/2019 03/12/2019 03/12/2019 03/12/2019 
Company E 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 
Company F 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 05/12/2019 
 
Execution 
result 
 
Company A Success Success Success Success Success 
Company B Success Success Success Success Success 
Company C Success Success Success Success Success 
Company D Success Success Success Success Success 
Company E Success Success Success Success Success 
Company F Success Success Success Success Success 
 
Table 6.15. User test cases execution results 
 
6.2.11. Acceptance and acknowledgments 
All test cases were successfully executed by both the researcher and the 
participants and the results were as expected. No errors or any other execution 
issues were reported by the participants. An illustrative example of a user 
logging in, submitting an incident/transaction, viewing the list of incidents and 
tracing the incident/transaction through Epirus explorer, can be found in 
Appendix F. 
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7. THE DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION: EVALUATION 
According to Peffers et al (2007) framework, the fifth activity of a design science 
research project involves evaluating the developed artefact. The authors state 
that evaluation could take many forms, and could include quantitative 
performance measures, such as simulations, budgets, or items produced, client 
feedback, the results of satisfaction surveys, as well as other quantifiable 
measures of system performance, such as the system’s response time or 
availability. The authors also state that, conceptually, the evaluation activity 
could include “any appropriate empirical evidence or logical proof”, and that at 
the end of this activity, the researcher has the option to iterate to previous 
phases of the framework, if improvements are deemed necessary, or continue 
to the communication activity (Peffers et al, 2007, p.13). 
 
Although there is a common agreement, amongst researchers, that evaluation 
is an essential activity in conducting rigorous Design Science Research 
(Venable et al, 2012), the available literature on this topic seems to be rather 
limited, while the applicable evaluation criteria and methods are presented in a 
rather fragmented manner (Venable et al, 2012; Prat et al, 2014). A number of 
evaluation methods has been proposed, however, and this includes, among 
others, methods by March and Smith (1995), Hevner et al (2004), Pries-Heje et 
al (2008), Venable et al (2012), and Sonnenberg and vom Brocke (2012). 
According to Venable et al (2012), the DSR literature provides very little 
guidance as to the actual design of the evaluation component of a DSR project, 
with the exception of the work by Pries-Heje et al (2008), who propose a 
framework of strategies for DSR evaluation. Based on this framework, Venable 
et al (2012) developed their own extended framework and method, which is 
utilized for evaluating this research project.   
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7.1. Applying the Venable et al (2012) framework and method 
Venable et al (2012) propose a four-step method (or process) for designing the 
evaluation process of a DSR project:  
 
a) Requirements analysis of evaluation process 
b) Mapping requirements to one or more of the dimensions and quadrants in 
applicable framework  
c) Selecting an appropriate evaluation method or methods that align with the 
chosen strategy quadrant(s), and 
d) Designing the evaluation in more detail. 
 
The details of this four-step process, as described by the authors, can be found 
in Appendix G. 
 
7.1.1. Requirements analysis of evaluation process 
This process will perform a technical evaluation of a product. More particularly, 
this process will evaluate the artefact (instantiation) developed by the 
researcher, a decentralized incident reporting platform. The aspects that will be 
evaluated are drawn from the pre-determined objectives of the artefact, as 
those were set in “Chapter four – Objectives” of this report.  
 
7.1.2. Mapping requirements to quadrants 
According to Venable et al (2012), in order for the researcher to initiate the 
evaluation activities, the evaluation requirements should be matched to one or 
more DSR evaluation strategies, which include selecting whether “ex ante” 
(prior to artefact development) or “ex post” evaluation (after artefact 
development) is required, and in which setting, naturalistic (i.e. field setting) or 
artificial (i.e. laboratory setting). 
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A researcher should begin the evaluation process by understanding the context 
of the required DSR evaluation and then map that understanding to the criteria 
shown in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. DSR Evaluation Strategy Selection by Venable et al (2012) 
 
The researcher should select an evaluation strategy (or combination of 
strategies) based on which rows, columns and cells in the above figure are 
most relevant to his/hers DSR project. Regarding this particular project, it is 
initially obvious that an “ex post” evaluation is required, since the artefact has 
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already been instantiated. A naturalistic approach is also necessary, since a 
real problem does exist (under-reporting of incidents), as well as a real system 
(the developed artefact) and real users. The evaluation activity should also opt 
towards the evaluation of the artefact’s effectiveness, with a low risk of false 
positives, despite the possibility of having an increased cost. Therefore, the 
fourth cell/quadrant (from left to right) of the second row of the framework 
appears more relevant to this project, as indicated by the orange arrow in figure 
7.1. 
 
7.1.3. Selecting appropriate evaluation methods 
The following stage involves selecting appropriate evaluation methods, based 
on the quadrant selected previously, in figure 7.1. The available evaluation 
methods are evident in the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 7.2. DSR Evaluation Method Selection by Venable et al (2012) 
 
The available evaluation methods for this research project are evident in the 
third cell/quadrant (from left to right) of the second row, as indicated by the 
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orange arrow in figure 7.2., which includes various options. The approach 
eventually selected for this project includes utilizing a survey for evaluating the 
produced artefact. More specifically, the users who participated in the testing 
activities (described in the “Demonstration” chapter) of the artefact were also 
called to complete evaluations, by completing, two, identical, Likert-style 
questionnaires, initially assessing the capabilities of their current (or previously 
used) incident reporting platform, and then assessing the capabilities of the 
newly developed artefact. The results obtained from these questionnaires will 
be used as input for the evaluating the artefact.  
 
7.1.4. Designing the evaluation in more detail 
The following stage involves designing the evaluation activity in more detail. 
The following table provides the finer details of the evaluation method: 
 
IRDA evaluation method 
 
Purpose The purpose of the evaluation method is to perform a comparison 
between the features/characteristics of the participants’ current (or 
previously used) incident reporting platform, and the 
features/characteristics of the newly developed, decentralized, incident 
reporting platform. This comparison (and the subsequent analysis of 
results) will allow the researcher to determine whether participants 
consider that the developed artefact has improved specific aspects of 
the incident reporting process.      
 
Evaluation method 
 
Survey/Questionnaire (quantitative). 
Evaluation method 
details 
 
Participants will be called to complete two, identical, questionnaires 
(Likert scale, 10-point), which include questions deriving from the 
project’s objectives. Participants will need to first complete 
questionnaire “A”, then successfully perform the various test activities 
on the newly developed platform (described in chapter six), and finally 
complete questionnaire “B”. Both questionnaires are available in 
Appendix H. 
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Participants 
 
Six organizations – their profiles are described in section “6.2.2.” of this 
report. 
Roles and 
responsibilities 
 
The questionnaires will be completed by the same individuals that 
performed the test activities described in chapter six. 
Timeframe 
 
03/12/2019 - 06/12/2019 
Prerequisites 
 
Participants will receive instructions for both executing the test cases, 
as well as for completing the questionnaires. Participants will be 
provided with the relevant information sheets and consent forms prior 
to the commencement of any activities. 
 
Assumptions 
 
o  Questionnaires will be distributed by the researcher (in hard copies) 
to the participants, in their organizational premises. 
o  Participants will complete the questionnaires in a voluntary fashion 
and without any bias, whatsoever. 
o  Participants should complete the activities within the given 
timeframe. The hard copies will be collected by the researcher on the 
last day of the agreed timeframe. 
o  Participants should be available and accessible for a further period 
of one week, in case further clarifications are necessary.   
 
Expected outcome 
 
By 06/12/2019 the researcher should possess six pairs of completed 
questionnaires.  
 
Data analysis 
method of results 
 
Non-parametric significance tests (Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test) 
 
Table 7.1. Evaluation method details 
 
7.2. Evaluation method: Results and analysis 
7.2.1. Results 
The questionnaires were collected by the researcher on 06/12/2019. The 
following tables describe the results obtained from the participants for both 
questionnaires: 
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Questionnaire “A” – Platform currently in use/previously used 
 
  
No. Question Company 
 
A B C D E F 
1 How would you rate the level of user anonymity the 
platform provides? 
1 2 2 1 3 1 
2 How would you rate the overall cost of purchasing, 
operating, managing, and maintaining the platform 
(including any staff training costs)? 
4 3 2 2 3 4 
3 How would you rate the ease of understanding the 
platform’s features and overall functionality? 
8 8 8 9 9 9 
4 How would you rate the overall ease of using the platform 
(including GUI design and simplicity in the reporting 
processes)? 
7 8 9 9 8 8 
5 How would you rate the level of customer support offered 
by the platform’s provider? 
8 8 9 10 9 9 
6 How would you rate the overall level of performance and 
efficiency of the platform? 
9 9 8 9 8 8 
7 How would you rate the overall level of security of the 
platform? 
7 8 8 9 8 9 
8 How would you rate the overall level of accessibility of the 
platform? 
9 10 9 10 8 9 
9 How would you rate the social features (e.g. chat, forum 
etc.) offered by the platform (if, any)? 
6 8 7 8 7 6 
10 How would you rate the platform’s availability (i.e. uptime) 
level? 
9 8 9 9 8 8 
11 How would you rate the overall platform’s transparency 
features including the presence of any auditability 
mechanisms? 
6 6 5 5 4 5 
 
Table 7.2. Results of questionnaire “A” 
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Questionnaire “B” – Incident reporting Decentralized App (IRDA) 
 
  
No. Question Company 
 
A B C D E F 
1 How would you rate the level of user anonymity the 
platform provides? 
9 9 10 9 8 10 
2 How would you rate the overall cost of purchasing, 
operating, managing, and maintaining the platform 
(including any staff training costs)? 
8 7 9 8 7 10 
3 How would you rate the ease of understanding the 
platform’s features and overall functionality? 
9 9 8 9 10 10 
4 How would you rate the overall ease of using the platform 
(including GUI design and simplicity in the reporting 
processes)? 
8 9 10 9 7 7 
5 How would you rate the level of customer support offered 
by the platform’s provider? 
7 8 8 9 10 8 
6 How would you rate the overall level of performance and 
efficiency of the platform? 
7 8 9 8 8 7 
7 How would you rate the overall level of security of the 
platform? 
8 9 8 7 9 7 
8 How would you rate the overall level of accessibility of the 
platform? 
7 8 9 8 9 8 
9 How would you rate the social features (e.g. chat, forum 
etc.) offered by the platform (if, any)? 
8 8 9 7 8 7 
10 How would you rate the platform’s availability (i.e. uptime) 
level? 
10 10 10 10 10 10 
11 How would you rate the overall platform’s transparency 
features including the presence of any auditability 
mechanisms? 
8 9 6 8 7 7 
 
Table 7.3. Results of questionnaire “B” 
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7.2.2. Analysis of results 
As previously mentioned, the questions included in the questionnaires were 
inferred from the research project’s objectives (as stated in chapter four), which 
were, in turn, inferred from the main research question. In order to evaluate the 
accomplishment of these objectives, it was necessary to compare and analyze 
the participants’ answers before (questionnaire “A”) and after (questionnaire 
“B”) using the developed artefact. Since each question (objective) examined 
distinct characteristics of the platforms, it was deemed necessary to perform 
eleven statistical significance tests, each for every distinct question (objective).  
 
To begin with, the questionnaires included eleven Likert scale questions. 
According to Derrick and White (2017, p.1), a Likert scale question is a “forced 
choice ordinal question, which captures the intensity of opinion, or degree of 
assessment, in survey respondents”. According to the same authors, a Likert 
item is historically comprised of five or seven points, although utilizing more or 
less points is a usual practice. The questionnaires in scope utilized a 10-point 
Likert scale, with participants having to provide an answer ranging from points 1 
(lowest) to 10 (highest), for each question. Likert scales are considered to be 
ordinal in nature, and thus subject to non-parametric tests, since although the 
response categories do have a rank order, the intervals between points cannot 
be assumed equal (Jamieson, 2004). However, researchers frequently presume 
that they are equal (Blaikie, 2003) and that in particular methodological and 
practical aspects, Likert responses may approximate interval level data, and 
thus become eligible for parametric tests (Norman, 2010). This practice, 
however, is highly controversial amongst researchers (Knapp, 1990; Meek et al, 
2007; Derrick & White, 2017).  
 
According to Jamieson (2004), before the assumption of interval data applies, 
researchers should consider the sample size and distribution of the responses, 
before applying any parametric tests. Derrick and White (2017) suggest, that if 
sample sizes are large, both parametric and non-parametric tests are likely to 
have sufficient power. In this case, however, a sample size of only six pairs of 
observations is available, and no assumptions about the normality of the 
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distribution can safely be made. Chou (1989), Berenson et al (2004), Keller 
(2005), Bowerman and O’Connell (2007) and Doane and Seward (2007), all 
agreed that for paired samples, where the sample size is small, the distribution 
is non-normal and the measurement is ordinal,  the t-test (parametric) is not 
appropriate and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (non-parametric) should be used 
instead. According to Blair and Higgins (1985), the Wilcoxon tests for both 
paired and unpaired samples are never significantly less powerful that t-tests, 
and when normality cannot be assumed for the distribution (for ordinal or 
interval measurements), they can even be much more powerful.  
 
Therefore, executing non-parametric tests appeared as the most suitable option 
for analysing the results of the questionnaires. Since the samples are 
dependant/paired (same participants for both questionnaires), data is ordinal in 
nature, normality cannot be assumed, and the sample size is small, the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test initially emerged as the prevalent option. “Sign test”, 
a non-parametric, binomial test, used to test for trends in a series of ordinal 
measurements (Conover, 1999) was also considered, but it was eventually 
discarded as an option, since it is considered to be a lot weaker in comparison 
to Wilcoxon’s test, when the detection of consistent differences is required 
(Demsar, 2006).  
 
To perform a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the first step is to form the null and 
alternative hypotheses. The researcher can then follow the procedure illustrated 
by Couch et al (2018):  
 
 
Figure 7.3. Wilcoxon signed-rank test method (in Couch et al, 2018) 
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The researcher can then compare the “W” output to a critical value from a 
reference table (applicable for small sample numbers), in order to reject or 
accept the null hypothesis, or even proceed to the calculation of the p-value 
(with a continuity correction).  
 
As evident, the Wilcoxon test discards pairs with zero difference. In a Likert-
scale questionnaire, with a limited range of answer options, it is certainly 
expected to have pairs of answers with zero difference. Since a very small 
number of participants was made available (n = 6), discarding any pairs could 
further diminish the power of the test. In addition, Pratt (1959) claimed that 
ignoring zeros could produce paradoxical probabilities. He therefore suggested 
a modified version of the test, which specified ranking the differences (including 
the zeros), then dropping the zeros (when summing the negative and positive 
ranks), and finally using the tables of probabilities for the total number of 
observations (including the zeros) (Hoffman, 2015). Another method of handling 
zero-differences was suggested by Putter (1955), but resulted in a loss of 
efficiency (Conover, 1973). When testing the efficiency of t-test, Wilcoxon test 
and Pratt’s test, in various scenarios, Derrick and White (2017) acknowledged 
that there is little practical difference in the conclusions drawn when the sample 
size is large; it becomes more a theoretical question about what test to use. 
However, when the sample size is small and the correlation between the paired 
groups is strong, they indicated that the Pratt’s test outperforms the two others. 
 
Therefore, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranked test modified by Pratt (or Pratt’s test) 
was eventually selected for the analysis of the results. All the tests could have 
been conducted manually (i.e. through hand calculations, since sample size is 
small), or by using a suitable statistical analysis software, such as “SPSS”, “R”, 
“STATA”, “SAS” or similar. It was eventually decided to utilize “R” software 
(version 3.6.1.) for executing the tests. The standard version of the software did 
not include Pratt’s test, so the “Coin package v. 1.3-1” (Hothorn, 2019) was 
installed, along with the “Paired data” package, for drawing boxplots for paired 
data.  
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The “R” script that was used to execute the tests is available in Appendix I. The 
following table presents the results of executing the eleven significance tests. 
The details of each specific test can be found in appendix K. 
 
Assumptions applicable to all eleven tests: 
o Samples are dependant (paired) and occur from the same population 
o Paired observations are independently and randomly drawn 
o Paired observations are of ordinal scale 
o Normal distribution cannot be assumed 
 
Significance tests (two-tailed, n=6, α = 0.05) 
Q Description Connected 
objectives and 
ITas 
QA  
results 
QB results p-
valu
e 
Verdict 
M IQR M IQR 
1 Anonymity O1, O3 
These objectives 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
supporting the 
anonymity of 
submissions 
 
1,5 1 9 0,75 0,03 Evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
user 
anonymity 
is improved 
with the 
proposed 
platform 
2 Cost O1 
This objective 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
with low cost 
 
3 1,5 8 1,5 0,03 Evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
cost of 
proposed 
platform is 
lower 
3 Ease of 
understanding 
O2, ITa4 
 
This objective 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
which would be 
easy to 
understand. The 
implementation 
target required 
the creation of a 
familiar 
environment for 
the users (thus 
8,5 1 9 0,75 0,13 No 
evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
ease of 
understandi
ng is 
different 
between 
platforms 
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contributing to the 
overall ease of 
understanding) 
 
4 Ease of use O2 
 
This objective 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
which would be 
easy to use 
 
8 0,75 8,5 1,75 1 No 
evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
ease of use 
is different 
between 
platforms 
5 Customer 
support 
O2 
This objective 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
which would 
provide features 
enabling the 
provision of 
customer support 
 
9 0,75 8 0,75 0,38 No 
evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
customer 
support is 
different 
between 
platforms 
6 Performance 
and efficiency 
O2 
 
This objective 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
which would 
behave 
adequately in 
terms of 
performance and 
efficiency 
 
8,5 1 8 0,75 0,31 No 
evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
performanc
e and 
efficiency is 
different 
between 
platforms 
7 Security O2 
 
This objective 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
which would 
behave in a 
secure way 
 
8 0,75 8 1,5 1 No 
evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
security is 
different 
between 
platforms 
8 Accessibility O2 
 
This objective 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
which would be 
widely accessible   
9 0,75 8 0,75 0,19 No 
evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
accessibilit
y is 
different 
between 
platforms 
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9 Social 
features 
O2 
 
This objective 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
which would 
include social 
features 
7 1,5 8 0,75 0,25 No 
evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
social 
features is 
different 
between 
platforms 
10 Availability O3 
 
This objective 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
which would 
provide a greater 
availability level 
than that of 
conventional 
solutions 
 
8,5 1 10 0 0,03 Evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
availability 
is improved 
with the 
proposed 
platform 
 
11 Transparency O3 
 
This objective 
mandated the 
creation of a 
reporting solution 
which would 
provide a greater 
transparency level 
than that of 
conventional 
solutions 
 
5 0,75 7,5 1 0,03 Evidence to 
suggest 
that level of 
transparenc
y is 
improved 
with the 
proposed 
platform 
 
Table 7.5. Results of significance tests 
  
7.3. Complimentary evaluation method 
In order to complement the artefact’s main evaluation method, a separate 
evaluation method will attempt to assess the quality of the developed software. 
This includes a high-level assessment of the developed software (performed 
solely by the researcher) against the requirements of the international standard 
“ISO/IEC 25010:2011 - Systems and software engineering — Systems and 
software Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) — System and 
software quality models”. The complimentary evaluation can be found in 
Appendix L.  
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7.4. Concluding remarks 
As part of the artefact’s evaluation method, eleven, non-parametric, significance 
tests were performed, on feedback data received from six, distinct, 
organizations, through Likert-scale questionnaires. The results of these tests 
indicated that objectives O1, O2 and O3 of this research project were achieved, 
as well as implementation target ITa4 .The rest of this project’s implementation 
targets were achieved through specific implementation actions, which are 
evident (and discussed) in both chapters six (Demonstration) and eight 
(Discussion and conclusion) of this report.  
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8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
8.1. Thesis summary 
The undeniable fact, that in the interconnected world we are now living in, 
organizations around the globe, face millions of security threats, on a constant 
basis, should have encouraged the vigorous reporting of information security 
incidents, should such incidents occur. Although virtually everyone agrees that 
information security incident reporting is beneficial to organizations (NIST, 2012; 
Gordon et al, 2003; ENISA, 2013; Gordon et al, 2015; Line & Albrechtsen, 
2016; Gonzalez, 2005), reporting statistics show that very few incidents are 
actually being reported (IOD & Barclays Policy report, 2016; Symantec, 2016; 
Newman, 2018; Ipsos MORI, 2017; SentinelOne, 2016; ENISA, 2012). It seems 
that organizations find it difficult to disseminate information related to security 
incidents (He and Johnson, 2012; Grispos et al., 2015), due to a variety of 
reasons, such as the fear of the incident’s consequences, including negative 
publicity, legal liability and possible financial penalties and reprimands, the 
exposure of organizational vulnerabilities, possible retribution attempts, the 
various costs related to incident reporting, such as operating costs, recruitment, 
training, as well as the overall organizational time spent by an organization’s 
personnel for reporting purposes (Johnson, 2002; Metzger et al, 2011; Ahmad 
et al, 2012; Etzioni, 2014; Ruefle et al, 2014; Housen-Couriel, 2018). 
 
This research project began with a comprehensive literature review of the two 
major themes of the research topic, incident reporting and blockchain. The 
various types of information security incidents were discussed, as well as other 
topics, such as their financial impact to organizations, the reasons why 
organizations choose to report (or not) incidents, the stance of incident reporting 
in the overall incident management lifecycle, as well as the various means and 
methods organizations utilize for incident reporting purposes. Furthermore, 
existing incident reporting platforms were identified and evaluated, in order to 
both detect features which make these platforms prevalent to use, as well as to 
identify potential areas for improvement, based on the given fact of incident 
under-reporting. The blockchain technology was also discussed, as a potential 
candidate for hosting the proposed solution. The technology’s core concepts 
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were explained, followed by a presentation of the various types of blockchains, 
the available consensus algorithms, blockchain’s advantages and 
disadvantages, decision models, and blockchain applications in related areas, 
such as data management, information security and incident reporting. The 
literature review confirmed that even though blockchain development was 
mainly focused towards the area of crypto/virtual currencies (Di Pierro, 2017), it 
has gradually witnessed the development of applications in a variety of other 
fields, including data management, information security, and even incident 
reporting, although the available literature for the latter area was rather limited. 
It was, however, confirmed, that blockchain technology, with its decentralized 
structure and its various inherent characteristics, including security, anonymity 
and integrity (Yli-Huumo et al, 2016), could act as the underlying technology, in 
order to develop an alternative option/solution for incident reporting purposes. 
 
Methodologically, this research project was situated in the applied research 
discipline (as it aimed to provide a solution to a problem of professional 
practice) and within the pragmatic paradigm, as it placed the problem of incident 
under-reporting as central and attempted to provide a solution. The Design 
Science Research was eventually selected as the research approach of choice, 
out of a few alternative approaches, such as Development research and Action 
research. Although, according to Peffers et al (2007), a generally accepted 
process for carrying out Design Science research does not exist, a number of 
different process models/frameworks were available for conducting Design 
science research, and out of these, the framework by Peffers et al (2007) was 
identified as the most appropriate choice, as it incorporates principles, practices 
and procedures necessary to conduct such research, while being consistent 
with prior literature (Peffers et al, 2007). The framework included six, distinct, 
activities/steps, and was followed in a nominally sequential order, beginning at 
activity/step one, since the researcher’s aim was to provide a solution to a 
known problem (under-reporting) and a problem-centred, research approach 
was therefore required. 
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The solution’s objectives were derived directly from the research question. 
Three objectives and four implementation targets were set, and were 
successfully achieved, as evident in the following table: 
 
Research 
question 
 
 
 Is there a way to create an innovative information security 
incident reporting solution, which will utilize the positive 
features offered by existing solutions, but will also provide 
added value to users, in order to increase their level of 
motivation towards the reporting of incidents? 
 
Objectives 
 
No. Description 
 
Key elements Objective 
included in 
evaluation 
activity 
 
Objective Achieved 
 
1 Create an incident 
reporting solution 
which enables 
and encourages 
the reporting of 
information 
security incidents 
amongst 
organizations, 
thereby reducing 
organizational 
demotivation for 
reporting. 
 
Anonymity, Cost 
reduction, 
Artefact 
(instantiation) 
Yes - artefact’s 
anonymity and 
cost were both 
included in the 
evaluation 
activity.  
 
Yes – verification and validation 
details for anonymity and cost 
elements are available in chapter 
6 and the evaluation details in 
chapter 7. The remaining element 
of creating an “artefact” is 
evidently fulfilled through the 
creation of the IRDA software. 
 
2 Create an incident 
reporting solution 
which utilizes the 
positive features 
offered by existing 
reporting 
solutions. 
Efficiency, 
Performance, 
Ease of use, 
Ease of 
understanding, 
Accessibility, 
Security, 
Yes – all key 
elements of this 
objective were 
included in the 
evaluation 
activity. 
Yes – verification and validation 
details are available in chapter 6, 
evaluation details in chapter 7. 
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 Support, Social 
features 
 
3 Create an incident 
reporting solution 
which provides 
added value to 
users, in 
comparison to 
existing solutions. 
 
Anonymity, 
Availability, 
Auditability/trans
parency/immuta
bility 
Yes – all key 
elements of this 
objective were 
included in the 
evaluation 
activity. 
Yes – verification and validation 
details are available in chapter 6, 
evaluation details in chapter 7. 
 
Implementation targets 
 
No. Description 
 
Key elements 
 
Target 
included in 
evaluation 
activity 
 
Target Achieved 
 
1 Create a manual 
incident reporting 
solution. 
 
Manual solution No Yes – The IRDA software 
developed is evidently an incident 
reporting tool enabling the 
manual submission of incidents. 
 
2 Create a software 
platform for the 
manual reporting 
of incidents 
 
Reporting 
software/platfor
m 
No Yes - The IRDA software 
developed is evidently an incident 
reporting platform.  
 
3 Create a private 
incident reporting 
platform. 
 
Private reporting 
software/platfor
m 
No Yes - The IRDA software 
developed is evidently a private 
incident reporting platform, as it 
only allows pre-authorized, 
registered, users to join the 
platform and use its various 
features 
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4 Create a familiar 
environment for 
platform users. 
 
Familiar 
structure, 
functionality, 
GUI, 
standardized 
reporting 
templates 
 
Yes – all key 
elements of this 
target were 
included in the 
evaluation 
activity. 
 
Yes – verification and validation 
details for these elements are 
available in chapter 6 and the 
evaluation details in chapter 7. 
 
Table 8.1. Achievement of set objectives and implementation targets 
 
The “Design and development” chapter, reports all those explicit design and 
development details that transformed the general concept of a decentralized 
incident reporting platform, into a fully working prototype. The “Demonstration” 
chapter illustrates the verification details behind the fulfillment of each set 
objective, as well as all the validation tests that were performed for testing the 
functionality of the software, by six, independent, organizations and the 
researcher. The “Evaluation” chapter describes the evaluation activities, which 
were conducted according to the Venable et al (2012) four-step process, for a 
DSR project. As part of the evaluation method, eleven, non-parametric, 
significance tests were performed, on feedback data received from six 
organizations.   
 
Moreover, it is important to note, that this entire report/thesis satisfies the sixth 
and final activity of the Peffers et al (2007) DSRM framework, named 
“Communication”, where, the problem in scope, its importance, details of the 
developed artefact and its effectiveness, amongst other elements, should be 
appropriately conveyed to researchers and other relevant audiences, such as 
practicing professionals. The structure of the thesis followed the flow of 
activities described in the DSRM model, and also borrowed some elements out 
of the nominal structure of an empirical research process, including the 
literature review, the description of the selected research methodology, as well 
as the “discussion and conclusion” chapter. The present thesis can therefore 
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act as a communicator to appropriate audiences, explaining how IRDA can be 
used to tackle the issue of incident under-reporting. 
 
8.2. Contribution summary 
The overall objective of a professional doctorate thesis is to propose 
answers/solutions towards a known business problem. Professional doctorates 
contribute to the overall knowledge economy and aim in improving the 
workplace and/or professional practice, in innovative and flexible ways (Usher, 
2002). Information security incident under-reporting is unambiguously a 
business problem, as identified by a variety of sources, such as ENISA (2012), 
Symantec (2016), Newman (2018) and many more. This thesis identified the 
underlying issues that cause this problem of incident under-reporting, and 
proposed a solution, in the form of an innovative artefact. 
 
This thesis describes an original attempt in utilizing the newly emergent 
blockchain technology, and its inherent characteristics, for addressing those 
concerns which actively contribute to the business problem. The research 
question set at the beginning of this research quest, probed the feasible 
formation of an incident reporting solution, which would increase the motivation 
of users towards the reporting of incidents, by utilizing the positive features 
offered by existing solutions, on one hand, but also by providing added value to 
the users, on the other. Following a structured procedure, the various 
demotivators affecting incident reporting were identified, and so were the 
current means and methods for reporting. The creation of a manual, reporting 
platform was recognized, through available literature, as the ideal reporting 
solution. The various demotivators include the organizational fear of the 
incident’s consequences, such as negative publicity, legal liability, regulatory 
incompliance and possible financial penalties and reprimands, the exposure of 
organizational vulnerabilities, possible retribution attempts, the various costs 
related to incident reporting, such as operating costs, recruitment and training, 
the organization’s overall IS maturity level, as well as the overall organizational 
time spent by an organization’s personnel for reporting purposes (Johnson, 
2002; Metzger et al, 2011; Ahmad et al, 2012; Etzioni, 2014; Ruefle et al, 2014; 
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Humphrey, 2017; Housen-Couriel, 2018). A number of these demotivators, such 
as fears for negative publicity and increased reporting cost (Koivunen, 2010; 
Ahmad et al, 2015; Ruefle et al, 2014; Choo, 2011; Ahmad et al, 2012, 
Johnson, 2002; Metzger et al, 2011; Jaatun et al, 2009; Etzioni, 2014; Housen-
Couriel, 2018), were treated with embedding innovative features in the 
developed artefact, such as reporting anonymity, within a low-cost reporting 
ecosystem. Performance, efficiency, security, accessibility, the presence of 
social features, as well as the solution’s ease of use and understanding, were 
all positive features, which were identified through the evaluation of existing 
solutions, and were also incorporated in the developed artefact. The increased 
availability, immutability and transparency levels of IRDA can be regarded as 
further benefits of the solution. The developed artefact suggests that there, 
indeed, exists, a way, for the creation of an innovative reporting solution, which 
utilizes the positive features offered by existing solutions, but also provides that 
necessary added value, which may ultimately increase the motivational level of 
users towards the reporting of incidents. 
 
Revisiting Gregor and Hevner (2013) and their DSR knowledge contribution 
framework, there are four possible types of knowledge contribution in Design 
Science research, and a DSR project can make more than a single type of 
contribution: Invention is inventing new solutions/knowledge for new problems, 
Improvement is developing new solutions/knowledge for known problems, 
Adaptation concerns the innovative adaptation of known solutions/knowledge 
for new problems and Routine Design is applying known solutions to known 
problems, which, by itself, would not usually be considered as a research 
contribution (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). This research project belongs in the 
Improvement segment of the framework, as it generates an innovative solution 
towards the known problem of incident under-reporting. The developed artefact 
is the first application utilizing blockchain for manual incident reporting 
purposes. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is currently no other 
solution offering similar benefits to users/organizations for incident reporting 
purposes. The most directly relevant/similar work is the theoretical framework 
for information sharing, proposed by Adebayo et al (2019), which was described 
in the literature review chapter of this thesis. The authors of this framework, 
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however, propose a public, rather than a private, blockchain implementation, 
where any security-conscious organization could join as a member, and could 
also include various security vendors (e.g. antivirus companies) which, in-turn, 
could offer applicable solutions (e.g. patches) to participating organizations, via 
a cloud configuration, also accessible via the blockchain. As previously 
mentioned, their work produced a high-level, theoretical framework and not an 
actual instantiation. 
 
The literature review chapter comprehensively examined the previous work 
related to the application of blockchain in domains relative to this project, such 
as data management, information security and incident reporting, in particular. 
In line with authors who have utilized blockchain as data management 
systems/repositories for various tasks (such as Lemieux, 2016, who presented 
a blockchain-based solution for creating and preserving digital records, for use 
by civil registries of births, deaths and marriages; Garcia-Barriocanal et al, 
2017, who utilized blockchain for the storage of metadata of digital archives; 
Cebe et al, 2018, who constructed a blockchain system for storing forensic 
evidence for accident investigations; Goharshay et al, 2018, who proposed an 
approach for maintaining credit history records on blockchain and others), this 
project indicates that blockchain can, indeed, be used for data 
storage/management purposes in the field of information security incident 
reporting. As also identified through this project’s literature review chapter, the 
previous work related directly to blockchain applications in the incident reporting 
domain is fairly limited. It seems that researchers in this domain have been 
focusing in automating tasks utilizing the blockchain technology, such as 
developing a solution that could replace human input, by facilitating automatic 
cyber incident classification (Graf & King, 2018) or by developing Blockchain-
based SIEM systems - for storing and accessing information security events - 
utilized by multiple devices, within the broader concept of the Internet of Things 
(Mesa et al, 2019; Miloslavskaya & Tolstoy, 2019). Although introducing some 
intelligent mechanisms in the developed platform is listed as a potential future 
task (section “8.5”), this project mainly focused in the creation of a manual, 
blockchain-based, reporting solution (which involves direst human involvement 
and supervision), since despite the recent focus in automatic mechanisms, it 
198 
 
seems that manual reporting is still favoured in organizations (Werlinger et al, 
2010; Koivunen, 2010; Metzger et al, 2011; Hove and Tårnes, 2013; Line, 
2013).  
Nevertheless, it seems that the interest of the research community regarding 
the potential applications of blockchain in information security incident reporting 
is swiftly intensifying. During the ending of this research project, and within the 
period of September 2019 and January 2020, four different research papers 
have emerged. Moreno et al (2020) proposed an incident response process 
utilizing a private blockchain network, for the recording of incidents occurring in 
a big data ecosystem. Furthermore, in order to increase resistance to a Sybil 
attack, Gong and Lee (2020) proposed a cyber threat intelligence framework 
which utilizes smart contracts and stores metadata of attacks on blockchain. 
Also, Riesco et al (2020) suggested a blockchain-based incentive model, to 
encourage the exchange of cyber threat and risk information, along with an 
Ethereum smart contract marketplace, to incentivize the sharing of information 
among different parties. Finally, Putz et al (2019) presented a private, 
blockchain-based, model for preserving the integrity of computer log records, in 
order for them to be successfully presented in courts. It seems that the research 
community is eagerly beginning to explore the interesting opportunities that 
blockchain unwraps in the area of incident reporting.  
 
This research project contributes to knowledge in various ways. To begin with, it 
investigated subjects (incident reporting and blockchain) where the available 
literature is rather limited. Although incident response/management has 
received attention from researchers, It was identified that incident reporting, as 
a distinct process, has not been extensively studied, in line with previous 
findings (e.g. Patrascu & Patriciu, 2013; Tondel et al, 2014; Humphrey, 2017). 
On the other hand, the available literature in blockchain is quite limited as well, 
although this could be due to its infancy, as a relatively new technology. Thus, 
this project adds to the literature of two fields which have not been extensively 
studied. In addition, this work contributed towards the evaluation of existing 
reporting schemes and solutions, with an emphasis in manual reporting 
platforms. It has identified the – currently available – reporting platforms, tested 
their use, compared and evaluated their features, and also identified their 
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positive and negative aspects. It has also identified the lack of standard 
taxonomies for information security incidents, in line with previous findings (e.g. 
Humphrey, 2017). Furthermore, this research project identified the blockchain 
applications currently available in the areas of information security, data 
management and incident reporting. This work also contributed to research by 
creating a functional, practical artefact in the blockchain domain, a domain 
where most studies are either experimental proposals, or theoretical concepts, 
with limited practicality in solving real-world problems (Taylor et al, 2019). 
Through this work, the first information security incident reporting “DApp” was 
designed, developed, and evaluated. Lastly, through the evaluation activity, and 
by conducting a series of non-parametric significance tests, it was identified that 
the developed solution could potentially increase the motivational level of users 
towards reporting incidents, although larger confirmatory studies are required, 
as discussed in sections “8.3.” and “8.4.” of this chapter. 
 
In general, according to Morkunas et al (2019), customers are interested in 
purchasing a “solution” to get a job done, rather than simply purchasing 
“products”. Johnson et al (2008) state that the value derived by the customer 
increases proportionally to the importance that the customer places on the job 
to be done, as well as by the satisfaction level related to the current options to 
complete the job, the availability of other options, and their pertinent cost. The 
developed artefact offers an alternative option to customers 
(users/organizations), to perform the explicitly important job of information 
security incident reporting. As identified through available literature, “customers” 
express concerns related to their currently available reporting options, which 
ultimately lead to the fundamental problem of incident under-reporting. IRDA 
aims to put these concerns at ease, as well as significantly reduce the cost 
associated to incident reporting. IRDA is addressed towards a range of potential 
customers, including authorities and businesses, which can use the product 
both internally (i.e. reporting within the various departments of a single 
organization) or externally (i.e. reporting within a group of businesses, under a 
designated authority). Furthermore, the platform could be of particular interest 
to the various CSIRTs and CERTs around the world (and especially within EU), 
which could evaluate its use over their current reporting solutions, built with 
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conventional technologies. More particularly, the early assumption that 
European CSIRTs/CERTs could potentially be both customers and evaluators 
of the decentralized platform, led to the integration and utilization of the 
“eCSIRT.net mkVI” incident taxonomy, since this taxonomy is endorsed by 
ENISA, its categories are universal and practical, and it is currently widely used 
amongst European CSIRTs (ENISA, 2018). This decision was taken in order to 
both create a familiar reporting environment for users, as well as to facilitate the 
transition process from another CSIRT solution to the IRDA platform. 
 
Morkunas et al (2019) state that blockchain interest is currently focused on 
financial services, with “very little discussion about non-financial services and 
how blockchain technology may affect organizations, their business models, 
and how they create and deliver value”. This project demonstrates that 
Blockchain can, indeed, be used for non-financial applications, possibly 
encouraging others to explore the various capabilities blockchain has to offer.  
 
Through the accomplishment of this project’s pre-set objectives and 
implementation targets, the developed artefact provides a positive answer to the 
research question: There, indeed, exists a way to create an innovative incident 
reporting solution, which builds upon the positive features of the existing 
solutions, but also provides essential added value. Hopefully, this developed 
software, featuring increased anonymity, availability, immutability and 
transparency levels, as well as an overall lower cost, will increase 
organizational motivation towards the reporting of incidents. IRDA successfully 
confronted a number of issues, identified by literature, as demotivators for 
incident reporting; whether it can ultimately change the dismaying statistics of 
incident under-reporting, remains to be seen. 
 
8.3. Limitations 
This research project was affected by various limitations. To begin with, the 
literature review chapter utilized resources (of both academic and professional 
nature) which were made available only in the English and/or Greek language. 
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Thus, a possibility exists, that a number of - relevant to this project – resources, 
in any other language, were not identified and therefore not taken into 
consideration. 
 
Methodologically, this research project utilized the Design Science Research 
framework by Peffers et al (2007). Although DSR “has been slow to diffuse into 
the mainstream of Information Systems research” (Peffers et al, 2007, p.2), its 
legitimacy is now widely acknowledged within the academic community, and 
several researchers have been successful in making the case for its value and 
validity, through the integration of “design” as a major component of research 
(Peffers et al, 2007). A limitation, however, of this methodology, is that a 
generally accepted process for carrying out Design Science research does not 
exist. Nevertheless, various models/frameworks have been made available, and 
the framework by Peffers et al (2007) was identified as the most appropriate 
choice for this project, as it incorporates principles, practices and procedures 
necessary to conduct such research, while being consistent with prior literature 
(Peffers et al, 2007). Another limitation of DSR, is that although there is a 
common agreement, amongst researchers, that evaluation is an essential 
activity in conducting rigorous Design Science Research (Venable et al, 2012), 
the available literature on this topic seems to be rather limited, while the 
applicable evaluation criteria and methods are presented in a rather fragmented 
manner (Venable et al, 2012; Prat et al, 2014). Thus – and as is the case with 
conducting DSR, in general - no generally accepted process for carrying out the 
evaluation activity of a DSR project exists. This limitation was confronted by 
selecting an evaluation framework which provided extensive and appropriate 
guidance, and, at the same time, was consistent with the prior literature, the 
Venable et al (2012) DSR evaluation framework. 
 
The financial cost of this research project was also a serious limitation. Since no 
financial aid was pursued, the researcher had to utilize his own, personal, 
resources, to fund the development of the artefact. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note, that not securing any external financial aid was a strategic decision, 
taken at the very beginning of the project’s development activities. Since the 
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researcher had the ability to secure the minimum budget for this project using 
his own resources, this decision was taken in order to avoid potential 
complications with any third parties, which could hinder the project’s successful 
and/or timely completion. Such complications could include disagreements 
regarding the project’s scope and overall objectives, since the sponsoring 
organization might have wanted to specifically tailor the requirements according 
to its own operational environment and needs. This could create an adverse 
effect regarding the produced solution’s applicability, generalizability, and 
universality. Furthermore, the involvement of a third party could potentially delay 
the implementation of the platform: for example, the third party could be 
reviewing and approving milestones at a very slow pace, thereby creating 
implementation delays. The sponsoring organization could have also not been 
releasing funds according to schedule, thus creating further delays. Further 
complications could also include a sudden halt of funding, a shift in the 
sponsoring organization’s priorities, or even a total withdrawal, following, for 
example, a lack of resources (both in available personnel and funds) due to a 
force majeure event. Therefore, and since a preliminary interest from 
organizations in utilizing such a solution was already suggested (through the 
pilot study, conducted prior to the initiation of this project), it was best decided 
not to pursue any sponsoring opportunities. 
 
The first consequence of this decision, however, was that the decentralized 
platform had to be hosted on a single blockchain node, on the Azure 
environment, rather than five or six, distinct nodes. Utilizing more than a single 
node, would require an additional investment, and while this cost might not 
appear prohibitive for an organization, it was deemed as an unnecessary 
expense, for a single researcher, attempting to produce a proof-of-concept (and 
not a production-ready), artefact. Another consequence related to the cost 
limitations of this project, was that the researcher was only available to 
experience and test the trial/limited versions of other incident reporting 
platforms, since the cost of purchasing/renting the full version of the platforms 
was prohibitive. However, this was not a major issue, since most features of the 
platforms were also made available through the trial versions. 
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A final consequence of the narrow financial resources available, was the limited 
turnout of organizations willing to evaluate the platform. The turnout might have 
been greater, if a financial motive (i.e. some kind of reward/prize) was offered to 
organizations, for their participation. In any case, it must be noted that Cyprus is 
a small market, nevertheless, and the absolute number of Cypriot organizations 
utilizing an incident reporting solution, is not expected to be high. However, this 
low number of participants might have implications related to the generalizability 
of this project’s findings. According to Hackshaw (2008, p.1143), although there 
is “nothing wrong with conducting well-designed small studies”, the results of 
such studies need to be carefully interpreted, since they may yield unreliable or 
imprecise estimates, or they may over-estimate the magnitude of an 
association. The author also suggests that data from such studies “should be 
used towards designing larger confirmatory studies” (Hackshaw, 2008, p.1143). 
Section “8.5 – Future work” of this chapter, states such a future intention for 
conducting a larger study, in order to confirm the validity of the evaluation 
activity of the developed platform. 
 
Time limitations were also an important element. The project had to be 
completed within a predefined period of time – according to the requirements of 
the University of East London. The researcher had to balance research, work 
and family commitments and produce the best possible outcome. Inevitably, 
some features were not implemented and were thus left for a future iteration of 
this project. These are documented in the next section of this chapter. 
 
A further limitation of this project was the realization of pseudoanonymity rather 
than the true anonymity of the participants. This was a strategic decision which 
was taken after mature consideration and careful reflection. A truly anonymous 
(public) blockchain, without a central authority, would be difficult to manage - 
and probably ineffective. There would be no way to handle misbehaving 
participants, as well as the submission of spam/untrue/misleading incidents, 
factors which could eventually deter honest users from participating in the 
reporting process and undermine the platform’s value. True anonymity had to 
be sacrificed in order to create an effective solution. 
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Since the developed artefact is a working prototype (a proof-of-concept 
solution), it did not undergo extensive testing and this poses as a further 
limitation. Before the artefact is ready for the production environment, it should 
undergo extensive grey box testing, including stress testing. 
 
Another limitation was that incident reporting was eventually made available 
(through the platform) only for the “Detection” phase of the incident 
management lifecycle, as described by the ISO 27035 standard, and was not 
made available for the “Lessons learned” phase. This means that users who 
submit an incident, do not have the option of updating their entry with further 
information, after their initial submission (although they are being warned to 
evaluate their entry before submission). This is again a by-product of thoughtful 
consideration, since the researcher opted to give participants an enhanced 
feeling of trust towards the immutability and transparency of the solution, rather 
than provide them with the ability to edit incidents. 
 
A final limitation has to do with the current state of the blockchain ecosystem, 
including general adoption, development and standardization. Blockchain is a 
new technology and although many governments, organizations and academics 
express an interest in its exploration, it is still in its infancy. There are no 
standardized procedures for development, there are no standardized features 
and components and the available resources and support options are very 
limited. Most DApps are still in experimental stage and the various blockchain 
components rarely glue well together and operate as planned. The development 
community is very small in size, while so many different blockchain 
implementations exist (with different capabilities, structure, programming 
languages, consensus algorithms and more). These factors made the task of 
getting help from the community, when needed, an exceptionally challenging 
task and made the overall development process distressing. Blockchain still has 
a long road ahead for mass adoption.  
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8.4. Discussion 
To sum up, this research project had three primary goals: 
o to identify and evaluate existing information security incident reporting 
schemes and solutions, 
o to evaluate the use of blockchain technology as a resolution towards the 
inherent problems of existing reporting solutions, and, 
o to design, develop and evaluate an incident reporting solution, which 
provides added value to users, and increases their level of motivation 
towards the reporting of information security incidents.  
 
All goals of this project have been achieved.  
The existing incident reporting platforms were identified and evaluated, and the 
results of this evaluation were utilized towards the design of the proposed 
solution. It is important to note, that although every effort was taken to identify 
all, available, incident reporting platforms (through a rigorous search process 
and by utilizing carefully crafted criteria), a possibility exists that some 
platforms/solutions may have not been identified. Therefore, some unique 
features (if any), of these hypothetically unidentified platforms, may have not 
been included in the overall evaluation process.    
 
Blockchain technology has also been thoroughly examined, as part of this 
research project. Blockchain appeared to be a suitable candidate for 
accommodating the required solution. The technology appears able to confront 
a number of organizational concerns, such as negative publicity, through its 
inherent anonymity features, as well as decrease the various high costs 
associated with reporting and its processes. It also offers additional benefits, 
such as increased availability, immutability and transparency levels. Could all of 
these features, including anonymity, have been achieved through utilizing 
conventional technologies, instead of blockchain? Probably, yes. However, the 
cost of combining a multitude of conventional technologies towards achieving 
the same objectives, would probably be significantly higher. Furthermore, this is 
the first attempt in examining whether blockchain, specifically, with its various 
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inherent attributes, can provide the added value that conventional technologies, 
cannot (and hence the problem of incident under-reporting). 
 
Therefore, a blockchain-based incident reporting solution has been created. 
The solution did not attempt to provide a resolution towards all the reporting 
demotivators, but rather to successfully confront some of them. Confronting 
these individual demotivators, however, does not necessarily mean an increase 
in the overall user motivation for reporting. User “motivation” is a complex and 
multi-dimensional concept and future work (section “8.5”) will attempt to further 
demystify it. However, through the evaluation activity, this research project 
suggests that by confronting a number of demotivators, the motivational 
reporting level of users can be improved. The literature identified a need for 
user anonymity in the reporting process, and the evaluation activity indicated 
such a rise in the anonymity level of users. The evaluation activity also indicated 
a decrease in cost by utilizing IRDA, another demotivator identified through 
literature. There were, however, various limitations, which are discussed in 
section “8.3”, with the limited number of participants in the evaluation activity 
being a major limitation. 
 
There are also other topics worthy of discussion. Although the pilot study 
conducted before the initiation of this project indicated that organizations could 
potentially be interested in utilizing such a solution, interest in IRDA cannot be 
taken for granted. Anonymity and low cost may not be sufficient for 
organizations to integrate IRDA into their reporting processes. Regarding this 
project’s methodology, the selection of Design Science research can be thought 
of as being effective, as the meticulous execution of the framework by Peffers et 
al (2007) led to a successful end result. This, however, does not imply that 
selecting a different methodology (such as Action research) would not provide a 
similarly good output, although authors such as Iivari and Venable (2009) 
consider that a client-researcher relationship is required for conducting Action 
research. 
 
207 
 
During IRDA’s design and development, a number of identified positive features 
of the other platforms were successfully integrated into the proposed solution. 
Easy-to-use and navigate interfaces were created, familiar and standardized 
incident reporting forms and incident taxonomies were used, as well as other 
useful features, such as multi-factor authentication, encrypted communication 
channels, social features and more. However, even more features could have 
been implemented, and these are presented in section “8.5.” of this report. Also, 
during the demonstration activities, the administrator test cases were performed 
solely by the researcher, for reasons stated in section “6.2.3”. However, these 
test cases should have ideally been executed by a potential customer of the 
solution, such as a CSIRT/CERT or similar authority. Such an execution 
environment could potentially add up to the overall credibility level of the 
solution. Lastly, the demonstration activity indicated that the produced solution 
operates as planned, and that the design output matches the design input. 
However, as section “8.3.” also points out, more extensive testing could have 
been conducted, since only black-box testing was utilized. Due to time (and 
cost) considerations, such an action was unfortunately not possible to conduct 
during this, proof-of-concept, stage of IRDA.  
 
8.5. Future work 
This final section of this chapter describes a number of possible future 
enhancements to this work.  
 
The platform is currently partly decentralized. Incident data is saved and 
retrieved from the chain, however the application cannot be considered as fully 
decentralized, since the front-end components are hosted on a traditional server 
environment, with a centralized structure. The solution would involve hosting the 
currently centralized components to a decentralized storage system. Common 
decentralized storage systems used in blockchain implementations, include, 
“IPFS”, “Storj”, “Dat”, “Swarm” and “Sia” (Nizamuddin et al, 2019; Heinisuo et al, 
2019). The InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) is “a distributed file system, which 
integrates successful ideas from previous peer-to-peer systems, including 
DHTs, BitTorrent, Git, and SFS” (Benet, 2014) and appears to be the most 
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popular choice amongst these systems (Nizamuddin et al, 2019; Heinisuo et al, 
2019). It is open source, content addressable, and can be used for storing and 
sharing a large volume of files with high efficiency (Nizamuddin et al, 2019). 
Due to its design properties, it also has no single point of failure, while its 
ultimate goal is to build a new decentralized Internet architecture, by replacing 
the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) (Heinisuo et al, 2019). In addition to the 
standard IPFS environment, the Azure BaaS platform also offers decentralized 
storage for private blockchain implementations, with a beta version of the IPFS 
module available on their marketplace. Although, during the latter stages of 
implementation actions, an effort was initiated to include this module in the 
platform’s ecosystem, it was eventually abandoned, due to time limitations.   
 
A final step towards the complete decentralization of the incident reporting 
DApp, would be the decentralization of its domain name. On the Internet, the 
Domain Name System (DNS) is used to translate human-readable domain 
names into IP addresses, which can then be loaded by internet browsers. On 
the Ethereum blockchain, the same task can be accomplished through the 
Ethereum Name Service (ENS), which, unlike the traditional, centralized, DNS, 
operates in a decentralized way (Antonopoulos & Wood, 2018). ENS, which is 
actually a DApp itself, is supported by a number of other DApps, for the 
registration, auction, and management of registered names (Antonopoulos & 
Wood, 2018). ENS could be utilized to obtain an “. eth” top-level domain for the 
incident reporting DApp, which would be accessible through ENS-compatible 
browsers. 
 
Future work could also include actions aiming towards the overall improvement 
of the aesthetics, functionality and features of the platform. The current GUI 
might be simple and effective but lacks those design elements which could 
make it more aesthetically pleasing to users. Also, users of the platform are not 
currently informed about new incident submissions, and therefore must 
manually check the platform, for new entries. A mechanism could be employed 
(in the form of an automated e-mail message or a message received through a 
chatbot, in a private instant messaging application) to inform users as soon as a 
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new incident is submitted. Furthermore, spam/test incidents can currently be 
seen on the platform. Even if the administrator removes the user from having 
access to the DApp, any spam/test/maliciously-intended incidents he/she has 
previously submitted will always remain on the blockchain. This was, indeed, a 
strategic decision, in order to increase the immutability and transparency of the 
platform. However, a filtering mechanism could be employed in the future, to at 
least enable the administrator to hide those incidents from appearing through 
the platform’s web interface. A further enhancement could include creating an 
anonymous forum (to complement the chat functionality), for the users to be 
able to discuss important matters and essentially store that content for future 
reference. Currently, the anonymous chat does not save any interaction 
content. Another useful feature would be creating a page section in the platform 
for receiving live feeds (e.g. through RSS updates) from various CSIRTs or 
other incident-focused organizations. Also, the platform has not been optimized 
for viewing through mobile devices; this could be implemented at some point in 
the future. Nevertheless, it is important to note, that at the time of writing, there 
were no mobile-browsers available, with Web3.0 support for connecting to 
custom networks. A beta version of Metamask (mobile version) was available in 
both Android and Apple stores, however it only supported connections to the 
Ethereum main and test networks (although support for custom networks in the 
near future appears imminent).  
 
Another future task could be testing the platform’s durability (and user 
acceptance and response) in a public environment, by deploying the application 
into Ethereum’s main network. Although some changes would have to be 
implemented beforehand (such as switching to a different consensus algorithm, 
since PoA is not currently supported in Ethereum main net) it would be very 
interesting to see how users would behave in such a scenario, and whether 
Adebayo et al’s (2019) theoretical framework could indeed work in practice.  
 
Future work, however, does not only include tasks of a technical nature. 
Beginning with the examination of the users’ motivation for reporting incidents, 
this project successfully confronted some of the demotivators, which according 
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to the identified literature, cause the issue of incident under-reporting. Through 
the evaluation activity, some individual elements (e.g. anonymity, cost) which 
directly affect user reporting motivation were examined and evaluated, and an 
improvement in these elements (through the new platform) was signified. 
Nevertheless, whether this improvement in individual elements can improve the 
overall user motivation for reporting was not explicitly examined. As seen from 
various studies (e.g. Johnson, 2002; Metzger et al, 2011; Ahmad et al, 2012; 
Etzioni, 2014; Ruefle et al, 2014; Humphrey, 2017; Housen-Couriel, 2018) there 
is a variety of reasons which can have an effect on the user/organizational 
motivation for reporting. Motivation can be considered as a key factor towards 
the increase of incident reporting. No matter the technology, uniqueness, ease 
of use and overall attractiveness of a solution, if the overall reporting motivation 
is low, then under-reporting will constantly remain an issue. Nevertheless, 
motivation appears to be a complex notion and a lot of questions remain 
unanswered: is creating an organizational culture, which encourages reporting, 
adequate, for an organization to increase its reporting statistics? If employees 
are financially, or otherwise, rewarded for reporting incidents, can that increase 
their reporting rate? On the other hand, could punishment be a more effective 
solution than reward?  Are there any employee behavioural traits, which 
determine whether an employee essentially reports incidents, or rather prefers 
to ignore them? Is there a fine line between motivation and over-motivation? 
Could over-motivation actually increase the rate of false-positive incident 
reports and thus create other issues? All of these questions could yield 
interesting results. A future task could thus involve the examination of 
organizational/user reporting motivation, through a more holistic approach. 
 
Furthermore, and as already mentioned in the limitations section, the low 
number of participants during the evaluation activity limit the generalizability of 
this project’s findings. Therefore, a future, confirmatory, evaluation activity, 
utilizing a significantly greater number of participants (probably not just from 
Cyprus, but from other parts of the world) would certainly be of high value. In 
addition, this work relied solely on secondary data from existing literature, in 
order to identify the organizational demotivators for the problem of incident 
under-reporting. A future task could include designing a study towards the 
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collection of primary data, in order to confirm the validity of existing 
demotivators or to identify any new ones, and to examine whether these align 
well with existing literature.  
 
Regarding incident reporting, in general, this project also identified a lack of 
standard taxonomies for security incidents, in line with previous recent findings 
(e.g. studies by Humphrey, 2017; ENISA, 2018). It would be interesting to 
examine why this complexity exists and whether it would be possible to design 
a universally accepted taxonomy. This would probably make the sharing of 
incidents between organizations a lot more efficient and could also aid in the 
overall harmonization of statistics.   
 
A final future task could include the possible exploitation of intelligence systems 
in the reporting process, in line with the emergence of a newer stage of 
blockchain technology, “Blockchain 4.0”. As already stated in the literature 
review chapter, this stage involves the inclusion of artificial intelligence in the 
blockchain environment: since AI allows computers to learn from data, while 
blockchain provides data accuracy, which is useful for feeding data into the AI 
system and for recording its outputs, the benefits of both worlds can be 
combined (Angelis & Da Silva, 2019). A future effort could include the 
introduction of mechanisms in the blockchain reporting app, which could predict 
future attacks and targets, based on historical data and current trends, as well 
as the introduction of a safety net, for identifying possible false-positive incident 
submissions, based again on existing data and examination of tendencies.   
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A – RISK ASSESSMENT 
The following table describes the risk assessment conducted as part of this 
research project:  
 
Risk assessment 
 
Risk 
element 
Description Likeli-
hood 
(a) 
Impact 
(b) 
Risk 
rating 
(c = a 
x b) 
Mitigating actions Final 
risk 
rating 
Health & 
safety 
concerns 
Electric devices 
malfunction 
leading to 
accidents (e.g. 
fire). 
1 2 2 Researcher’s 
equipment and work 
environment follow 
all standard safety 
precautions. 
 
1 
UEL 
ethical 
guideline
s 
violation 
Research project 
breaches UEL 
ethical research 
guidelines. 
1 3 3 Ethical approval 
received from 
relevant committee 
prior to commencing 
the demonstration & 
evaluation activities. 
Ethical guidelines 
were followed 
throughout the 
project’s course. 
 
1 
Loss of 
data 
Loss of research 
data due to 
equipment failure 
or accident. 
 
1 3 3 Research data was 
regularly backed-up 
in cloud provider. 
1 
Project 
failure 
due to 
limited 
funds 
The project could 
fail if funds were 
not available for 
necessary project 
purchases (e.g. 
Microsoft Azure, 
Office 365). 
 
 
1 3 3 Funding was secured 
before the research 
project’s initiation 
1 
Table values 
 
a) Likelihood of Risk 
 
b) Impact c) Risk Rating (c = a x b) 
1 = Low (Unlikely) 1 = Minor 1-2 = Low 
2 = Moderate (Likely) 2 = Considerable 3-4 = Medium 
3 = High (Very likely) 3 = Major 6-9 = High 
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Project 
failure 
due to 
hardware
/software 
failures 
Hardware and 
software 
necessary for 
conducting this. 
project could 
unexpectedly fail. 
1 2 2 Provisions were 
taken in order to 
have readily 
available backup 
equipment in case of 
hardware/software 
failure. 
 
1 
Project 
failure 
due to 
lack of 
supervisi
on 
Project could fail 
due to unproper 
supervision. 
1 3 3 Supervision 
meetings were 
carried out regularly 
and draft work was 
submitted for review. 
Annual monitoring 
review ensured 
adequate work 
progression. 
 
1 
Project 
failure 
due to 
time 
mismana
gement 
Researcher is a 
full-time working 
professional. If 
work/research/per
sonal life balance 
is unproperly 
managed, 
implications could 
be devastating. 
 
2 3 6 Adequate pre-
planning and proper 
time management for 
all researcher’s 
activities. Strict 
deadlines were set 
and followed. 
2 
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APPENDIX B – DAPP SMART CONTRACT & TEST CODE 
The code of the main smart contract used for IRDA is presented below: 
pragma solidity ^0.5.0; 
/** 
 * @title ReportsStorage 
 * @dev Core smart contract of IRDA platform, which stores all reports 
 * also returns report data by ID 
 */ 
contract ReportsStorage { 
    // Current count of submitted reports 
    uint256 private _index; 
    // Struct data of report 
    struct Report { 
        string ttl; 
        uint256 dtsubmit; 
        string reportJSON; 
    } 
    // Mapping of reports by id 
    mapping(uint256 => Report) private _reports; 
    // Event should be triggered when a new report will be submitted 
    event EvtReport(uint256 _reportID); 
    // Empty fallback method 
    function () external payable {} 
    /** 
     * @dev Submitting report with data will store it on contract storage 
     * @param _ttl Title of report, should be text-string 
     * @param _reportJSON Data of report, should be JSON-string 
     */ 
    function submitReport(string calldata _ttl, string calldata _reportJSON) external { 
        _index++; 
        _reports[_index] = Report(_ttl, block.timestamp, _reportJSON); 
        emit EvtReport(_index); 
    } 
    /** 
     * @dev Returns the report data by id 
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     * @return data of report (title, creation timestamp and JSON) 
     */ 
    function getReport(uint256 reportID) external view returns ( 
        string memory ttl, 
        uint256 dtsubmit, 
        string memory reportJSON 
    ) { 
        Report memory report = _reports[reportID]; 
        return ( 
            report.ttl, 
            report.dtsubmit, 
            report.reportJSON 
        ); 
    } 
    /** 
     * @dev Returns the count of submitted reports 
     * @return the current count of submitted reports 
     */ 
    function getReportsCount() external view returns (uint256 ret) { 
        return _index; 
    } 
} 
 
The JavaScript code used for executing the smart contract tests is presented 
below: 
 
const assert = require('assert') 
const fetch = require('node-fetch') 
const { time } = require('@openzeppelin/test-helpers') 
const ReportsStorage = artifacts.require('./ReportsStorage.sol') 
 
contract('ReportsStorage', (accounts) => { 
    let contractInstance 
    const user1 = accounts[0] 
    const user2 = accounts[1] 
 
 const generateRandomData = async () => (await fetch('https://randomuser.me/api', { method: 
'GET' })).text() 
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    const demoTitle = "Report title 1" 
    const demoTitle2 = "Report title 2" 
 
    let demoJson 
    let demoJson2 
 
    before(async () => { 
        contractInstance = await ReportsStorage.new() 
 
        demoJson = await generateRandomData() 
        demoJson2 = await generateRandomData() 
    }) 
    context('◯ Empty state checks', async () => { 
        it("initial reports count should be zero", async () => { 
            const count = await contractInstance.getReportsCount() 
            assert(count, '0', "report count issue") 
        }) 
        it("get empty report data from contract", async () => { 
            const data = await contractInstance.getReport('1') 
 
            const title = data['0'] 
            const timestamp = data['1'] 
            const json = data['2'] 
 
            assert(typeof title === 'string' && title.length === 0, true, "report title issue") 
            assert(timestamp, '0', "report timestamp issue") 
            assert(typeof json === 'string' && json.length === 0, true, "report json issue") 
        }) 
    }) 
    context('◯ Submit report', async () => { 
        it("should submit report", async () => { 
            await contractInstance.submitReport(demoTitle, demoJson, { from: user1 }) 
        }) 
        it("reports count should be increased after submit", async () => { 
            const count = await contractInstance.getReportsCount() 
            assert(count, '1', "reporst count issue") 
        }) 
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        it("check report data from contract", async () => { 
            const data = await contractInstance.getReport('1') 
            const title = data['0'] 
            const timestamp = data['1'] 
            const json = data['2'] 
            const now = await time.latest() 
 
            assert(title, demoTitle, "report title issue") 
            assert(timestamp, now, "report timestamp issue") 
            assert(json, demoJson, "report json issue") 
        }) 
    }) 
    context('◯ Submit 2nd record', async () => { 
        it("should submit report", async () => { 
            await contractInstance.submitReport(demoTitle2, demoJson2, { from: user2 }) 
        }) 
        it("reports count should be increased after second report", async () => { 
            const count = await contractInstance.getReportsCount() 
            assert(count, '2', "reporst count issue") 
        }) 
        it("check 2nd report data from contract", async () => { 
            const data = await contractInstance.getReport('1') 
            const title = data['ttl'] 
            const timestamp = data['dtsubmit'] 
            const json = data['reportJSON'] 
            const now = await time.latest() 
 
            assert(title, demoTitle2, "report title issue") 
            assert(timestamp, now, "report timestamp issue") 
            assert(json, demoJson2, "report json issue") 
        }) 
    }) 
}) 
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APPENDIX C – PARTICIPANTS RECRUITMENT E-MAIL 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
As part of my doctoral research project, I have very recently developed an 
innovative platform for the reporting of information security incidents, amongst 
organizations. If your organization is currently utilizing (or has utilized, at some 
point, in the past) an information security incident reporting platform, then it 
would be eligible to participate in the functionality testing and evaluation of this 
new software. More specifically, you would be requested to complete a first 
questionnaire, evaluating your current (or previously used) incident reporting 
platform and then execute five (5) simple test cases on the developed system. 
You would then have to complete a second questionnaire, evaluating your 
experience with the newly developed system. 
Participating organizations can be of any size and operate in any business 
sector. As mentioned above, the only major eligibility prerequisite is that 
participating organizations should currently be using (or have used, at some 
point, in the past) an existing incident reporting platform, either commercially 
available or open source/free.  
 
Please declare your interest by replying to u1445442@uel.ac.uk stating the 
name and business sector of your organization, as well as the name of the 
incident reporting platform you are currently using (or have used).  
 
Declaration of interest deadline: 22/11/2019, 20.00 hrs 
 
Best regards, 
Alexis Michail 
Doctoral researcher 
University of East London 
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APPENDIX D – ETHICAL APPROVAL 
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APPENDIX E – INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS FOR 
DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITIES 
 
Demonstration activities - Test instructions 
*Please remember to complete Questionnaire A – “Questionnaire for evaluating 
features of current (or previously utilized) incident reporting platform” before 
initiating the following activities and questionnaire B – “Questionnaire for 
evaluating features of newly developed incident reporting platform” after you 
have concluded the activities. 
 
Thank you once more for accepting to test and evaluate the functionality of 
IRDA, the Incident Reporting DApp! 
 
For performing your assigned test cases, please follow the steps below:  
 
1. Download and install a Web3 enabled browser or install the Metamask 
extension (recommended) to your current Chrome/Firefox/Opera browser. The 
following steps apply to users who have installed the Metamask extension. 
2. Create an account on Metamask – remember to securely save your 
password and Seed Phrase. 
3. Provide a copy of your public key to the researcher and wait for the 
researcher’s confirmation in order to proceed with registration. 
4. After you have received the researcher’s confirmation, change your 
Metamask’s network connection to “Custom RPC” and input the following 
address as RPC URL: https://master1.blockchain.azure.com:3200/-
iTfL2ll0UAMam3QhMILMsG5 
5. Save the new network. 
6. Navigate to https://alexis-michael.eu/reporting/ 
7. A Metamask pop-up window will now appear in your browser - Login to your 
Metamask account (if you are not already logged-in) and allow IRDA to connect 
to your account.  
8. Click on the “Sign up” tab and complete the required information (E-mail, 
phone number and password). Please select a phone number you currently 
have access to, since the one-time-password will be sent to this number. 
9. Click on “Get started” button – check your mobile phone for an SMS 
message containing a six-digit number. Input this number to the designated field 
and continue. 
10. IRDA’s homepage should now be visible on your screen. Please log-out of 
your account, and follow the below instructions for executing the test cases: 
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The following test cases should be executed in sequential order: 
 
Test case: UTC01 – User Login  
1. Login to your Metamask account (connected to the IRDA network). 
2. Navigate to https://alexis-michael.eu/reporting/ 
3. Allow IRDA to connect to your account 
3. Fill-in your e-mail account and password and click on “login”. 
4. A pop-up window will appear stating that the verification SMS has been sent. 
Click the “OK” button to close this window. 
5. Check your registered mobile phone for an SMS message containing a six-
digit number. Input this number to the designated field and click “login”. 
6. IRDA’s homepage should now be visible on your screen. 
 
Test case: UTC02 – User submit incident  
1. While on IRDA’s homepage, click on the “Submit incident” button. 
2. Fill in all available fields (at least the minimum required fields – indicated with 
a red asterisk) of the form with details of a mock incident.  
3. Click “Preview & submit” button. 
4. Review content of form and if satisfied with content click “submit” button, 
otherwise click “edit form” button. 
5. A Metamask pop-up window will now appear asking you to sign your 
transaction. Proceed to signing your transaction.  
6. After a moment or so, the transaction ID should appear on your screen. 
 
Test case: UTC03 – User view incident  
1. While on IRDA’s homepage, click on the “View incidents” button. 
2. The incident submitted through the previous test case (UTC02) should be 
evident in the relevant table and located at the top of the list. 
3. Click on any field of the specific row of the incident. 
4. Confirm the data displayed is identical to the data submitted as part of 
UTC02 execution. 
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Test case: UTC04 – User ask for help  
1. While on IRDA’s homepage, click on the “Ask for help” button. 
2. Fill-in your e-mail address and a message containing the text “Please don’t 
leave me!” – you can also include your name in the relevant field (optional). 
3. Click the “Send” button. 
4. Wait for admin confirmation regarding message receival. 
 
Test case: UTC05 – User chat 
1. While on platform’s homepage, click on the “Live chat” button. 
2. Notify researcher to join the chat session. 
3. After the researcher has joined the chat and sent an acknowledgment 
message, type a message with content: “Hello fellow anonymous!” 
4. Click on the “submit” button. 
5. The researcher should reply with a second acknowledgment message. 
6. Messages sent and received should be visible on your screen. 
 
Please report the results (success/failure) of the above test cases to the 
researcher, at your earliest convenience, and in any case on or before 
05/12/2019. In case of a failed test case please contact the researcher 
immediately and document your exact actions leading to this outcome, as well 
as any error messages (if any) displayed to you. 
 
Thank you for your time and effort! 
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APPENDIX F – ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF USER 
PERFORMING TEST CASES 
 
The following example illustrates the flow of actions for logging-in to the 
platform, submitting an incident, viewing that incident in a list and tracing that 
incident through Epirus explorer:  
 
1. Login to your whitelisted Metamask account. Navigate to https://alexis-
michael.eu/reporting.  
 
 
 
2. When prompted, allow IRDA to connect to your 
Metamask account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Type your e-mail address and password and click 
login. When the SMS containing the OTP arrives, enter 
the code in the relevant field and click login once more 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. While on the DApp’s homepage, 
select the “Submit incident button” 
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5. Complete the report form with details 
of a mock incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Confirm the incident’s details before 
final submission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Sign the transaction with Metamask 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Transaction has been submitted! 
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9. Transaction has been registered in incidents list   
 
 
10. Navigate to: http://epirus-
8ea3d7.westeurope.cloudapp.azure.com/transactions and confirm that 
transaction hashes match 
 
 
The incident has been successfully submitted on the blockchain! 
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APPENDIX G – VENABLE ET AL’s (2012) FOUR-STEP METHOD 
FOR EVALUATING DSR PROJECTS 
 
Venable et al’s (2012) four-step evaluation framework for DSR projects is 
presented below: 
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APPENDIX H – EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
A. Questionnaire for evaluating features of current (or previously utilized) 
incident reporting platform 
 
Please complete this questionnaire providing answers regarding your current 
(or previously utilized) incident reporting platform. This questionnaire should be 
completed before testing the new platform. Please mark your selections with a 
“√”, “x” or “+” symbol, in black or blue ink. 
 
On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest (poor) and 10 being the highest 
(excellent) score, please rate the following features of your current (or 
previously utilized) incident reporting platform: 
 
1. How would you rate the level of user anonymity the platform provides? 
 
 
No or negligent anonymity                                                                                         Excellent level of anonymity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
2. How would you rate the overall cost of purchasing, operating, managing, 
and maintaining the platform (including any staff training costs)? 
 
 
Very expensive                                                                                                                     Free or very low-cost 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
3. How would you rate the ease of understanding the platform’s features and 
overall functionality? 
 
 
Very hard to understand                                                                                                  Very easy to understand 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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4. How would you rate the overall ease of using the platform (including GUI 
design and simplicity in the reporting processes)? 
 
 
Very hard to use                                                                                                                          Very easy to use 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
5. How would you rate the level of customer support offered by the 
platform’s provider? 
 
 
Very bad support                                                                                                                        Excellent support 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
6. How would you rate the overall level of performance and efficiency of the 
platform? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
7. How would you rate the overall level of security of the platform? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
8. How would you rate the overall level of accessibility of the platform? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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9. How would you rate the social features (e.g. chat, forum etc.) offered by 
the platform (if, any)? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
10. How would you rate the platform’s availability (i.e. uptime) level? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
11. How would you rate the overall platform’s transparency features 
including the presence of any auditability mechanisms? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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B. Questionnaire for evaluating features of newly developed incident 
reporting platform 
 
Please complete this questionnaire providing answers regarding the newly 
developed incident reporting platform. This questionnaire should be completed 
after testing the new platform. Please mark your selections with a “√”, “x” or “+” 
symbol, in black or blue ink. 
 
On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest (poor) and 10 being the highest 
(excellent) score, please rate the following features of your current (or 
previously utilized) incident reporting platform: 
 
1. How would you rate the level of user anonymity the platform provides? 
 
 
No or negligent anonymity                                                                                         Excellent level of anonymity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
2. How would you rate the overall cost of purchasing, operating, managing, 
and maintaining the platform (including any staff training costs)? 
 
 
Very expensive                                                                                                                     Free or very low-cost 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
3. How would you rate the ease of understanding the platform’s features and 
overall functionality? 
 
 
Very hard to understand                                                                                                  Very easy to understand 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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4. How would you rate the overall ease of using the platform (including GUI 
design and simplicity in the reporting processes)? 
 
 
Very hard to use                                                                                                                          Very easy to use 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
5. How would you rate the level of customer support offered by the 
platform’s provider? 
 
 
Very bad support                                                                                                                        Excellent support 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
6. How would you rate the overall level of performance and efficiency of the 
platform? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
7. How would you rate the overall level of security of the platform? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
8. How would you rate the overall level of accessibility of the platform? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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9. How would you rate the social features (e.g. chat, forum etc.) offered by 
the platform (if, any)? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
10. How would you rate the platform’s availability (i.e. uptime) level? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
 
11. How would you rate the overall platform’s transparency features 
including the presence of any auditability mechanisms? 
 
 
Very bad                                                                                                                                                  Excellent  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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APPENDIX I – “R” SCRIPT USED FOR SIGNIFICANCE TESTING 
 
The following “R” code was used for executing the eleven significance tests of 
this project: 
 
before <- c(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) 
after <- c(y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6) 
my_data <- data.frame(  
                group = rep(c("before", "after"), each = 6), 
                weight = c(before,  after) 
                ) 
print(my_data) 
library("dplyr") 
group_by(my_data, group) %>% 
  summarise( 
    count = n(), 
    median = median(weight, na.rm = TRUE), 
    IQR = IQR(weight, na.rm = TRUE) 
  ) 
before <- subset(my_data,  group == "before", weight, 
                 drop = TRUE) 
after <- subset(my_data,  group == "after", weight, 
                 drop = TRUE) 
library(PairedData) 
pd <- paired(before, after) 
plot(pd, type = "profile") + theme_bw() 
library(coin) 
wilcoxsign_test (before ~ after, distribution = "exact") 
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APPENDIX J – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY DETAILS 
 
1. Research philosophy 
Saunders et al (2007) explain, that some vital assumptions about the 
researcher’s view and “understanding of the world”, can be indicated by the 
research philosophy adopted by the researcher. These, world-related, 
assumptions, naturally underpin the research process (Saunders et al, 2007), 
and are important to review, since people may conduct research for an entire 
career, without considering the philosophical implications of their passively 
received areas of interest and research methods (Kuhn, 2012). Vaishnavi et al 
(2004/19) argue, that in multi-paradigmatic or pre-paradigmatic communities, 
such as information systems, researchers should certainly consider the 
“fundamental bases of the socially constructed realities in which they operate 
in”. There are three major ways of thinking about research: Ontology, 
Epistemology and Axiology (Saunders et al, 2007; Collis & Hussey, 2013; 
Vaishnavi et al, 2004/19) 
 
a) Ontology 
According to Vaishnavi et al (2004/19), Ontology is the study that describes the 
nature of reality: what is real and what is not, what is derivative and what is 
fundamental; and whether the researcher is committed to objectivism or 
subjectivism in his view of reality (Saunders et al, 2007). Ontological questions 
include “What exists”, “What is true” and “How can we sort existing things?” 
(Killam, 2013).  
 
b) Epistemology 
Vaishnavi et al (2004/19) describe Epistemology as the study that explores the 
nature of knowledge and refers to questions such as how knowledge is 
acquired and “how we come to know what we know” (Killam, 2013). It is a 
philosophical assumption concerned with items of knowledge acceptable as 
valid knowledge (Collis & Hussey, 2013). Epistemological questions include “On 
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what does knowledge depend upon?” and “How can we be certain of what we 
know?” (Vaishnavi et al, 2004/19). 
 
c) Axiology 
According to Saunders et al (2007), Axiology is a branch of philosophy that 
studies “judgments about value”. It refers to what the researcher believes is 
valuable and ethical, and these basic beliefs guide the researcher’s decision 
making (Killam, 2013). Axiological questions include “What values does an 
individual or group hold and why?” (Vaishnavi et al, 2004/19). 
 
2. Research paradigms 
Mertens (2005) argues, that the researcher’s theoretical framework is what 
influences the exact nature of the definition of research. According to the same 
author, this framework, as distinct from a theory, is referred to as the “paradigm” 
and effects the way knowledge is interpreted and studied (Mertens, 2005). It is 
this choice of paradigm that outlines the intent, motivation and expectations of 
the research (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). According to Mackenzie & Knipe 
(2006), there is a number of different paradigms discussed in literature, 
although different sources may sometimes use different terms, which may 
ultimately lead to confusion. Some of the most common paradigms referred to 
in research, are the following (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006):  
 
a) Positivist and post-positivist paradigm 
Positivism, which is also referred to as “science research” or “scientific method”, 
is based on the empiricist, rationalistic, philosophy that originated with Aristotle 
(Mertens, 2005), and signifies a deterministic philosophy in which outcomes or 
effects are determined by causes (Creswell, 2014). In order to control and/or 
predict forces that surround us, positivists utilize observation and measurement, 
in order to describe an experience, or test a theory (O’Leary, 2004). Post-
positivism replaced positivism after the second World War (Mertens, 2005), and 
is driven by the assumption that “any piece of research is influenced by a 
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number of well-developed theories, apart from, and as well as, the one which is 
being tested” (Cook & Campbell, 1979, p.24). This paradigm is most commonly 
associated with quantitative methods of data collection and analysis (Mackenzie 
& Knipe, 2006). 
 
b) Interpretivist/constructivist paradigm 
Understanding the “world of human experience”, through the underlying idea 
that “reality is socially constructed”, is the approach to research that 
interpretivists/constructivists take (Mertens, 2005). Therefore, researchers 
incline to rely upon the “participants’ views of the situation being researched” 
(Creswell, 2014). This paradigm is most commonly associated with qualitative 
methods of data collection and analysis, or a combination of both, where 
quantitative data may be used in a way that expands or supports qualitative 
data (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006).   
 
c) Transformative paradigm  
The transformative paradigm appeared during the 1980s and 1990s, partially 
because of the dissatisfaction related to the existing paradigms, but also due to 
a realization that a lot of the psychological and sociological theory related to the 
existing (and dominant) paradigms, "had been developed from the white, able-
bodied, male, perspective, and was based on the study of male subjects" 
(Mertens, 2005). According to Creswell (2014, p.9), transformative researchers 
trust that “inquiry needs to be intertwined with politics and a political agenda", 
and their action agenda includes reforms able to "change the lives of the 
participants, the institutions in which individuals work or live, and the 
researcher’s life” (Creswell, 2014). This paradigm is most commonly associated 
with a mixed methods approach (although researchers can opt for utilizing 
merely quantitative or qualitative approaches), for data collection and analysis 
(Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006), since such an approach allows the development of  
"more complete portraits of our social world, through the use of multiple 
perspectives and lenses (Somekh & Lewin, 2005, p.275). 
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d) Pragmatic paradigm 
According to Mackenzie and Knipe (2006), Pragmatism is not loyal to any one 
system of philosophy or reality, but pragmatists rather focus on the “what” and 
“how” of the research problem (Creswell, 2014). The research problem is 
placed as central, and all approaches are applied to understanding the problem 
(Creswell, 2014); data collection and analysis methods most likely to provide 
insights into the problem are chosen, with no commitment, whatsoever, to any 
alternative paradigm (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). This paradigm, according to 
Creswell (2014), provides an opportunity for multiple methods, different 
assumptions and worldviews. 
The following table by Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) is very informative, as it 
presents the language most commonly associated with the major research 
paradigms: 
 
 
Table J1. Language commonly associated with major paradigms (Mackenzie & 
Knipe, 2006) 
 
Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) support, that while data collection methods can be 
combined, a researcher, does, usually, philosophically, align, with one of the 
research paradigms; although Hassani (2017) argues, that in many situations, a 
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combination of approaches that these paradigms suggest, would better serve 
the research design - rather than a single paradigm - and a mix/multi-methods 
paradigm has received attention in studies (Johnson et al, 2007). Furthermore, 
Ramesh et al (2004) pointed out, that research in computing has been 
conducted according to a broad range of approaches and paradigms. In any 
way, the philosophical alignment of the researcher effects every decision made 
in the research process, including the choice of methodology (Mackenzie & 
Knipe, 2006).  
 
3. Research approaches 
The following section describes “Development”, “Design” and “Action” research 
approaches. It also details the similarities between the Design Science research 
and the Action research approaches. 
 
a) Development research 
Development research could be described as a disciplined investigation, for the 
purpose of improving either the developer, or the artefact being developed, in 
the general context of the development of a product, program, or software 
(Hasan, 2003). It can also be thought of as "proof by demonstration" 
(Nunamaker et al, 1991).  Nunamaker et al (1991) argue that the advancement 
of Information Systems and practice often comes from new system concepts. 
However, these concepts, on their own, do not necessarily ensure a system’s 
subsistence, and therefore artefacts must be developed, in order to test the 
underlying concepts.  
 
According to Hasan (2003), there must exist a research agenda in a system 
development project - since it is also research - although the progress of the 
project is usually determined by the system requirements. A researcher must 
therefore state the research problem, the questions to be asked and the 
consequent objectives, and must also be able to interpret the research findings 
in terms of research contributions to knowledge (Hasan, 2003). These 
contributions may be in the innovative nature of the artefact, its ability to 
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improve workplace performance, or in the depiction of a new method of product 
development and they must be verifiable, usually through the success of the 
artefact as a proof of concept (Hasan, 2003). 
 
Based on Nunamaker et al (1991) previous work, Hasan (2003) proposed an 
explicit framework for development research, which includes five stages of 
systems development: 
 
i) Concept design: At this stage, the researcher ought to find, synthesize, use 
and apply existing knowledge, to identify gaps and develop a meaningful 
research objective. 
 
ii) Constructing the system’s architecture: At this stage, the researcher 
designs the architecture of the system, defines components, models, algorithms 
and data structures. 
 
iii) Prototyping: At this stage, the researcher develops the proof-of-concept, 
which could be presented as a single working prototype, or could involve the 
iterative analysis, design and implementation of an evolving prototype. 
 
iv) Product development: At this stage, the prototype’s specifications are 
formalized, in order to build, test and evaluate a robust system. 
 
v) Technology transfer: If the artefact is successful, it may seem appealing to 
a greater audience, and therefore, at this stage, it may be possible to evaluate 
the use of the artefact, with case studies or experiments, which may even 
trigger a new research cycle. 
 
268 
 
As Nunamaker et al (1991) point out, Development research can be described 
as a multimethodological approach to Information Systems research, but it is 
just one of the many available methodologies. 
 
b) Design Science research 
According to Vaishnavi et al (2004/19), research can be broadly defined as an 
activity which contributes to the understanding of a phenomenon; in the case of 
Design Science research, however, all or part of the phenomenon might not 
naturally occur, but rather be created (Lakatos, 1978). March & Smith (1995) 
state, that whereas natural science tries to understand reality, an “artificial” 
science attempts to create things that serve human purposes.” In the same 
context, Design Science, according to Hevner et al (2004, p.77), “creates and 
evaluates IT artefacts intended to solve identified organizational problems”. 
According to the same authors, Design Science involves a “rigorous process to 
design artefacts to solve observed problems, to make research contributions, to 
evaluate the designs, and to communicate the results to appropriate 
audiences”, whereas such artefacts may include “constructs, models, methods, 
and instantiations”. They go on by stating that research should represent a 
verifiable contribution, and rigor must be applied both in the development of the 
artefact, as well as in its evaluation. They also add that the development of the 
artefact should be a search process that draws from existing theories and 
knowledge, to come up with a solution to a defined problem, which is interesting 
to the research community (Gregor and Hevner, 2013) and that research must 
be effectively communicated to appropriate audiences. It is therefore evident 
that Design Science research aligns with pragmatism and it must pass both the 
tests of science and practice (Markus et al, 2002).  
 
In order to understand the Design discipline and its research process, a general 
model for generating and accumulating knowledge has been proposed by Owen 
(1997):  
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Figure J1. Model for generating and accumulating knowledge by Owen (1997) 
 
Owen (1997, p.11) explains that “knowledge is generated and accumulated 
through action”, and that “doing something and judging the results is the general 
model”, where knowledge is creatively used to create works, which are 
consequently evaluated to build knowledge.  
 
Vaishnavi et al (2004/19) argue that “learning through building”, the underlying 
philosophy of the Design Science research, is not exclusively used in the 
Information Systems domain, as the domains of engineering, education and 
health care, also utilize such an approach: programs of treatment are designed 
and empirically evaluated in health care, while the same analogy applies to new 
learning programs and curricula, in education. According to the same authors, 
Design Science research is a set of synthetic and analytical techniques and 
perspectives for performing research in the Information Systems domain, which 
typically involves the creation of an artefact and/or design theory, in order to 
improve the current state of practice and the existing research knowledge 
(Baskerville et al, 2018). According to Vaishnavi et al (2004/19), design means 
"to invent and bring into being", and therefore design science deals with 
creating a new artefact that does not exist. In order to provide a better 
understanding of the different forms of knowledge contribution of design science 
research, Vaishnavi et al (2004/19) provide the following table:  
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Table J2. Outputs of Design Science research by Vaishnavi et al (2004/19) 
 
Vaishnavi et al (2014/19, p.7) argue that Design Science research differentiates 
itself from routine design by the production of “new, true and interesting” 
knowledge, and that it is mostly desirable to produce an artefact using “state-of 
practice application, with state-of-practice techniques, and readily available 
components”. According to Peffers et al (2007, p.2), although Design Science 
research “has been slow to diffuse into the mainstream of Information Systems 
research”, several researchers have been successful in bringing Design 
Science into the Information Systems research community, successfully making 
the case for its value and validity, and integrating “design” as a major 
component of research.  
 
Although a generally accepted process for conducting Design Science research 
does not exist (Peffers et al, 2007), there is a number of available process 
models for conducting Design Science research, such as those by March and 
Smith (1995), Hevner et al (2004), Peffers et al (2007) and Purao (2013). 
Although the overall research process slightly differs, from model to model, they 
all share some basic attributes, such as identifying the problem, defining the 
objectives, designing, implementing and evaluating the artefact, and 
communicating the message to a greater audience. 
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c) Action research 
Action research traces its origins to the social sciences – due to the massive 
social changes that the second World War brought (Baskerville & Myers, 2004) 
– and was explicitly introduced as a research methodology to the information 
systems community by Wood-Harper (1985), who incorporated action research 
concepts into an action-based systems development methodology called 
“Multiview” (Baskerville, 1999). Action research aims “to contribute both to the 
practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation, and to the 
goals of social science, by joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable 
ethical framework” (Rapoport, 1970, p.499). It has increased in importance for 
information systems towards the end of the 1990s, as the results it produces 
are considered to be highly relevant, since they are grounded in practical action, 
in order to solve a problem, while carefully informing theory (Baskerville, 1999). 
It therefore has a dual goal, by contributing both to research and practice (Iivari 
& Venable, 2009), and refers to a class of approaches, rather than a single, 
monolithic, research approach (Baskerville, 1999). According to Baskerville 
(1999), a wide-spread agreement is found in literature, on four common 
characteristics of Action research, which include “an action and change 
orientation”, “a problem focus”, “an organic process involving systematic and 
sometimes iterative stages”, and “collaboration among participants”.  
 
Action research aims to create organizational change, while simultaneously 
studying the process (Baburoglu and Ravn 1992), and it is usually an iterative 
research approach, strongly oriented towards collaboration and change, 
involving both researchers and subjects (Baskerville & Myers, 2004). The action 
researcher is change-oriented; he/she believes that complex processes can be 
studied best by introducing changes into these processes, and consequently, 
observing their effects (Baskerville, 1999). Action research can be thought to 
belong to the post-positivist paradigm (Baskerville, 1999), although more recent 
literature situates Action research in pragmatism (Baskerville & Myers, 2004). 
  
Baskerville and Myers (2004) describe a variety of forms in Action research, 
including “canonical action research”, “collaborative practice research”, 
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“participatory action research” and “dialogical action research”. Regarding 
information systems, according to Baskerville (1999), these forms were 
inventoried and analysed from different perspectives: for example, one 
perspective (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1998) identified ten distinct forms of 
action research in information systems, while another perspective (Lau, 1999) 
outlined specific characteristics to identify research projects as members of a 
class of action research approaches.  
 
According to Baskerville (1999), the most dominant action research description 
is the one provided by Susman and Evered (1978), although this particular 
approach has more recently been extended into a form known as “participatory 
action research” (Baskerville, 1999). After establishing a client-system research 
environment, five, identifiable, phases are iterated: “diagnosing”, “action 
planning”, “action taking”, “evaluating” and, finally, “specifying learning”. The 
following figure illustrates this action research structural cycle: 
 
 
Figure J2.. Action research structural cycle by Susman and Evered (1978)  
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An Action research framework has also been proposed by Lau (1999), which 
includes four dimensions:  
 
i) The “conceptual foundation dimension”, which includes the research aim, 
the theoretical assumptions and the perspective. 
 
ii) The “study design dimension”, which includes the background of the 
research, the envisioned change, the participants, the sources and the duration; 
the methodological details of the study, in general. 
 
iii) The “research process dimension”, which describes the sequence of 
steps by which action research is conducted, and should include one or more 
iterations of problem diagnosis, action interventions, reflective learning and 
extraction of general lessons, and, 
 
iv) The “role expectations dimension”, which describes the capacity and 
expectations of both the researcher and the study participants, and also 
includes specifying competencies and evaluating ethical issues. 
 
d) Similarities between Design Science research and Action research  
According to Nguyen et al (2019), several studies comparing Design Science 
research and Action research have concluded that both methodologies share 
many common characteristics. The similarity between Design Science research 
and Action research has been identified by a number of studies, including those 
by Jarvinen (2007), Cole et al (2005) and Papas et al (2012).  
 
Jarvinen (2007) presented a side-by-side comparison of the two approaches, 
comparing the cyclical process of action research and the general methodology 
of design science research, and concluded that there are many similarities; 
although the approaches might utilize different names for the various steps of 
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each, the actual content is very similar. The following table illustrates the most 
important characteristics of both approaches:  
 
Table J3. Comparison of Action research and Design science by Jarvinen 
(2007) 
 
Jarvinen (2007), therefore, concluded that there is a very high fit between the 
two approaches, and thus, Design Science research and Action research 
should be considered as similar approaches. Furthermore, Cole et al (2005) 
stated that both approaches share common assumptions regarding ontology, 
epistemology, and axiology. 
 
The research community, however, does not reach a consensus regarding the 
similar nature of the two approaches. Authors such as Iivari and Venable 
(2009), argue that the two approaches are “decisively dissimilar”, as some 
activities of Design Science are always mutually exclusive from Action research, 
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and that it is often the case that Action research does not share the 
paradigmatic assumptions and research interests of Design Science research. 
According to Peffers et al (2007, p.33), perhaps the clearest distinction between 
the two approaches is found in their conceptual origins, as Action research 
comes from the concept of the researcher being an “active participant”, in 
solving practical problems, in organizational contexts, whereas Design science 
originates “from a history of design as a component of engineering and 
computer science research”. Furthermore, Design Science research assumes 
no, specific, client-researcher relation and/or collaboration, contrary to Action 
research, which usually requires the existence of a particular client-researcher 
relationship (Iivari & Venable, 2009). According to Venable (2009, p.105), 
“clients” of a Design Science research project, would be “the set of all members 
of the generalised class of all people or organizations, who could potentially be 
motivated to solve instances of the generalised class of problem(s) addressed 
by the project’s outcome/artefact”. 
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APPENDIX K – SIGNIFICANCE TESTS 
Significance test 1: Anonymity 
 
Question How would you rate the level of user anonymity the platform provides? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
1 2 2 1 3 1 9 9 10 9 8 10 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
1.5 1 9 0.75 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O1, O3 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of user anonymity is not significantly different with IRDA 
H1 Level of user anonymity is significantly different with IRDA 
Results  
 
 
 
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is evidence to 
suggest that the level of user anonymity after using IRDA is significantly 
higher than before using IRDA (Z = -2.23, p = 0.03, α = 0.05), a partial 
requirement of objectives O1, O3 
Table K1. Significance test for anonymity  
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Significance test 2: Cost 
 
Question How would you rate the overall cost of purchasing, operating, managing, 
and maintaining the platform (including any staff training costs)? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
4 3 2 2 3 4 8 7 9 8 7 10 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
3 1.5 8 1.5 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O1 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of cost is not significantly different with IRDA 
H1 Level of cost is significantly different with IRDA 
Results  
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is evidence to 
suggest that the overall cost of IRDA is significantly lower than that of 
other reporting platforms (Z = -2.23, p = 0.03, α = 0.05), a partial 
requirement of objective O1 
 
Table K2. Significance test for cost  
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Significance test 3: Ease of understanding 
 
Question How would you rate the ease of understanding the platform’s features and 
overall functionality? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 8 9 10 10 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
8.5 1 9 0.75 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O2, ITa4 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of ease of understanding is not significantly different with 
IRDA 
H1 Level of ease of understanding is significantly different with IRDA 
Results  
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is no evidence 
to suggest that IRDA’s ease of understanding is significantly different than 
that of other platforms (Z = -2, p = 0.13, α = 0.05), a partial requirement of 
objectives O2, ITa4 
 
Table K3. Significance test for ease of understanding  
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Significance test 4: Ease of use 
 
Question How would you rate the overall ease of using the platform (including GUI 
design and simplicity in the reporting processes)? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
7 8 9 9 8 8 8 9 10 9 7 7 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
8 0.75 8.5 1.75 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O2 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of ease of use is not significantly different with IRDA 
H1 Level of ease of use is significantly different with IRDA 
Results  
 
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is no evidence 
to suggest that the level of IRDA’s ease of use is significantly different 
than that of other platforms (Z = -0.45, p = 1, α = 0.05), a partial 
requirement of objective O2 
 
 
Table K4. Significance test for ease of use  
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Significance test 5: Customer support 
 
Question How would you rate the level of customer support offered by the platform’s 
provider? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
8 8 9 10 9 9 7 8 8 9 10 8 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
9 0.75 8 0.75 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O2 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of ease of customer support is not significantly different with 
IRDA 
H1 Level of ease of customer support is significantly different with 
IRDA 
Results  
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is no evidence 
to suggest that the level of IRDA’s customer support is significantly 
different than that of other platforms (Z = 1.34, p = 0.38, α = 0.05), a 
partial requirement of objective O2 
 
Table K5. Significance test for level of customer support  
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Significance test 6: Performance & Efficiency 
 
Question How would you rate the overall level of performance and efficiency of the 
platform? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
9 9 8 9 8 8 7 8 9 8 8 7 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
8.5 1 8 0.75 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O2 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of ease of performance & efficiency is not significantly 
different with IRDA 
H1 Level of ease of performance & efficiency is significantly different 
with IRDA 
Results  
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is no evidence 
to suggest that the level of IRDA’s performance and efficiency is 
significantly different than that of other platforms (Z = 1.41, p = 0.31, α = 
0.05), a partial requirement of objective O2 
 
Table K6. Significance test for performance and efficiency  
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Significance test 7: Security 
 
Question How would you rate the overall level of security of the platform? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
7 8 8 9 8 9 8 9 8 7 9 7 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
8 0.75 8 1.5 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O2 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of security is not significantly different with IRDA 
H1 Level of security is significantly different with IRDA 
Results  
 
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is no evidence 
to suggest that the level of IRDA’s security is significantly different than 
that of other platforms (Z = 0.21, p = 1, α = 0.05), a partial requirement of 
objective O2 
 
 
Table K7. Significance test for security  
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Significance test 8: Accessibility 
 
Question How would you rate the overall level of accessibility of the platform? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
9 10 9 10 8 9 7 8 9 8 9 8 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
9 0.75 8 0.75 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O2 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of accessibility is not significantly different with IRDA 
H1 Level of accessibility is significantly different with IRDA 
Results  
 
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is no evidence 
to suggest that the level of IRDA’s accessibility is significantly different 
than that of other platforms (Z = 1.60, p = 0.19, α = 0.05), a partial 
requirement of objective O2 
 
 
Table K8. Significance test for accessibility  
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Significance test 9: Social features 
 
Question How would you rate the social features (e.g. chat, forum etc.) offered by 
the platform (if, any)? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
6 8 7 8 7 6 8 8 9 7 8 7 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
7 1.5 8 0.75 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O2 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of social features is not significantly different with IRDA 
H1 Level of social features is significantly different with IRDA 
Results  
 
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is no evidence 
to suggest that the level of IRDA’s social features is significantly different 
than that of other platforms (Z = -1.50, p = 0.25, α = 0.05), a partial 
requirement of objective O2 
 
 
Table K9. Significance test for social features  
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Significance test 10: Availability 
 
Question How would you rate the platform’s availability (i.e. uptime) level? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
9 8 9 9 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
8.5 1 10 0 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O3 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of platform availability is not significantly different with IRDA 
H1 Level of platform availability is significantly different with IRDA 
Results  
 
 
 
 
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is evidence to 
suggest that the level of platform availability of the IRDA is significantly 
higher than that of other platforms (Z = -2.25, p = 0.03, α = 0.05), a partial 
requirement of objective O3 
 
 
Table K10. Significance test for availability 
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Significance test 11: Transparency 
 
Question How would you rate the overall platform’s transparency features including 
the presence of any auditability mechanisms? 
 
Results Before IRDA 
 
 
n = 6 
After 
A B C D E F A B C D E F 
6 6 5 5 4 5 8 9 6 8 7 7 
Medians (M) & 
Inter-quartile 
range (IQR) 
 
M IQR M IQR 
5 0.75 7.5 1 
Boxplot of 
paired results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connected 
objectives 
O3 
 
Type of test Two-tailed 
 
Confidence 
interval 
95% 
 
Hypotheses H0 Level of platform transparency is not significantly different with 
IRDA 
H1 Level of platform transparency is significantly different with IRDA 
Results  
 
 
 
 
Verdict A Wilcoxon-Pratt Signed-Ranked test indicated that there is evidence to 
suggest that the level of platform transparency of the IRDA is significantly 
higher than that of other platforms (Z = -2.23, p = 0.03, α = 0.05), a partial 
requirement of objective O3 
 
 
Table K11. Significance test for transparency 
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APPENDIX L – COMPLIMENTARY EVALUATION METHOD 
 
According to the ISO/IEC 25010 (2011), the quality of a software/system refers 
to “the degree to which the software/system satisfies the stated and implied 
needs of its various stakeholders, and thus provides value”. Estdale and 
Georgiadou (2018) argue, that this value (to organizations and users), arises 
from the software’s actual behaviour in use, and that ISO/IEC 25010 aids in 
identifying such value, by dividing software characteristics in two quality models 
(“quality in use” and “product quality”), and thus enables direct assessment of 
the developed software. The “quality in use” model assesses the outcome of 
interaction, when a software is used in a particular context, and is composed of 
five characteristics, which are subdivided in further sub-characteristics (ISO/IEC 
25010, 2011). The “product quality” model, assesses the static properties of the 
software and the dynamic properties of the system, and is composed of eight 
characteristics, which are also subdivided in further sub-characteristics 
(ISO/IEC 25010, 2011). According to the standard, both models provide a set of 
characteristics, against which the stated quality requirements of the 
software/system can be compared for completeness, and are applicable to both 
software products and systems. The models can be utilized by those 
responsible for evaluating the software/system’s quality, such as developers, 
quality assurance, control staff, and independent evaluators (ISO/IEC 25010, 
2011). 
a) Designing the evaluation in more detail: 
 
Complimentary evaluation method 
 
Purpose The purpose of this evaluation method, is to complement the main 
evaluation method, by performing a high-level assessment of the 
developed software against the requirements posed by the international 
standard “ISO/IEC 25010:2011 - Systems and software engineering — 
Systems and software Quality Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) 
— System and software quality models”. This evaluation method aims 
to assess the quality of the developed software (artefact), by utilizing an 
internationally renowned software quality standard. 
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Evaluation method 
 
Participant observation (researcher). 
Evaluation method 
details 
 
The developed software’s features/characteristics will be compared by 
the researcher against the ISO/IEC 25010 Software Quality Model 
requirements. According to the standard, software quality is assessed 
over two broad dimensions, “product quality” and “quality in use”. 
“Product quality” relates to the static and dynamic properties of the 
software, and includes assessment of eight, distinct, characteristics, 
whereas “quality in use” evaluates the outcome of human interaction 
with the software, and includes the assessment of five, distinct, 
characteristics. 
 
Participants 
 
Researcher. 
Roles and 
responsibilities 
 
Researcher will compare the features/characteristics of the developed 
software against the requirements of the standard and document the 
results. 
 
Timeframe 
 
09/12/2019 – 13/12/2019 
Prerequisites 
 
Access to the text and provisions of the ISO/IEC 25010:2011 standard. 
Assumptions 
 
The various characteristics will be assessed on a high level of detail 
(overview, low degree of granularity). 
 
Expected outcome 
 
A table describing how the developed software satisfies (or not) the 
various requirements/provisions of the standard. 
 
Data analysis 
method of results 
 
One-to-one comparison of characteristics and qualitative interpretation 
of results. 
 
Table L1. Second evaluation method details 
 
b) Results and analysis 
As previously indicated, this is a complementary, qualitative, evaluation method, 
and therefore the various software characteristics were evaluated, by the 
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researcher, on a high, non-exhaustive, overview, level. The following table 
summarizes the evaluation results: 
 
Quality in use 
 
Characteristics Sub-characteristics 
 
IRDA software 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
 
The software developed met its specified goal, 
which was to create a manual, private, incident 
reporting platform, with specific characteristics, 
which can encourage incident reporting by users 
and organizations. Users can view and submit 
incidents and communicate in an anonymous 
fashion, without losing any of the benefits offered 
by other reporting solutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efficiency 
 
Although a decentralized solution is undoubtfully 
slower than a centralized one, the number of both 
users and expected incidents for every platform 
instance are considerably low, to expect any 
major efficiency/performance issues. The choice 
of a private blockchain implementation along with 
a suitable consensus algorithm (PoA/IBFT) also 
ensured that transactions are processed in a 
light-weight manner. The first evaluation method 
also indicated that there is no evidence to 
suggest that the level of IRDA’s performance and 
efficiency is significantly different than that of 
other platforms. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Satisfaction 
Usefulness 
 
Participants who tried IRDA expressed their 
satisfaction with the software, successfully 
completed all test cases, and positively evaluated 
the various software features. 
 
Trust 
 
Based on the success of the test cases 
performed by all participants (including the 
researcher), it is expected that the software will 
behave as intended. 
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Pleasure 
 
Participants did not express any dissatisfaction 
while utilizing the various features of the 
software. 
Comfort 
 
Participants did not express any physical 
discomfort while using the software. 
 
 
 
Freedom from 
risk 
Economic risk 
 
IRDA is considerably less expensive to operate 
than any other commercial alternatives. 
Furthermore, due to its anonymity features, the 
economic risk associated with potential concerns 
(i.e. economic risk associated with organizational 
reputation concerns) is mitigated. 
 
Health & safety risk 
 
No health and safety risks applicable to users 
were identified. 
Environmental risk 
 
No environmental risk was identified. The choice 
of a private blockchain implementation, along 
with a suitable algorithm (PoA/IBFT), also 
ensured that transactions are more 
environmentally friendly than open blockchain 
implementations utilizing ‘traditional’ algorithms 
(such as PoW) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Context 
coverage 
Context 
completeness 
 
IRDA can be easily used by non-expert or non-
technical users, using widely available equipment 
(personal computers, laptops, mobile devices), 
with a limited set of prerequisites (i.e. having an 
Ethereum wallet and a Web3.0 capable browser). 
IRDA can operate in low network bandwidth 
conditions, although it cannot operate offline (i.e. 
a complete lack of internet connectivity would not 
allow users to view/submit incidents, chat etc). 
  
Flexibility 
 
Although the software currently operates in a 
particular BaaS environment (Microsoft Azure), it 
could easily be transferred to any other cloud 
provider (such as AWS for example), or even 
operate in a local environment. If, at some point 
in the future, further platform functionality is 
required, new smart contracts could be deployed 
(with associated front-end modifications). 
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Product quality 
 
Characteristics Sub-
characteristics 
 
IRDA software 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Functional 
suitability 
Completeness 
 
The software satisfies all stated and implied 
needs and objectives, as those were set in 
Chapters four (Objectives) and five (Design & 
Implementation) of this report. 
 
Correctness 
 
The various test cases performed, indicated that 
the software provides the correct/expected 
results, with the needed degree of precision. 
 
Appropriateness 
 
The software’s functions facilitate the 
accomplishment of specified tasks and 
objectives; the various functions are simple and 
easy to understand and use (by end users of the 
platform) and exclude any unnecessary steps. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
efficiency 
Time-behaviour 
 
Although no tests regarding the software’s 
processing times and throughput rates were 
executed, the 100 transactions per second 
allowed by Quorum (and independently verified 
by other researchers, such as Baliga et al, 2018) 
are considered adequate for the platform’s initial 
purposes. 
 
Resource utilization 
 
No specific tests have been performed. However, 
according to Azure’s platform statistics, with the 
selected implementation, the blockchain nodes 
run at a max CPU usage of 2.5%, with a memory 
usage of around 35%. If needed in the future 
(e.g. if significantly more users/incidents join/are 
recorded), additional resources can be 
purchased. 
 
Capacity 
 
Again, no specific tests have been performed. 
However - and as also mentioned above – the 
numbers of virtual machines and blockchain 
nodes on Azure can be increased at any time, to 
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accommodate demand in users/bandwidth/ 
storage. 
 
 
 
 
 
Compatibility 
Co-existence 
 
The software is implemented on a BaaS platform 
and therefore its use should not have any 
detrimental impact, on any other service/product 
currently present in the local operational 
environment of the users. 
 
Interoperability 
 
The software’s front-end can smoothly 
invoke/receive/interpret communication with the 
blockchain, through designated smart contracts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Usability 
Appropriateness 
recognisability 
 
Participants did not express any concerns related 
to the appropriateness of the software, for 
incident reporting purposes. They successfully 
performed all test cases and positively evaluated 
the software, during the first evaluation activity. 
 
Learnability 
 
Participants did not express any concerns related 
to difficulties in learning to use the software and 
its features. They were provided with product/test 
instructions, they successfully performed all test 
cases, and then positively evaluated the 
software, during the first evaluation activity.  
 
Operability 
 
Participants did not express any concerns related 
to operating the software and using its features.  
 
User error protection 
 
The most serious error a user can make on the 
platform, is submitting an incident (through the 
relevant form) with inaccurate, wrong or missing 
content. Firstly, the software does not allow 
reports with empty content on the ‘required’ form 
fields. Secondly, when the user completes the 
form and clicks on the “Preview & submit” button, 
a warning message appears to the user, calling 
him/her to carefully review the incident before 
clicking the “submit” button, as the incident is not 
editable once it is submitted. 
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User interface 
aesthetics 
 
Participants did not express any concerns related 
to the aesthetics of the user interface. The GUI is 
simple and intuitive, and no excessive graphics 
were applied. 
 
Accessibility 
 
The software can be accessed by any device with 
internet connectivity, an Ethereum wallet, and a 
Web3.0 capable browser. Where possible, users 
with disabilities can take advantage of their 
device/browser’s disability features (such as 
zoom, contrast, text-to-speech etc) to browse 
content.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reliability 
Maturity 
 
Although no specific tests (other than the test 
cases) have been performed, the software seems 
to be reliable under normal operation 
circumstances. 
 
Availability 
 
100% blockchain availability is warranted; 
Quorum nodes ensure that actual content 
(incidents) is always available. However, since 
the front-end components were not stored in a 
decentralized fashion, their availability is limited 
to 99.9% (according to researcher’s hosting 
provider). 
 
Fault tolerance 
 
Hardware or software faults in a particular node 
do not hinder the platform’s operational status, as 
remaining nodes can handle operations. 
 
Recoverability 
 
In the event of an interruption or failure of a node, 
remaining nodes handle operations. When the 
failed node recovers/returns, the other blockchain 
nodes aid in updating its state accordingly. 
 
 
 
 
 
Security 
Confidentiality 
 
Only pre-authorized users have access to the 
platform. Multi-factor authentication ensures that 
stolen platform credentials, on their own, do not 
grant access to the platform. Encryption ensures 
that data is protected in all of its states (at rest, in 
transit, in use). 
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Integrity 
 
Due to blockchain’s inherent characteristics, data 
(incidents) submitted on the platform cannot, in 
any way, be modified. 
 
Non-repudiation 
 
Due to blockchain’s inherent characteristics, data 
(incidents) submitted on the platform cannot, in 
any way, be repudiated. 
 
Accountability 
 
Although users of the platform can submit 
incidents and communicate in an anonymous 
fashion, between each other, the platform’s 
administrator can detect the originator of an 
incident submission. This allows the administrator 
to take appropriate action, should malicious 
behaviour be detected. However, the 
administrator cannot control/track content in the 
chat function, which is truly anonymous for every 
participant. 
 
Authenticity 
 
The authenticity of a participant is initially 
ensured through the offline screening of a 
registration application, before being granted 
access to the platform. Approved users have their 
public key white-listed as a first authentication 
measure. Authenticity is also enhanced by 
utilizing two-factor authentication procedures 
(email/password combination, OTP via SMS). 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintainability 
Modularity 
 
The platform is built of discrete components (both 
backend and frontend), which provide adequate 
modularity. The platform could change GUI, other 
frontend properties and complete operating 
environment, without requiring major 
modifications. 
 
Reusability 
 
The principle of code reusability has been utilized 
throughout the development of the platform. 
Code snippets and smart contracts could be 
reused for any other similar project. 
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Analyzability 
 
Well-commented source code allows 
implementing potential changes with due care 
and due diligence. 
 
Modifiability 
 
The software can be effectively and efficiently 
modified in the future, according to specific 
needs, without introducing defects or degrading 
its quality. 
 
Testability 
 
Adequate test criteria can be defined for the 
platform. A number of functional test cases have 
already been executed by the participants (users 
& researcher), while non-functional tests can be 
scheduled and performed in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Portability 
Adaptability 
 
The platform is highly adaptable. In case of 
increased usage, more nodes, storage and 
memory could easily be added. The platform 
could also be moved entirely to a new cloud 
provider or be locally installed. In addition, 
although the platform has not been optimized for 
mobile use, this can be done at some point in the 
future. 
 
Installability 
 
As already mentioned, the platform can be 
moved/installed entirely to a new cloud provider 
or be locally installed. Regarding users, apart 
from having an Ethereum wallet and a Web 3.0- 
compatible browser, they do not need to execute 
any other local installations, since the platform 
supports web-based access.  
 
Replaceability 
 
Users of the decentralized platform can, at any 
point, cease using the platform, and utilize any 
other platform or mechanism, without worrying 
about any “lock-in” risk. Incidents on the platform 
are submitted and presented in a standardized 
format (utilizing ISO/IEC 27035:2016 reporting 
template with eCSIRT.net mkVI” taxonomy), and 
users can import these in any other software. 
Table L2. Second evaluation method results 
